Faculty of Graduate Studies
Ph.D. Program in the Social Sciences

Thwarting Settler Colonial Policies through Urban Self-Development: The Case of Shu'fat Refugee Camp in Jerusalem

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

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

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

Dr. Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian

Dedication

To My Mother and Father,

May their Souls Repose in Peace

Acknowledgements

My PhD study was made possible by the financial and academic support of both Birzeit University and NORAD's "Urban Transformations in the Southern Levant Project." I would like to thank both of them for their generous support and encouragement during my study years. I have also benefitted from a generous financial grant by The International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (IJURR) that facilitated my fieldwork for this study.

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Abstract

Over the past two decades, the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, four kilometers northeast of Jerusalem, witnessed profound transformations due to significant urban self-development in the camp area. The most significant changes took place as a direct result of Israel's "center of life policy" in Jerusalem after 1995. Building on the critique (Englert 2020, Barakat 2018) of settler colonialism as formulated by Patrick Wolfe (2006, 2012) and Lorenzo Veracini (2007), the thesis explores the question if and how urban self-development by Shu'fat Camp residents could subvert Israel's settler colonial policies. It analyzes forms of power that indigenous people possess to enable them to resist their marginalization and make changes in their lives. The thesis relies on Lila Abu Lughod's (1990) analysis of power and resistance and Asef Bayat's (2013) concept of "social non-movements," to define characteristics of agency and tools of power in the hands of the camp residents. Urban self-development, as a reaction to Israel's "center of life policy", led to an expansion of the camp boundaries and a substantial increase in the population of the camp area. Also, these actions of the camp residents achieved significant political results by thwarting Israel's demographic policies in Jerusalem and preventing the implementation of Israel's plans of settlement continuity in the area, at least for the time being. The thesis tries to fill several gaps in the literature on settler colonialism. It chose indigenous resistance as its main focus, presenting the camp residents as people of agency, rather than simply as victims of settler colonial policies. The thesis is based on qualitative research, using participant observation and semi-structured interviews with camp residents during the period between January 2017 and November 2020. This approach made it possible to develop a trajectory of transformations from villagers to refugees in the Old City of Jerusalem, and then in Shu'fat camp, to workers in the Israeli labor market, and finally to construction developers.

Keywords: *Settler colonialism, power, resistance, urban self-developments, Shu'fat Refugee Camp, Jerusalem, "center of life policy."*

الملخّص

شهد مخيّم شعفاط للاجئين، الواقع على بعد أربعة كيلومترات شمال شرق مدينة القدس، تحوّلات عميقة خلال العقدين الماضيين نتيجة للتطورات الذاتيّة الحضريّة الكبيرة في منطقة المخيّم. حصل التغيّر الأكثر أهميّة كنتيجة مباشرة لتطبيق اسرائيل "سياسة مركز الحياة" في القدس بعد العام 1995. بناء على الدراسات النقديّة (Englert 2020, Barakat 2018) لمنظور الاستعمار الاستيطاني كما صاغه باتريك وولف (2006, 2012) ولورينزو فيراشيني (2007)، تبحث هذه الأطروحة كيف ساهمت أعمال التطوير الذاتي الحضري لسكّان مخيّم شعفاط في إحباط السياسات الاستعماريّة الاستيطانيّة الاسرائيليّة. تحديدا، تبحث الدراسة في أشكال القوّة التي تمتلكها الشعوب الأصلانيّة لتمكّنها من مقاومة تهميشها وإحداث التغيير في حياتها. تعتمد الدراسة على تحليل ليلى أبو لغد (1990) لعلاقات القوّة والمقاومة، ومفهوم آصف بيات (2013) لـ "اللا-حركات الاجتماعيّة" لتحديد خصائص وأدوات القوّة في أيدي سكّان المخيّم. أدّت التطوّرات الذاتيّة الحضريّة، والتي اعتمدها سكّان المخيّم كردّ فعل لـ "سياسة مركز الحياة" الاسرائيليّة، إلى توسيع حدود المخيّم والزيادة الكبيرة في عدد سكّانه. علاوة على ذلك، أدّت هذه التطوّرات إلى نتائج سياسيّة أهمّها احباط السياسات الاسرائيليّة الديمغرافيّة في القدس ومنع تنفيذ مخطط اسرائيلي لخلق تواصل استيطاني في المنطقة، على الأقل في الوقت الحالي. تحاول الأطروحة ملء عدد من الفجوات في الأدبيّات السابقة حول الاستعمار الاستيطاني، وذلك بالتركيز على مقاومة الشعب الأصلاني بتقديم سكّان المخيّم كفاعلين وليسوا مجرّد ضحايا للسياسات الاسرائيليّة الاستعماريّة. تمّت كتابة الأطروحة كبحث كيفي يعتمد على الملاحظة بالمشاركة والمقابلات شبه المنظّمة مع سكّان المخيّم خلال الفترة الواقعة ما بين كانون الثاني من العام 2017 وتشرين الثاني من العام 2020. وقد أتاح هذا المنهج امكانيّة تتبّع مسار التحوّلات التي عاشها سكّان المخيّم من قرويّين لاجئين في البلدة القديمة في القدس ولاحقا في مخيّم شعفاط، إلى عمّال في سوق العمل الاسرائيلي، وأخيرا إلى مطوّري بناء.

الكلمات المفتاحيّة: الاستعمار الاستيطاني، القوّة، المقاومة، التطوّرات الذاتيّة الحضريّة ، مخيّم شعفاط للاجئين، القدس، "سياسة مركز الحياة".

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Abbreviations

American Friends Service Committee	AFSC
Applied Research Institute	ARIJ
Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry	ACCI
Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem	CCPRJ
Declaration of Principles	DoP
Graduate Institute of Development Studies at the University of Geneva	IUED
Gross Domestic Production	GDP
Identity Card	ID
International Committee of the Red Cross	ICRC
Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights	JCSER
Jewish National Fund	JNF
Jordanian Dinar	JD
League of the Red Cross Societies	LRCS
Occupied Palestinian Territory	OPT
Palestine Liberation Organization	PLO
Palestinian Authority	PA
Palestinian Observatory of Israeli Colonization Activities	POICA
United Nations General Assembly	UNGA
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
United Nations Relief and Works Agency	UNRWA
West Bank and Gaza Strip	WBGS
Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp	WCSHC

CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction: Why Shu'fat Refugee Camp?!

Figure 1.1: Overview of Shu'fat Refugee Camp – view from 'Anata village. Source: Author, August 6, 2019.

1.1. Introduction

From 1987 until 2007, I commuted between my home in the village of 'Anata[1] and Jerusalem on a daily basis, while I studied and then worked in the city. I was struck by the clearly visible urban and demographic changes taking place in Shu'fat Refugee Camp, which is located between 'Anata and Jerusalem. The camp that absorbed refugees as well as poor Jerusalemites having lived in houses of no more than one or two floors presently has a new skyline of high-rise buildings. They began to rise at a slow pace in the late nineties, and intensified after the completion of the separation wall around the camp in 2006. At a time when Shu'fat Camp was being turned into a heavily urbanized area, Israel tightened its siege, surrounding it with the separation wall and building a military checkpoint at the western entrance, towards Jerusalem. This siege separated the camp from Jerusalem and suffocated its residents. Residents thus, have only one heavily controlled military checkpoint, through which they can reach Jerusalem, where many of them work. The Shu'fat Camp has thus been left neither inside nor outside of Jerusalem.

[1] 'Anata village, about five kilometers northeast of the Old City of Jerusalem, is located outside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries.

This led to my first questions: What has happened in the camp and what are the reasons for this striking change?

Although not completely separate from the surrounding villages of ‘Anata and Shu’fat and from the city of Jerusalem, Shu’fat Refugee Camp has always been different from its surrounding Palestinian neighbourhoods in terms of over-crowdedness, segregation, and the limited space that does not allow room for expansion, or even the performance of daily practices. Moreover, the camp refugees are unique in their special status as refugees, as they live in temporary space under poor conditions and are entitled to humanitarian assistance. The Shu’fat Refugee Camp, like camps all over the world, is characterized by the diversity of its people. They come from different backgrounds and areas unlike the surrounding villages, whose residents generally have more a homogeneous background. New urban construction activities transformed the Shu’fat Camp into a destination for Jerusalemites, seeking affordable housing within the city limits. Meanwhile, these developments made the camp’s population more heterogeneous and made the temporary nature of the camp ever more questionable.

Representing two central issues in the Palestinian cause - refugees and Jerusalem – the Shu’fat Refugee Camp is situated within a wider historical, political and geopolitical context. The continual implementation of the Zionist project in Palestine divided Palestinians into distinct groups, with each group enjoying a different legal status, depending on where they live. The first group includes Palestinians that remained in the Palestinian areas occupied by Israel in 1948. They hold Israeli citizenship. The second group consists of Palestinians in the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip (WBGS)[2]; and yet another group consists of the Palestinians of Jerusalem. There are also the Palestinians in the diaspora. Although our concern in this study is the Jerusalem area and Palestinian Jerusalemites, we cannot study them in isolation from the rest of the Palestinian people.

1.1.1. Zionist colonial procedures and the Palestinian struggle

The complicated legal situation in Palestine, which will be discussed further in the following pages, made it difficult to determine the best approach to use in conceptualizing colonial processes and Palestinian resistance in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. This requires us to review the Zionist colonial workings and Palestinian struggle from the beginning of the Zionist project in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. There is also a need to present the international humanitarian and human rights context within which Israel was established in 1948. This brief review will help in understanding the specificity of Israeli colonization of Palestine compared to older colonialist situations in the world in addition to helping us to understand the importance of the ongoing Palestinian struggle and its international impact.

There is a common thread, linking the continual Jewish and Israeli actions of land dispossession and oppression of Palestinians since the start of Jewish migration to Palestine in the late nineteenth century. Although the scope of the Zionist project was still concealed from Palestinians at that time, it was received with suspicion by Palestinians as Jewish migration to Palestine intensified. These suspicions were revealed in a letter Yousef Diyaa Khalidi (1846-1906), a Palestinian politician and Jerusalem Mayor in the late nineteenth century, sent to French

[2] The term West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) is also referred to in this thesis as the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).

Rabbi Tzadok Kahn in 1899 to be passed to Theodor Herzl, demanding that the Jews let Palestine and its people live in peace (Ya'qub 2016; Gribetz 2018; Khalidi 2020). In his letter, Khalidi warned of the consequences of Jewish plans in Palestine and confirmed that the Palestinians would not stay silent and allow the Jews to become the lords of the land (Ya'qub 2016; Khalidi 2020). Khalidi thus understood early that the Jews were specifically targeting the Palestinian land. He also asked the Zionists to relinquish "geographical Zionism," connecting Zion and Palestine (Ya'qub 2016; Khalidi 2020). His introduction of the term "geographical Zionism" reveals Khalidi's awareness of the Jewish intention to seize Palestinian land.

Yousef Khalidi's efforts were continued after his death in 1906 by his relative Rauhi Khalidi. In a newspaper interview in 1909, Khalidi warned of the implication of Jewish migration and settlement activities in Palestine, stating that they would lead to the expulsion of Palestinians from their country in future (Kullab 2007; Gribetz 2018). Rauhi Khalidi is the author of a 110-page manuscript on the history of the Zionist movement under the title "Zionism," written in the year 1912 (Kullab 2007). This manuscript also reveals the early worries of Palestinians regarding the danger of the Zionist movement (Kullab 2007; Gribetz 2018). Palestinian fears were not confirmed until the Balfour Declaration in 1917, when a new era of struggle against the Zionist project began that included Palestinians from all social classes (Sayegh 1965, 39-46). This shows a high level of awareness of the dangers of Jewish immigration to Palestine and confirms that Palestinians were not just onlookers or passive recipients of Zionist goals. After 1917, the Palestinian struggle became more serious, including violent resistance at the popular level and non-violent diplomatic struggle of Palestinian political elites (for further details, see Sa'ad 1985 and Al-Hurani 2003).

1.1.2. International context of the establishment of Israel

The 1948 war or the *Nakba* of the Palestinian people was part and parcel of the Zionist project. In 1948, Israel was established in Palestine on the ruins of about 450 Palestinian towns and villages that were destroyed leaving two thirds of the Palestinian population ethnically cleansed from their villages and land (Kana'na 2000, 88),[3] instantly transforming them into refugees and internally displaced people. Most of the Palestinian refugees were villagers, living on the production of the land they were cultivating. As a result of their expulsion and ensuing landlessness they were left in disarray and without a source of income.[4]

The establishment of Israel in 1948 coincided with significant changes at the international level, following the Second World War (WWII). The post-WWII era witnessed the rise of human rights discourse and consciousness that called for decolonization with the adoption of several international treaties and covenants, advocating for the protection of the rights of states, populations and individuals. This was initiated with the UN Charter of 1945[5] and included articles protecting the sovereignty of states. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[6]

[3] Kana'na was not the first to describe the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948 as ethnic cleansing. Before him, Palestinian scholar Walid Khalidi suggested that the 1948 war of the Palestinian *Nakba* was a planned ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in his article "Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine" (1988). The idea was adopted later on by Nur Masalha in his *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (1992).

[4] Most scholars agree that the main reason for the Palestinians to leave their living places was fear. The Jewish paramilitary troops committed massacres to terrorize the Palestinians and force them out of their homes. According to Ilan Pappe, Jewish paramilitary groups committed at least 31 massacres, starting "with the massacre in Tirat Haifa on 11 December 1947 and ending with Khirbat Illin in the Hebron area on 19 January 1949" (Pappe 2006, 258). However, the massacre of Deir Yassin village, west of Jerusalem, which took place on April 9, 1948, was a principal reason for the exodus of Palestinians, according to several scholars, as the news of the massacre spread immediately "all over Palestine by radio" (Tamari 2002, 100).

[5] UN Charter, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.

[6] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.

was adopted, ensuring protection of individual human rights. The Fourth Geneva Convention,[7] adopted in 1949, guarantees humanitarian protection of civilians during armed conflicts. Then in 1966 came the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[8] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).[9] Both covenants recognize the right of all people to self-determination. By the time these two covenants entered into effect in 1976 all Arab countries had freed themselves of colonialism, whilst Israel was tightening its colonization of Palestine. These conventions and many others at the international level overwhelmed the entire world with a discourse of human and legal rights of populations. Palestinian resistance activities and their calls for independence and liberation were received with the sympathy and support of the countries of the world in general, especially as Israel's policies of ethnic cleansing came in defiance of this overwhelming discourse. Thus, the Zionist project was not smoothly implemented in Palestine as it faced several impediments, preventing its final accomplishment. The Zionist policies of expulsion and ethnic cleansing could not completely eliminate the Palestinians. Large numbers of Palestinians survived, and remained in their land, struggling, resisting, and calling for the right to their homeland. These calls were supported by the international community, thus providing international legitimacy to the Palestinian resistance and struggle against the Zionist colonial project.

[7] Fourth Geneva Convention, available at: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf.
[8] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf.
[9] International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx.

1.1.3. Legal status of Palestinians

The Zionist project that witnessed the establishment of Israel in 1948 was based on occupying Palestinian land, claiming its ownership, and trying to remove Palestinians with the goal of replacing them. The demographic balance has since served as the tool, directing Israeli policies and strategies. Approximately two thirds of the Palestinian population were forced out of their homes and lands in 1948 and have become refugees inside and outside of Palestine. The Palestinians who remained in the occupied part of Palestine were granted Israeli citizenship whilst Israel persisted in the achievement of its settlement and expansion project on Palestinian land. Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (WBGS) in 1967 including Jerusalem, tightening its measures of dispossession, exploitation, and racism; however, in 1967, Israel could not expel as many Palestinians as it had in 1948. Approximately 320,000 Palestinians were reported expelled or forced to flee in the wake of the 1967 war, whilst 1.3 million Palestinians remained *in situ* (Masalha 1999, 64-65), including 70,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem and its surrounding villages (Farsakh 2009, 384). The large number of Palestinians in the newly occupied territory was viewed as a threat to Israel's demographic goals; therefore, Israel had to deal differently with this population. Immediately after the war, Israel issued three proclamations, announcing that its Military Command had assumed executive, judicial and legislative powers in the WBGS, excluding the city of Jerusalem (Shehada 1996, 7). With Military Proclamation No. (2), Israel implemented laws that were effective in the area prior to June 7, 1967 in the WBGS, whilst in Jerusalem, Israeli law was implemented.

The status quo was maintained until the early nineties. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP)[10] between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, Israel's military authorities in the WBGS were retained. Article (XVII.4.b) of the DoP stipulates that, "the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial, and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law." Thus, the legal status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) did not change much after the signing of the Oslo Accords with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This means that the PA's assumption of limited powers in the OPT did not end Israel's occupation of the territory. Meanwhile, Israel's disengagement plan and dismantling of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005[11] also did not end the Israeli occupation, which took a different nature with Israel maintaining functions in the strip, including control of all borders and crossings. Addendum A, 3 (1) of the plan stipulates that "Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea of the coast off the Gaza Strip."[12]

Meanwhile, the legal status of Jerusalem developed differently under Israeli occupation since 1967. In violation of international law[13], Israel announced in 1967 the annexation of Jerusalem,

[10] Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on September 13, 1993, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/ Declaration+of+Principles.htm.
[11] Israeli Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, 6 June 2004, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Di sengagement+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm.
[12] Addendum A-Revised Disengagement Plan-Main Principles: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209909/. For further details on the legal status of the Palestinian Territory under Israeli occupation, the annexation of Jerusalem, and Israeli obligations in the OPT, see Halima Abu Haneya, 2011.
[13] International law does not recognize forcible annexation of occupied territory by the occupying entity. For example, Article (2), Paragraph (4) of the UN Charter stipulates that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Forcible annexation of occupied territory was also dismissed in the UNGA resolutions No. (2628) on November 4, 1970, No. (2799) on December 13, 1971, and No. (2949) on December 8, 1972.

and it has worked hard since that time to emphasize its full sovereignty over the Holy City, thus distinguishing it from the rest of the OPT. This annexation was also confirmed in the Israeli Basic Law, adopted on July 30, 1980. Israel refused to implement any international law provisions rejecting this annexation. In 1990, Israel rejected the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSC) No. (672) on October 12, 1990, and No. (673) on October 24, 1990,[14] that East Jerusalem was under a belligerent occupation. Israel insisted that the state of belligerency does not apply to Jerusalem as it was under its sovereignty. In a later resolution the same year, the UNSC expressed its grave concern over this rejection and urged Israel "to accept the *de jure* applicability of the Geneva Convention of 1949, to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and to abide scrupulously by provisions of the convention."[15] Consequently, with this annexation of Jerusalem, whilst imposing military rule on the rest of the OPT, we find a complicated situation of colonial rule. Israel applies two distinct laws on the occupied Palestinians – military laws in the WBGS and the Israeli law in Jerusalem. Israel also applies two different laws in the WBGS. Whereas military laws apply to Palestinians in the WBGS, Jewish settlers there are subject to Israeli law (including the Gaza Strip until 2005).

1.2. Literature review and general framework: Settler colonialism

This section is an introduction to the main analytical framework of this research – settler colonialism. Later chapters will contain further analytical frameworks and theoretical paradigms, such as Lila Abu Lughod's (1990) analysis of power and resistance, Asef Bayat's (2013) concept of "social non-movements", and David Harvey's (2006) concept of "accumulation by

[14] These two resolutions of the UNSC were adopted in the wake of the October 8, 1990 shooting by Israeli policemen of 17 Palestinians in East Jerusalem, (Source: Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/MIDEAST.BOU-04.htm, seen on September 10, 2020).
[15] UNSC Resolution No. (681) on December 20, 1990.

dispossession," [16] that I will not discuss at this point. I will move now to discuss settler colonialism as the main analytical framework of this study.

Shu'fat Refugee Camp is part of Jerusalem that is an "annexed" territory, occupied in 1967, and most of its population consists of Palestinians expelled from their towns and villages in 1948. In the past few decades an increasing number of scholars have used the settler colonialism paradigm to explain the nature of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. As of the nineties, the settler colonialist model has served as the dominant perspective on the situation in Palestine especially with the rediscovery of texts written in the sixties by Fayez Sayegh (1965) and Maxime Rodinson (1968/1973)[17]. Since the nineties a plethora of work on settler colonialism has been produced by a number of scholars that became key references in this field. In addition to Sayegh and Rodinson, in the nineties Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini's work was published. Their work on settler colonialism culminated in the creation of the online Settler Colonial Studies Journal in 2010 by a collective based in Melbourne, including Veracini and Edward Cavanagh.[18]

Settler colonialism emerged as a critique of the limitations of post-colonial theory, which is concerned with the continual impact of colonial rule on decolonized countries (Carey & Silverstein 2020, 2). Settler colonialism refers to the colonizers, who stayed in the colonized land and accentuated their settlement and displacement of indigenous lands and people. The significant amount of scholarly work in this field distinguishes between settler colonialism and

[16] Further elaboration on the analyses of these frameworks will be presented in chapters three and six of this thesis.
[17] Maxime Rodinson first wrote his *Israel, fait colonial? Les Temps Moderne* in French in 1968. His work was then translated into English as *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* It was published in 1973.
[18] Journal of Settler Colonial Studies blog: https://settlercolonialstudies.blog.

the classical form. Unlike classical colonialism, based on economic dominance and the extraction of wealth from the colonized land and exploitation of the colonized population (see Rodney 1972), settler colonialism aims to dispossess the land and replace the indigenous people. However, exploitation of the indigenous people in labor is not absent in all cases of settler colonialism (including the case of Israel as will be discussed later in this chapter), but it is not the target. Land is the target.

Many analysts and theoreticians of settler colonialism, starting with Patrick Wolfe (1999, 2006), agree that settler colonialism is based on two principal issues: dispossession of land and elimination of indigenous people. Fayez Sayegh (1965), although he did not use the term, analyzed precisely what Zionist settler colonialism did to Palestinians when arguing that Zionist colonialism is a "combined form of forcible dispossession of the indigenous population, their expulsion from their own country, the implantation of an alien sovereignty on their soil, and the speedy importation of hordes of aliens to occupy the land thus emptied of its rightful inhabitants," (Sayegh 1965, V). In this, Sayegh, writing in Arabic, preceded all the main scholars in the field, including Maxime Rodinson (1968/1973)[19], who was one of the first scholars to analyze Israel as a settler colonial regime, discussing the nature of colonialism and the features of development of the Israeli regime. Rodinson (1973, 91) concluded that the establishment of Israel in Palestinian land goes in line with the American and European expansion goals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for settlement purposes or for dominating people economically and politically.

[19] *Supra* note (17).

Sayegh also preceded Patrick Wolfe (2006) in considering that this type of colonialism is based on the logic of elimination, adding the ideas of segregation, exclusion and racial supremacy that characterize the Zionist ideology (Sayegh 1965, 22). His work provided us with an analytical tool to interpret Israel's measures against Palestinians in Jerusalem that is based on racial separation and exclusion.

Wolfe (2006, 388) summarized the concept of settler colonialism by stating that "settler colonizers come to stay." Moreover; the continuity nature of settler colonialism made Wolfe (2006, 390) consider it as "a structure rather than an event." The permanent stay in colonized land is what distinguishes settler colonialism from any other type. Colonial states may target the colonized people or the country's land and resources for their interests, but settler colonialism primarily targets the land for the colonizers to settle on and claim ownership. An important aspect of Wolfe's project is his dismantling the colonial logic of settlers who consider themselves as occupying empty land proven to have been inhabited by indigenous people (Wolfe 1999, 26 & 2016, 237). Settler colonialism requires erasing the memory, culture and history of the indigenous peoples and even erasing their bodies and existence from the land because "(s)ettler colonialism destroys to replace" (Wolfe 2006, 388) and is "a sustained institutional tendency to supplant the indigenous population" (Wolfe 2012, 134). This is clear in Israel's demographic plans in Jerusalem. Since the occupation of Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has been targeting the presence of Palestinian Jerusalemites in their city by implementing discriminatory policies against them (see for example Shargai 2010).

During the past several decades there has been an increasing amount of literature, describing Israel as a settler colonial project (see Hilal 1976; Massad 2006; Veracini 2007). Settler colonialism seems to be the best interpretative paradigm. It takes into account the specifics in Palestine, creating an Israeli version of settler colonialism vs. other settler colonial models in various parts of the world over the course of history. The continual resistance of the indigenous Palestinian people is a main factor in thwarting this project and preventing its completion. This resistance is manifested in different forms: violent and non-violent. The focus in this research will be on the unorganized non-violent collective resistance of Palestinians against Israel's settler colonial discriminatory policies.

I will thus be using the settler colonial approach, which makes it possible to infer general propositions regarding the complex nature of Israeli colonial control and Palestinian resistance. Settler colonialism forms an important analytical framework to understand Israel's colonial workings in Jerusalem in an attempt to transform it into a settler colonial city[20] based on dispossession of land and the elimination (displacement), exclusion and marginalization of indigenous people. The settler colonial framework helps us in analyzing Israel's policies and strategies in Jerusalem that aim to promote Israel's annexation, Judaization and control of the city, whilst at the same time dominating its Palestinian citizens. Special focus will be given in this study to the way in which the Shu'fat refugees contributed to thwarting Israel's settler colonial policies in the city through urban construction, providing an affordable housing

[20] The settler colonial city is distinguished with the "dynamic of displacement and replacement ……. Its significance for the positioning, control, and regulation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous bodies within city and surrounding environments …… The settler colonial city was a site where the appropriation of indigenous land was coupled with aggressive allotment and property speculation, …" (Edmunds 2017, 7).

alternative for Palestinian Jerusalemites, protecting them against displacement and elimination from their city.

Consequently, this study looks into the practices and actions of ordinary indigenous people that challenge the dominating settler colonial authority which seeks to lock them into certain conditions and circumstances to ensure subjugation and control. These conditions and circumstances are based on policies of separation, exclusion and geopolitical goals. The situation in Jerusalem and Shu'fat Camp is not isolated from the general Zionist settler colonial project in Palestine and cannot be understood outside of it; however, it has gained its own particularity.

This study argues that Israeli strategies and policies in Jerusalem, specifically the "center of life policy" that will receive more focus in later chapters in this research, acted counterproductively and caused the latest urban and socio-economic developments in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Israel's policies in Jerusalem since 1967 have been governed by its demographic plans to ensure a Jewish majority in the city (Yiftachel and Yacobi 2006, 273). However, Israel's plans so far have been countered by Jerusalemites who continue to reproduce their space and presence in their city.

1.2.1. Jerusalem an exemplar of settler colonialism:

Review of Israel's geopolitical policy in Jerusalem

Map 1.1: The changing map of Jerusalem. Source: (UN Habitat. 2015, 4): http://unhabitat.org/books/right-to-develop-planning-palestinian-communities-in-east-jerusalem/ (Accessed May 20, 2020).

During the British Mandate era in Palestine, several master plans for Jerusalem were presented. The first plan was presented in 1918 and the last in 1944. All of these plans were intended to keep the eastern part of the city as open space, with spatial development focused in the north-western and south-western areas (UN-Habitat 2015, 68). As of 1948, the boundaries of Jerusalem changed several times to serve Israel's demographic goals (See Map 1.1 above). In 1948, Israel divided Jerusalem into western and eastern sections by occupying the western section. In the wake of the occupation of the rest of the Palestinian territory in 1967, Israel annexed the eastern section of the city in breach of international law[21]. Upon annexation, Israel granted Palestinian Jerusalemites special identity cards, differentiating them from the rest of Palestinians in the WBGS as part of its policy to separate Jerusalem from the rest of the OPT. Nonetheless, since

[21] See previous section above.

1967, Israel's main goal was to achieve full control by Judaizing the city. To achieve this, it implemented discriminatory planning and housing policies against Palestinian Jerusalemites. For example, Israel enhanced settlement construction for Jews, whilst restricting Palestinian construction in the city (Wari 2011, 460; Dumper 2014, 86; See also Chiodelli 2012a & 2012b).[22]

Israel's oppressive measures and policies against Palestinian Jerusalemites continued and in time, began to assume different dimensions. With the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993, Israel started implementing new conditions on the ground in Jerusalem with the goal of thwarting any possible settlement with the Palestinians on the city. Meanwhile, Israel continued promoting its demographic plans in favour of Jews (Shargai 2010, 6).

One of Israel's means of achieving its demographic plan in Jerusalem during the post-Oslo period was the "center of life policy." This policy, which does not apply to Jews (Badil 2006, 30) was first adopted based on a high court ruling in 1988. The Israeli Ministry of Interior began its implementation only in 1995 as Israel escalated its measures against Jerusalemites following the signing of the Oslo Accords (Jefferis 2012, 94). However, the "center of life policy" proved counterproductive to Israel's plans (Karmi 2005, 11). As part of Israel's demographic goal in the city, this policy originally aimed to exclude Palestinian Jerusalemites who live outside the city's municipal boundaries, by revoking their identity cards. However, these Jerusalemites who did not want to lose privileges, associated with these IDs (including free access to and work opportunities in Israel) decided to return to live within the city's municipal boundaries to

[22] In the eastern part of Jerusalem, only 13% of land is allocated for Palestinian construction, much of which is already built up, while 35% has been allocated for illegal Israeli settlements, (source: OCHA website: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/record-number-demolitions-including-self-demolitions-east-jerusalem-april-2019).

maintain their residency status. The Shu'fat Refugee Camp was an affordable option for them (Karmi 2005, 11). Candice Graff (2014, 13) notes that thousands of the returning Jerusalemites, who could not afford to live in expensive Jerusalem neighborhoods, sought to live in the Shu'fat Camp despite its dire conditions including chaos, crowdedness, and lack of services.[23] As a result, the population of the camp nearly doubled and included non-refugee Jerusalemites. According to UNRWA estimations in 2015, the number of registered camp refugees consisted of 12,500 people, whilst the actual number of camp inhabitants reached 24,000 (UNRWA 2015, 1).

Israel's policies were also enhanced in 2002 with the construction of the separation wall. The wall played a significant role in separating Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian Territory, expanded Jerusalem boundaries to include the surrounding Jewish settlements and separated more Palestinians from Jerusalem. People, who were separated included Jerusalemites with Jerusalem IDs and living in spaces within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, such as Kufr Aqab, Shu'fat Refugee Camp, Dahyat a-Salam and al-Walajeh. Thus, the wall has been a vital tool to try and draw new boundaries for the city (see Kimhi 2006).

In 2013, Jonathan Rokem stated that the construction of the separation wall made life harder for the people, who live on the West Bank side and depend on Jerusalem in their work and general daily life. He added that this situation resulted in mass migration of Palestinians from the West Bank into the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. This situation "changed the demographical balance, increasing the Palestinian percentage in Jerusalem. Ironically, this contradicts keeping a Jewish majority in the city, the main priority of Israel's planning policy in the past 46 years" (Rokem 2013, 6). This confirms the role of Palestinian Jerusalemites in thwarting Israel's

[23] Further discussion of the "center of life policy" will be presented in the coming chapters.

demographic plans for Jerusalem and supports the main argument of this thesis that Israeli policies in Jerusalem have proven counterproductive. Palestinian Jerusalemites, who were outside of their city, acted against the Israeli will and instead of being excluded from their city, were able to return and maintain their presence.

Other scholars also emphasized the fact that Israel's discriminatory policies in Jerusalem are destined to fail. Nazmi Jubeh in 2015 noted that despite the expulsion policies that Israel is implementing against the Palestinian Jerusalemites, "they now constitute nearly forty percent of the population of what is called "united Jerusalem," when they had numbered under twenty percent in 1967. This important demographic fact will be one of the major factors in determining the future of the city" (Jubeh 2015, 24).

1.2.2. Critique of the exclusive settler colonial model for Israel in Palestine:

Review of the political economy of Jerusalem

Israel's policies of separation and exclusion are not without impact on the political economy of Jerusalem, which cannot be understood in isolation from the political economy of the OPT in general. The Palestinian economy is a dependent economy in the sense that it is subordinated to the Israeli economy and is dominated by the policies and strategies of Israel (see Naqib 1997; Hever 2010). Since its occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967, Israel allowed limited prosperity of the Palestinian economy in its own interest as a means to suppress resistance against its occupation (Naqib 1997, 19; Hever 2010, 9). Leila Farsakh (2009) attributed Palestinian economic troubles to the Israeli measures to strengthen Palestinian dependency on Israel. Several policies were adopted by Israel to hamper the Palestinian economy and ensure it is

kept dependent on the Israeli economy. These include controlling the natural resources of water and land in the WBGS (Naqib 1997, 21-22) and preventing Palestinians from running serious industrial or financial institutions (Arnon et al. 1997, 80; see also Roy 2016). The Israeli economic policies in the WBGS and exploitation of Palestinians converted the OPT into a consumer market for Israeli products (Abu Sada 2009, 415; see also Naqib 1997).

Yusif Sayigh (1986) defined several areas in which the Palestinian economy is dependent on the Israeli economy, including trade, labour, finance and infrastructure services. He argued the dependency of the Palestinian economy over the years has caused pauperization despite the "outward appearances of prosperity or Israeli claims of economic well-being" (Sayigh 1986, 46).[24] Thus the Israeli labour market became an alternative for Palestinian workers to gain a source of living.

Palestinian labour in the Israeli market is one manifestation of the economic dependency of the OPT on the Israeli economy. Israel has exploited Palestinian workers since the sixties. With the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Jews tried to depend on themselves without resorting to Palestinian labour. They managed to some extent, particularly in the field of agriculture (Ellman and Laacher 2003, 11). In the mid-sixties, with the increasing rate of Jewish migration to Palestine and the accompanying need for more housing, Israel needed Palestinian workers in the construction industry. This constituted the main reason for Israel to end its military rule in 1966

[24] See also Sara Roy, 2016, for the concept of de-development of the Palestinians. Although Roy developed the concept to analyze the economic situation in the Gaza Strip, it can also be applied to the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem, regardless of the fact that they are slightly better off.

of Palestinian towns and villages in areas it had occupied in 1948, to facilitate movement of Palestinian workers (Sabbagh 1990, 36).

In the wake of the 1967 war, the Israeli market began receiving Palestinian workers from the WBGS. By 1974, approximately 70,000 Palestinian workers, comprising about one third of the Palestinian workforce, were employed in the Israeli labour market. About 10,000 West Bank workers were estimated to have been employed in manual jobs in the Jewish sector of Jerusalem in 1980 (Romann and Wingrod 1991). Thus the growth of the Palestinian economy was limited to the extent that it helps Palestinians to survive without burdening the Israeli economy. Palestinians in the OPT are not Israeli citizens and so they are not entitled to any social benefits from Israel that can burden the Israeli economy. Ziad Abu-'Amr in analyzing the economic situation in the Gaza Strip, which is not much different from that of the West Bank under Israeli occupation, wrote, "In the best of circumstances, the Arab economy is permitted to develop only so long as its development does not compete or interfere with Israeli interests and broader objectives, or place a fiscal or economic burden on the Israeli system," (Abu-'Amr 1993, 116).

The negative impact of this dependency is emphasized with the deterioration of the Palestinian economy after Israel imposed restrictions on entry of Palestinian workers to Israel in the wake of the First *Intifada* of 1987-1993. During this period Israel started imposing closures on the OPT, preventing Palestinians from reaching their places of work in Israel in what was called a "form of collective punishment against the Palestinian population," (Grinberg 2014, 229). This closure procedure was accompanied with the Israeli issuance of magnetic identity cards for workers. These IDs were used as a means of control to suppress any participation of workers in *Intifada*

activities. Workers proven to have taken part in the *Intifada*, would not be granted a magnetic card and so, they would lose their work in Israel (Grinberg 2014, 222). These measures led to a drop in the OPT economy. David Fielding (2000) estimated a 10.1 percent drop in the Gross Domestic Production (GDP) in the OPT in 1987, 1.1 percent drop in 1988 and 6.2 percent drop in 1989 (Fielding 2000, 3).[25] In the early nineties, Israel began implementing the entry permit policy and imposed several conditions on those individuals that are allowed to work in Israel. The permit policy further limited the number of Palestinians allowed into Israel and thus contributed to increasing rates of unemployment amongst the Palestinians. Israel cited security issues to justify its oppressive permit policy against the Palestinians. However, according to Yael Berda (2018), Israel's permit policy is far from security logics and is only meant to dominate the Palestinians' everyday life (Berda 2018, 12). Israel's permit system is also one of the policies, used in a settler colonial context, with the goal of tightening control of the colonized population, under a security pretext. Berda wrote, "(T)he management of the Palestinian population in Israel has served as a laboratory for policies and technologies restricting mobility, particularly to police social inequalities," (Berda 2018, 9). The permit policy can be added to other policies that Israel is using to control and exploit the Palestinians.[26] The number of permits, granted to Palestinian workers, continued to drop in the early nineties not only for security purposes, but also as a result of Israel's implementation of a separation policy. In 1992, Israel issued 115,000 work permits for

[25] Investment and industrialization has always been limited in the OPT since 1967, and so the *Intifada* did not have a big impact on this already weak sector (See Razin and Sadka 1993).

[26] Berda (2018) based her analysis of the Israeli permit policy on three interrelated components of space, race and documents. The three elements represent tools in the hand of the Israeli occupation authorities to control the daily lives of the Palestinians with the help of the implementation of emergency laws, inherited from the British Mandate, the classification of the population based on place of living and management of the space by imposing closures, checkpoints, and bypass roads. A report by Badil Institute has seen the Israeli permit policy "as a mechanism of enforcing other displacement policies, such as discriminatory zoning and planning policies, denial of residency, land confiscation and access of land and to natural resources," (Badil 2015, 9).

Palestinians of the OPT, and in 1994, the number of permits dropped drastically to 65,000 permits (Ellman and Laacher 2003, 11).

With the closure policies and limiting the number of Palestinian workers into Israel during the years of the *Intifada*, Jewish employers, whose work was affected, started searching for alternatives. They sought cheap non-Jewish labour from the Far East, Thailand, Latin America and Eastern Europe. Foreign workers entered the different economic fields in Israel. In fact, foreign workers had joined the Israeli market since the 1980s, but in very small numbers. However, with the eruption of the First *Intifada* which limited the number of Palestinian workers, foreign workers were imported in large numbers (Hever 2012, 125; Ellman and Laacher 2003, 11). Importing foreign workers then increased dramatically with the eruption of the Second *Intifada* in the year 2000, which was more violent than the First *Intifada* of 1987-1993, and the increased Jewish suspicion of the Palestinians, making them hesitant to employ them. This suspicion not only led to excluding Palestinians of the OPT from employment, but also to dismissing about 10,000 Palestinian workers from the northern areas of Nazareth, ʻAkka and the Galilee villages. Palestinians were replaced by foreigners to work in the fields of construction, agriculture and other sectors (Ellman and Laacher 2003, 12). For Jewish employers, a foreign worker costs them less than Palestinian workers. At a time the Palestinian worker costs the employer $30 for 10 hours, a Chinese workers costs him only $10 for 10 hours (Ibid). Nonetheless, Israel is not concerned with having a settled non-Jewish workforce, given its goal of maintaining the Jewish nature of the country. Unlike the foreign workers, Palestinians have homes and families to get back to every day of the week, whether in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, whilst the foreign workers cannot return home within a short period of time. For this

reason in addition to the increasing unemployment rates amongst Israelis, resentment against foreign workers grew in Israel, leading to restrictions on foreign labour migration to a maximum stay of two years with no civil rights (Ibid, 40). However, large numbers of foreign migrants have chosen to remain in Israel illegally. In 1991, about 14,700 undocumented migrants were reported as working illegally in Israel. In 2003, out of 300,000 foreign workers in Israel, 200,000 are illegal migrant workers (Ibid, 20).

By 2012, the Israeli market absorbed a very limited number of Palestinian workers from the WBGS. In 2012, Shir Hever stated that 32% of the West Bank workforce and 57% of the Gaza workforce were employed in Israel before the eruption of the First *Intifada,* whilst in 2012 the percentage dropped to only 12.6% of the West Bank and 0% of the Gaza workforce are employed in Israel. "This makes a total of 81,000 Palestinian workers who work for Israeli employers, none of them are from Gaza, compared with 202,000 labor immigrants who are currently estimated to be working in the Israeli economy" (Hever 2012, 126).

The Oslo Accords of the nineties played a significant role in reframing the foundations of the political economy of the occupation instead of dismantling it (Farsakh 2009, 391-392). The Oslo Accords tightened Israel's grip over the Palestinian economy, leading to further deterioration. Although the primary goal of the 1994 Protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris was to settle economic issues between Israel and the Palestinians, it in fact extended Israel's grip over customs and trade (Hever 2010, 12). Since this agreement, Israel has been responsible for collecting customs for Palestinian imports on behalf of the PA. Israel holds these revenues whenever it wishes to pressure the PA to accept its political dictates. Also, since the Paris

Protocol, Israel has dictated trade policies Palestinians should follow in accordance with its interests. Grinberg stated that the Paris Protocol allowed Israel to direct Palestinian trade policy in accordance with the interests of Israeli manufacturers and importers, ignoring the interests of their Palestinian counterparts, (Grinberg 2014, 239-240).

The economic situation in the Palestinian part of Jerusalem, including the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, is not much different in its dependency on the Israeli economy. However, the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem in the wake of the 1967 war created a discrepancy between Jerusalem and the rest of the OPT that was placed under military rule (Shtern 2018, 7). Palestinian Jerusalemites in general suffered from discrimination at all levels. Despite the annexation of the eastern part of Jerusalem, Israel discriminated in treatment between the Jewish and Palestinian populated areas in terms of services offered, planning policies, etc. Although Israel has been calling for the unification of the western and eastern parts of Jerusalem since 1967, its policies of separation are stronger than its goal of unification. Since 1967, Jerusalem witnessed two distinct socio-economic conditions between the western and eastern parts of the city (Hever 2010, 107). The Palestinian part of Jerusalem suffered from neglect by Israeli authorities in the basic infrastructure at all levels: education, health, transportation, water, and sewage systems (Shtern 2018, 7). Moreover; the discriminatory planning policy against the Palestinian Jerusalemites created a sharp housing crisis in Jerusalem that led to massive unlicensed construction in the city and the migration of tens of thousands of Jerusalemites from the city to the surrounding areas in search of a better housing (See Chiodelli 2012b).

Economically, Jerusalemites have free access to the Israeli labour market. Nonetheless, they were exploited by Jewish employers, who offered them lower wages compared to Jewish workers. Palestinians were also hired for low-rank unskilled or manual jobs such as construction work and related professions, including floor-laying and pipe installation (Hever 2010, 119-121). Mostly they worked in the construction of Jewish settlements in the eastern part of Jerusalem during the 1970s and 1980s as this period witnessed high rates of settlement construction. In 1980, it was estimated that 8,600 Palestinian Jerusalemites, comprising 40 percent of the Palestinian Jerusalemite workforce, were employed in manual jobs and other low-status jobs in the Jewish sector of Jerusalem (Romann and Wingrod 1991, 104-105; Shtern 2018, 7). Employment of Palestinian Jerusalemites in white-collar jobs in the Jewish sector was rare, which forced educated Jerusalemites to seek suitable work in the OPT or even in Arab countries (Romann and Wingrod 1991, 30; Shtern 2018, 7).

Movement of Palestinian Jerusalemites into Israel was not affected by Israeli policies and measures imposed on the movement of the Palestinians of the WBGS, including the checkpoints and permit policies. Nonetheless, these policies negatively impacted Palestinian shop owners in Jerusalem, particularly those in the Old City and Salahiddin Street (the main commercial complexes in the eastern part of Jerusalem), as the number of West Bank customers dramatically decreased. This forced many Jerusalemite merchants to relocate their shops or open new ones outside Jerusalem. One example is Mr. Ibrahim, who closed his shoe store in the Old City of Jerusalem and opened a new one on ‘Anata Road in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp.[27]

[27] Author’s interview with Mr. Ibrahim, owner of a shop, selling shoes on ‘Anata Road, Shu’fat Refugee Camp, on February 17, 2019.

1.2.3. Exploitative settler colonial regime in Palestine

Despite the colonial-like exploitative nature of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, settler colonialism heavily imposes itself with the continual construction of Jewish only settlements and bypass roads on Palestinian land in the OPT and Jerusalem (the Gaza Strip up until 2005). In 2015, Rudoren and Ashkenas[28] documented settlement expansion as common across Israeli governments over time. In light of Benjamin Netanyahu's promises of permanent settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem, settlements have grown significantly during Netanyahu's administration to more than 650,000 units in the West Bank and Jerusalem; however; the growth rate of settlements under Netanyahu was only slightly higher than other administrations. Specifically, under Barak, the settlement construction rate was actually higher (Rudoren and Ashkenas 2015). The Jewish settlement boom in the Palestinian Territory since 1967 and Netanyahu's promises of permanent settlement only emphasize the nature of the Israeli rule of Palestine, a settler colonial regime.

The establishment of Jewish settlements on Palestinian land is both a manifestation of Israel's exploitation of the Palestinians and dispossession of their land. The Israeli policy of settlement construction on dispossessed Palestinian land and absorption of the Palestinian labour force, in the Israeli markets since 1967 are not separate events. Before joining the Israeli labour market, these workers were mostly farmers "*fellahin*", working in their land. Israel intended to prevent the development of any viable agricultural projects for Palestinians by restricting the movement of people and goods through checkpoints and roadblocks. These obstacles forced Palestinian

[28] Rudoren, Jodi and Jeremy Ashkenas. 2015. "Netanyahu and the Settlements: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's settlement policy resembles his predecessors' in many ways, but it is a march toward permanence in a time when prospects for peace are few." New York Times, Magazine world, (March 12, 2015): http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/12/world/middleeast/netanyahu-west-bank-settlements-israel-election.html?_r=0 (Accessed September 24, 2020).

farmers to leave work on their land and seek an alternative source of income (see Abu Sa'da 2009). In fact, the relatively high wages in the Israeli labour market convinced many Palestinian farmers to leave their land and seek work in Israel. This provided Israel with a better opportunity to confiscate more Palestinian land for settlement purposes (Budeiri 1982, 62). For this reason, Israel applied an Ottoman Land Law from 1858, allowing it to confiscate land that remains uncultivated for three consecutive years (Gordon 2008, 128-131).

Discussing the changes in the economic structure of the WBGS under Israeli occupation in 1982, M. K. Budeiri stated that the Israeli policy of expropriation of Palestinian land for settlement purposes turned Palestinian peasants from the WBGS into cheap labour in the Israeli economy. This has weakened the peasant's links to his land and encouraged migration of the peasants from their villages to Jordan and other countries or to seek work in the Israeli market (Budeiri 1982, 62). This shows how the absorption of Palestinian labour in the Israeli market has been utilized as a means to achieve settler colonial goals of dispossession of land. This means that Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian land served as a bridge between the colonial policies of exploitation of land, resources, and people and the settler colonial policies of dispossession, expulsion and elimination. Jewish settlements have tightened Israeli control of the OPT and Palestinian economy, and at the same time they encroached on Palestinian land, thus expelling Palestinians, and limiting the space left for them to live in.

Israel's failure to erase the Palestinians completely has hindered the accomplishment of its settler colonial project. Moreover, the work of Palestinians in the Israeli labour market has contradicted the settler colonialist logic, introducing a classical colonial element to the project. Lorenzo

Veracini (2011) argued for distinguishing between colonialism and settler colonialism. He wrote, "(I)f I come and say: 'you work for me', it's not the same as saying 'you, go away'. This is why colonialism is not settler colonialism: both colonisers and settler colonisers move across space, and both establish their ascendancy in specific locales. While significant, the similarities end there," (Veracini 2011, 1). The distinction here is quite clear. Colonialism lives on exploitation, whilst settler colonialism lives on elimination. In the case of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, both elements exist. Israel tells the Palestinians: work for me, in order to leave your land for me. Israel eliminated as many Palestinians as it could and found itself forced to exploit the others that remained. It could not complete the erasure of the Palestinians, who succeeded in resisting the elimination policy and survived.

Critical discussions have emerged on the theory of settler colonialism (see for example Snelgrove et al. 2014; Kauanui 2016; Barakat 2017). Several scholars criticized the pure settler colonial approach for focusing on Australia, North America and Canada and ignoring the settler colonial situation in Africa which was not focused on the elimination of the indigenous people, but rather on exploiting them (Kelley 2017, 269; Englert 2020, 19), and ignoring the situation in Latin America, where settlement in the northern part focused on dispossession of land and elimination of people, whilst in the southern part the focus was on extraction of resources and controlling labour of the indigenous population (Speed 2017, 784). This, according to these scholars, limited the scope of settler colonialism approach of Wolfe and Veracini.

Moreover, the critiques of the settler colonial approach also questioned whether these studies can help us analyze and understand decolonization as they do not take into consideration the issue of

agency, i.e. the political and economic activities of the indigenous people (Snelgrove et al. 2014). They also question the extent of success and failure of the settler colonial regimes (Barakat 2017). They criticize that the mainstream settler colonial approach departs from a settler point of view, confirming that the two main features – dispossession of land by the settler and the elimination of the indigenous people (Wolfe 2006; Veracini 2010, 2013) reproduce power relations by ignoring agency and insurgency of indigenous people (see Snelgrove et.al. 2014; Barakat 2017). Thus it is of importance "to include indigenous resistance as central in continuously limiting, redirecting, and frustrating settler attempts to dispossess, exploit, and/or eliminate" (Englert 2020, 1649). This is precisely the contribution of this study both theoretically and empirically through the case study of Shu'fat Refugee Camp. The Shu'fat refugees used urban construction as a form of resistance and power to overcome hardships under a settler colonial regime as will be discussed in later chapters.

Building on this issue, this thesis presents settler colonialism through a new and unique model, different from the USA, Canada, Australia, and perhaps any other part of the world. It is a model that does not discard the colonial exploitative aspect, but rather uses it for settler colonial purposes, particularly for the dispossession of land. Consequently, it is a mixed non-pure model that can add to the diversity of the different cases of settler colonialism in the world. Settler colonialism expands the logic of colonialism, but is characterized by remaining in the land, which necessitates the erasure of the indigenous people. However, in the case of Palestine, Palestinian agency and resistance acts have always foiled the Israeli settler colonial project and sabotaged its accomplishment. The Gaza Strip represents a significant example in foiling the Zionist project. The militarized resistance succeeded in ending the physical presence of the

Israeli military forces and settlements. Israel was forced to withdraw its military forces and dismantle its settlements in the Strip in 2005 although it maintained its hegemony by other means including controlling the borders. The Shu'fat Refugee Camp in Jerusalem presents another example of the importance of the Palestinian agency and resistance in countering Israel's settler colonial policies, although it is not militarized as is the case in Gaza.

1.2.4. Shu'fat Refugee Camp: A profile in settler colonial practices and resistance

1.2.4.a. Research Aims and Questions

By examining the Shu'fat Refugee Camp as a case study, this thesis addresses the settler colonial paradoxes that arise within the prolonged Israeli occupation of Palestine. First, the research aims to show that settler colonialism can be challenged not only by providing an accurate historical narrative from the Palestinian point of view, but also by bringing to light agency, every-day actions and mechanisms of power practiced by the indigenous people to maintain their presence on their land and thwart Israel's plans. Second, with a specific look at the Shu'fat Camp, I want to contribute to and further develop the concept of settler colonialism by introducing a model based on both elimination and exploitation that distinguish the Zionist settler colonial project in Palestine.

Using an anthropological approach helped me to explore the lived realities of Shu'fat refugees, including their perceptions, behaviour and motivations. In particular, I tried to illustrate how Shu'fat residents made sense of the significant rapid urban and socio-economic transformations[29] in the past decades.

[29] For the purpose of this research, I define socio-economic transformation as the parallel social and economic change in a society that indicates a change in people's behaviour, needs and demands. In this research it refers to the

My aim throughout is to explore people's manner in coping with, and perhaps overcoming their precariousness under a settler colonial regime. I will describe their special kind of insurgency against exclusion, exploitation and oppression in the quest for an effective response to settler colonial rule. Consequently, my research is led by two principal questions:

- How did Shu'fat Camp residents try to subvert Israel's settler colonial policies for demographic change in Jerusalem by land acquisition and urban construction?
- What kind of power do indigenous people possess to enable them to make changes in their lives?

The answers of these two questions will be brought about whilst dealing with another three minor questions:

- What are the processes of socio-economic differentiation that have taken place in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp since its establishment in the mid-sixties?
- What are the pathways by which Shu'fat refugees entered into the real estate market in the camp?
- How have the post-1995 developments in Jerusalem impacted the Shu'fat Refugee Camp socioeconomically?

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change in the economic resources in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp that led to significant change in the social behavior and needs of the camp residents. This is revealed in development of services of education, health and infrastructure in the camp, especially after 1995. Researching and analyzing these factors and changes help us to find out how the political economy in Shu'fat has developed.

1.2.4.b. Description of the study area: the Shu'fat Refugee Camp



Map 1.2: Location of Shu'fat refugee camp northeast of Jerusalem. Source: Mohammed Muhsen, 2019.

Location and area

The Shu'fat Refugee Camp is located on the outskirts of Jerusalem, about four kilometers northeast of the Old City of Jerusalem. It was built in 1965 on a piece of land rented by UNRWA on a 99-year lease. It initially covered about 203 dunums of land, to accommodate 500 refugee families, who had been gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem having been expelled from their towns and villages in the 1948 war. In time, the area of the Shu'fat Camp expanded to include the surrounding land in the hills of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada, northwest and south of the camp respectively. Today the total area of the Shu'fat Camp reaches 535 dunums of land and the name Shu'fat Refugee Camp is used to indicate the entire area of camp's expansion. The Shu'fat Camp is surrounded from the north by Pisgat Ze'ev and Neve Yaakov settlements, from the east by 'Anata village, from the south by the French Hill settlement and the 'Issaweya village, and from the west by Shu'fat village.

Population

The original number of camp refugees in 1965 was estimated at 1,500 refugees and by 1967 it reached 3,300 refugees. Today the population of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and its area of expansion count more than 24,000 people, with about 14,700 registered refugees. The camp population is a mixture of refugees, non-refugee Jerusalemites and West Bankers. The refugees are concentrated within the original UNRWA camp boundaries, whilst the non-refugees occupy the buildings in the camp's area of expansion in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills. However, some non-refugee families bought or rented UNRWA houses within the original boundaries of the camp.

Economy

The camp area is deemed one of the heaviest commercial centers on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Industry in the camp area is rare; however, the commercial sector is strong and diversified. It is managed mainly by non-refugee outsiders, especially merchants from different West Bank areas.

The characteristics of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and its area of expansion will receive more focus in the coming chapters. In chapter two, I will focus more on the history of the establishment of the Shu'fat Camp and the origins of its refugees.

1.2.4.c Thinking of Shu'fat Camp as a field of study

In a visit to relatives that own a ready-mixed concrete factory in 'Anata, I learnt that they supply concrete for new construction in the camp. We had a casual conversation on this new change and

its causes. They told me that the "*Thawala*", refugees originally from Beit Thul,[30] encroached on land which originally belonged to *Shu'fati* people, from Shu'fat village[31] and started building on it. In Arabic, they used the words "*hajamu*" (attacked or invaded) and "*dakhalu*" (entered) to describe what occurred to the land of *Shu'fati* people. However, the term does not indicate whether this "entering" of the land was legal, through the purchase of land or illegal, by simply occupying and using it. This land is located in Ras Shehada and Ras Khamis hills, clearly outside the original UNRWA boundaries of the camp and bordering it from the south and north-west, respectively. I wondered if it is possible that anyone can simply appropriate land, assume its ownership and use it, and further why the owners of the land are silent to this encroachment given the fact that it was openly illegal. I also asked myself why Israel was silent in the face of the unlicensed construction on this land! These questions and many others remained in my mind without reasonable answers. Some people argue that the use of the land by the refugees was important simply to protect the land against expropriation for Jewish settlement purposes, especially as this land is close to Jewish settlements that surround the camp. Other people disagree with this interpretation and believe that those, who took the land, were collaborators with the Israeli authorities simply because Israeli authorities did not demolish the newly constructed buildings. There are many contradictory opinions and views.

How, then, can we understand and interpret these developments of mass construction by the refugees and the influx of returning Jerusalemites into these buildings? Is it resistance against the Israeli occupation or collaboration with it? I had many questions without clear answers. One thing however seemed quite clear: Shu'fat Camp represents a kind of deformed and chaotic

[30] Beit Thul village is one of the western Jerusalem villages that were destroyed in 1948.
[31] Shu'fat village is located west of Shu'fat camp and three kilometers north of the Old City of Jerusalem.

urbanization with the absence of necessary infrastructure, proper planning, environmental considerations, and even the most basic safety measures for its residents.

When I embarked on my PhD at Birzeit University and I had to decide the subject of my dissertation, the transformations in Shu'fat Camp were fresh in my mind. I described the problem of the camp to my supervisor and conveyed to her the inquiries in my mind. She agreed with me that the issue is worth investigation and documentation. Thus my investigative journey of the developments in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp soon began.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Start of fieldwork

In order to establish a basis for analysis of the socio-economic developments in Shu'fat Refugee Camp and explore people's everyday actions and dynamics to cope up with their precariousness, I needed to collect relevant data, concerning the population, the residences and businesses in the camp. However, the lack of written academic material on the camp and the scarcity of available data required me to select a methodology that can help discover what is really going on for the purpose of answering the study questions. The most flexible and useful methodological approach in this case is an inductive approach. Following an inductive approach, I began collecting data in order to explore the situation in the Shu'fat Camp to see where the collected data can help drive the research. This approach helped me generate data by several means: personal observations, informal discussions, participant observations as well as semi-structured interviews. The fieldwork began as early as January 2017, whilst I was preparing for the research proposal and

has not stopped along with the research process; however, intensive fieldwork took place during the period between June 2018 and June 2019.

1.3.2. Author's personal observations and informal conversations

Figure 1.2: Main entrance to the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, January 13, 2019.

I initiated the first phase of intensive fieldwork in June 2018 with certain questions in my mind: What kind of businesses are there in the camp? Who are the owners? Where are they from? When did they start the businesses? How or where did they get the capital? What did they do before? I also needed data regarding construction developers in the camp. Who are they? When did they enter the construction sector? And what did they do prior to that? Moreover, I needed to examine how economic developments influenced the daily social life of the individuals themselves and their lifestyle.

My first visit to the camp for intensive fieldwork for the purpose of the research took place on Saturday, June 30, 2018. The primary purpose was to interview one of the ex-members of the Popular Committee in the camp. On the one hand, I needed to listen to the history of the camp

from its people and on the other hand, I wanted to see if the Popular Committee could provide me with any form of material including surveys, statistics, maps or photos concerning the camp and its residents.

The two-minute drive from ʻAnata village to Shu'fat Camp took nearly half an hour. The headquarters of the Popular Committee are located in the center of the camp. The density of the population of the camp and its surroundings are revealed in the heavy traffic jams in the camp streets and the main ʻAnata Road. There are no parking lots. The camp's narrow streets and the main ʻAnata Road have in turn become parking lots for cars. In general, the worst traffic jams are observed in the camp on the weekends, Fridays and Saturdays, as most people do not leave for their work outside the camp and their cars are kept parked on the roadside for the entire day. Moreover, all the buildings along the ʻAnata Road are built quite close to the roadside, providing no space for a sidewalk or a footpath. This situation forces pedestrians to walk in the middle of the road. Children also play in the streets and cross from side to side with total disregard for the moving cars, which indicates the absence of a playground for children in the camp and further jams the streets.

The first thing that attracts your attention when entering the camp is the light blue and white colours of the UNRWA headquarters on the right side along the main road, leading to the center of the camp. In fact, the first things you encounter in the Shu'fat Camp are the camp institutions on the right and left: UNRWA main headquarters and its health center, the Child Center, the Youth Social Center, the Popular Committee headquarters, the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp and Massira School, run under its auspices as well as the main mosque. Then there are UNRWA

schools to the west of the mosque, all occupying the northern part of the camp, creating a sort of public space. Interestingly this space is called by all the center of the camp even though it is actually not at all the center of the camp and its dwellings.

Finally, I arrived at the Popular Committee headquarters and was welcomed by my interviewee. He narrated the story of the camp from the perspective of the refugees themselves. His narration corresponded to a large extent with available literature regarding the establishment of the camp. However, he added new information I had not found in the existing literature.

In the 1960s the refugees found themselves in very dire conditions in their new location. According to his narrative, the conditions in the new location were worse than those in the Old City of Jerusalem, where they had been living. He considered the poor conditions in the new location of the camp to be a result of the small-sized houses, no available electricity and only public latrines, and insufficient amount of water for the residents. This information was also later confirmed during further interviews with camp refugees. I sensed in their narrations that they missed city life and disliked being isolated from the city in such a 'deserted' location. When I asked one woman about how she felt when she first arrived in the camp, she sadly replied, "It was 'village-like', unlike the Old City, where everything is around you -- shops, people and Al Aqsa. A kind of 'exile' far from everything"[32]

Apart from the history of the camp, I wanted to understand the social and economic dynamics of the new developments in the wake of the construction surge with high rise buildings in the Ras

[32] Interview with Um Jihad (nickname), originally from Hebron City, at her home in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp on January 31, 2019.

Khamis and Ras Shehada hills. These areas absorbed tens of thousands of Jerusalemites who returned to live within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem with the goal of maintaining their residency status in the city. I carried out additional visits to the camp during the summer of 2018, with the aim of conducting a general survey of the existing businesses and population structure. On July 10, 2018, I surveyed the center of the camp. The next two days, July 11-12, 2018, I surveyed the stores along ʻAnata Road. In all, I entered about sixty businesses. I spoke to shop owners to gather general information and had informal conversations with them. Further information about the commercial sector in the Shu'fat Camp and its area of expansion will be provided in the next chapters.

Through informal conversations and short interviews with the camp residents, I was also able to gather initial data about construction developers, who embarked on the construction boom in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills. I discovered that the evolving construction sector is mainly sponsored by about ten Palestinian refugees, all of whom are from the Shu'fat Camp. More information on this group of refugee construction developers will be provided in later chapters of this study.

These initial observations were not sufficient to provide for a socio-economic analysis of the camp and its surrounding areas, but did give me a general idea of the complexities of the socio-economic situation in the camp and suggested the need for further in-depth interviews with the residents, shop owners and construction developers for more personal stories.

One of the problems I faced during my initial fieldwork was people's fear of speaking. Although some people and store owners appeared willing to speak with me, others were more hesitant. "I am worried my words would turn into an accusation against me," the owner of a grocery shop on 'Anata Road said. In fact, he was not the only one to express his worries about my intentions, although I did not ask for names. As their work is informal and their shops are not licensed, they want to avoid any possible, undesirable consequences if they were to reveal any specific information about their work. They avoided disclosing any information on their initial capital, profits, or even how long they have been working. Their main concern was avoiding taxation by the Israeli authorities, or being asked to officially register their businesses with the Israeli institutions, which yields high fees.

1.3.3. Participant observation

The worries of the shop owners made me hesitate to conduct further interviews with the camp residents, particularly as I am aware of the sensitivity of the situation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites, and their mistrust of outsiders; they are often worried that any word they say might be used against them as mentioned earlier. Therefore, I decided to adopt another strategy, by which I could get closer to the camp residents and earn their trust before I began conducting further interviews. For this, I contacted the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp to conduct participant observation. We agreed that I would spend a three-month period of participant observation from October to December 2018. During these three months, I visited the center two days a week and spent there several hours each day. I took part in the center's activities and recorded in detail my observations. My main aim was to become familiar with the center's staff and the women, benefiting from its activities. The center offers training services for the camp's

women refugees on different handicrafts. It also includes a gym, secondary school for girls, kindergarten and nursery.[33] During these three months of participant observation, I took part in the accessory-making and sewing courses with the other women in the camp. I was able to get closer to all in the women's center, including the administrative team, the working staff, the trainers and trainees, who then were able to facilitate my interviews by reaching out to camp residents for these interviews.

1.3.4. Semi-structured interviews[34]

Apart from short interviews I conducted in 2017, whilst I was preparing the research proposal, I started the first intensive stage of interviews with the camp residents with the help of the women in the center in 2018. In addition to many informal conversations during my stay in the Women's Center, I seized every possible opportunity for interviews and continued conducting interviews after I completed the participant observation period, benefitting from the relations that I established with the camp's women. I prepared myself for conducting the interviews and guided narrations. I also planned a general framework for the interviews containing information I needed to gain from interviewees. There was a focus on life stories. I established a series of open questions to allow the interviewees to bring as much information as possible. I recorded many of the interviews after obtaining the permission of the interviewees. However, some of them refused the recording and I then resorted to taking notes of their narrative. I made transcriptions of the interviews, partly based on records and partly on my own account.

[33] More details about the Women's Center – Shu'fat Refugee Camp appear in later chapters of this study.
[34] Here I refer to the interviews, which I planned upon a defined framework of topics with open questions.

In the first round, I conducted 19 anonymous semi-structured and narrative interviews during the period between October 2018 and the end of January 2019. The interviews focused on life stories of refugees, mainly older persons who had witnessed the 1948 war, the establishment of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp in 1965 and the 1967 war. I wanted to understand the living conditions of the refugees, first in the Old City of Jerusalem and then in the current location of the Shu'fat Camp to understand the changes that took place in their life in the camp. I achieved this goal by following up the story of their expulsion from their original villages and towns, their life in the Old City of Jerusalem between 1948 and 1965, and the socio-economic changes they experienced up until today. The data obtained helped me draw up the historical background of the Shu'fat Camp and its refugees.

I collected data on the history of the establishment of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and the conditions of the people that were moved there. This information was related to the gathering of people in the Old City of Jerusalem after the 1948 *Nakba* until they were moved to the new location of the camp in 1965. I discovered that a significant number of these individuals, who were moved to the new location in Shu'fat, were not actually refugees, nor were they expelled from their villages and towns by the war. Mostly, they were originally poor migrants from Hebron; they became refugees only after UNRWA moved them from the Old City of Jerusalem and emplaced them in the newly built Shu'fat Camp in the mid-sixties. Upon their movement to the new location in the Shu'fat Camp, they were granted UNRWA refugee cards (more on the history of the camp refugees will be discussed in the next chapter).

I conducted a second phase of interviews during the period between March and June 2019. This time I focused on camp institutions, including UNRWA, the Shu'fat Camp Services Committee, commonly referred to as the Popular Committee[35] and the Youth Social Center, mostly referred to by the camp refugees as *Nadi* or "Club,"[36] in addition to four interviews with refugees who became construction developers in the camp. All these interviews aimed to understand the situation in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and understand its people and their mechanisms for overcoming their precariat situation, as well as understanding how the socio-economic transformation took place in the camp. I also made visits to several Jerusalem institutions and conducted interviews there. I visited the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI)[37] in Ar-Ram to gain a comprehensive picture of the businesses in the camp and its area. I also visited the Maps Department of the Arab Studies Society[38] and the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (CCPRJ) [39] in Dahyet el-Barid to gather relevant maps and data for my research. In all, I conducted 14 interviews.

My fieldwork did not stop at that point and continued until the very last minutes of writing, including additional literature review, interviews and informal conversations. Whenever necessary, I returned to people previously interviewed for additional explanations or further details, mostly on the phone. During the first phase of COVID-19 lockdown, I conducted two

[35] The Popular Committees are local committees established in all the Palestinian refugee camps upon Palestinian cabinet decision in 1996.The Popular Committees in the Palestinian camps serve the refugees under the umbrella of the PLO Department of Refugees Affairs, (*Source: Official website of the PLO Refugee Department*). Further details on the Popular Committee in Shu'fat Refugee Capmp appear in the coming chapters.
[36] The Club is one of the most significant national institutions in the Shu'fat Camp. Further details on the Youth Social Center will be presented in the coming chapters.
[37] ACCI is a non-profit organization founded in 1936. Representing the business sector in Jerusalem, the Chamber serves all its business members in different fields of economy, including tourism, trade, industry, etc, (Source: Official website of the Chamber: http://www.jacci.org/).
[38] Maps Department of the Arab Studies Society is one of the active departments of Orient House in Jerusalem.
[39] CCPRJ was established in 2005 in order to protect the rights of the Palestinian Jerusalemites against the Israeli discriminatory policies and to promote the presence of the Jerusalemites in their city (*Source: Official website of CCPRJ*).

interviews on the phone. This time, I interviewed people from ʻAnata village and not Shu'fat Camp. One interview was with one of the First *Intifada* activists from ʻAnata village. I needed to understand how people of the surrounding areas viewed Shu'fat refugees prior to the *Intifada*, particularly as the camp during that time was a well-known hub for drugs. I conducted the second interview also on the phone with one of the owners of the concrete factory in ʻAnata with the goal of getting more information on the financial transactions between the factory and construction developers in the camp. I also conducted further interviews and follow-up interviews later on during September and October 2020. Between 2017 and 2020, I conducted 39 semi-structured interviews and dozens of informal conversations. During my fieldwork, I met and interviewed urban and rural refugees from about 19 places of origin, including Qatamun, Beit Thul, Lydda, Malha, al-Walajeh, Jaffa, Deir Ayyub, Hebron, Qatanna, Lifta, Jerusalem, Dura, Beit Jibrin, Jemzo, Bir Saba', Qastina, Yalo, ʻImwas, and Beit Mahsir. These areas of origin are highly represented in the camp as with regard to the number of refugees, according to a 2008 statistics of the Encyclopedia of Palestinian Camps.[40]

[40] Encyclopedia of Palestinian Camps: http://palcamps.net/ar/camp/88/. According to the encyclopedia, the Shu'fat Camp refugees represent 72 places of origin (see Appendix IV in this study.) However, many of the existing literature and UNRWA website mention 53-55 places of origin. During my interview with UNRWA Director of Shu'fat Camp on March 27, 2019, he stated that the Old City refugees originally represented 57 villages and after their movement to Shu'fat Camp, refugees of six villages could not live in the new location and handed their refugee cards to UNRWA, relinquishing their refugee status, and left the camp to live somewhere outside of it. The refugees, who remained in Shu'fat Camp today, represent 51 villages only, according to UNRWA Director. However, due to technical reasons, concerning UNRWA office in the camp, the director could not provide me with any official statistcs regarding the origins of the refugees, whether those who remained in the camp or those who relinquished their refugee status.

Research Methodology Chart

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">Methodology
Steps of inductive approach
(January 2017-November 2020)</th></tr>
<tr><th colspan="4">Preparatory stage (January – February 2017)</th></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">Data Source</th><th>Sample Content</th><th>Outcomes</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Literature review
(Jerusalem and edge areas, settler colonialism)

Preparatory Interviews:
• Construction developer,
• Jerusalemite residents of new buildings</td><td>• history of area,
• housing crisis in Jerusalem,
• discriminatory planning policies in Jerusalem,
• influx of Jerusalemites back into Jerusalem, and people mobility reasons
• gathering in edge areas within municipal boundaries,
• fear of revocation of IDs,
• Shu’fat refugee camp became affordable destination for these returnees,
• land acquisition campaign in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada by refugees,
• surge of construction of commercial buildings</td><td>• Choosing subject
• Define the volume of research problem
• Writing research proposal with initial questions and theoretical framework</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="4">Fieldwork (June 2018-November 2020)</th></tr>
<tr><th>Steps</th><th>Data Source</th><th>Sample Content</th><th>Outcomes</th></tr>
<tr><td>Step 1 (June – July 2018):</td><td>Field survey of businesses in camp area
informal conversations
Semi-structured interviews with:
• Former Popular Committee member,
• Restaurant owner,
• Owner of concrete factory,
• Displaced Jerusalemite living in the Shu’fat Camp</td><td>• taking photos
• field notes upon personal observations
• general historical information on the establishment of the camp
• hundreds of shops appeared in the camp after the year 2000
• Commercial sector mostly managed by outsiders / mainly West Bankers
• Population growth of the camp area / increasing number of health and education facilities in the camp area
• Several refugee women managing commercial facilities</td><td>preparing first report of the initial observations</td></tr>
<tr><td>Step 2: (Oct. –Dec. 2018)</td><td>Participant observation: 3 months at the Women’s Center – Shu’fat Refugee Camp</td><td>• Women refugees mostly seek free courses on money-generating skills
• Women refugees seek paid work in the Women’s Center
• Many refugee women manage at-home work to generate money</td><td>• Building trust and relationships with the community of the Women’s center
• With the help of women in the center, I was able to conduct several interviews with women refugees at the center and reach other camp refugees outside the center to conduct interviews.</td></tr>
</table>

Step 3: Semi-structured interviews	***Round 1:*** ***(Oct. 2018-Feb. 2019).*** Interviews with: • Refugees, • Women, • Construction developers, • Shop owners	History of Shu'fat camp and its refugees, socio-economic developments	I wrote a chapter on the history of Shu'fat refugee camp
	Round 2: ***(Feb. - July 2019).*** Interviews with officials in camp institutions: (UNRWA, Popular Committee, Youth Social Club, Women's Center). Official in Jerusalem relevant institutions (Chamber of Commerce, Maps Department- Orient House) construction developers.	• UNRWA services in Shu'fat Camp, • Colonial workings of Israel in Jerusalem and the camp, • People's agency, • Land acquisition, • Urban development	• Defining new research questions and argument • Defining a suitable analytical framework • Starting writing and analysis
	Round 3: ***(Feb. –Nov. 2020)*** Conducting further interviews and follow up phone calls with previously interviewed people, needed for the analysis.	Supporting previously obtained data: further explanation and more details on certain points.	Assisting writing and analysis of the research

1.4. Limitations of the research

Some limitations should not be ignored in this research. The first limitation I faced is the lack of available literature on the history of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp; I sought to overcome this limitation by listening to life stories from elderly people during the first stage of interviews. These individuals represent the first generation of the Palestinian *Nakba*, who witnessed the 1948 events and the establishment of the camp.

There is another limitation that I was actually aware of before I began my fieldwork. It concerns the worries of the camp refugees and their skepticism regarding strangers who try to obtain any personal information from them. Although I tried to overcome this obstacle by creating trust with

people before I conducted interviews, there is still the probability that the interviewees concealed or altered some information. In fact, many construction developers completely refused to talk to me and thus limited the number of interviews amongst this group. Out of ten refugee construction developers in the camp, I was able to interview only four of them. I understand their worries and rejection of being interviewed since my fieldwork coincided with a critical stage in the life of Shu'fat Camp, when the Jerusalem municipality announced it would remove UNRWA and take on its responsibilities in the camp. These limitations might hamper analysis of the results. Despite these limitations, I hope that this study was able to contribute fresh and useful data as well as insightful analysis on this topic.

1.5. Ethics statement

As previously mentioned, the fieldwork in this study followed different strategies: personal observations, informal conversations, participant observation and semi-structured interviews. The most critical stage in the fieldwork was conducting interviews with the camp residents. During this stage, sensitive data was collected on the lives of the people and their ways of living, lifestyle and sources of income. Research was conducted with full compliance with research ethics norms based upon the codes of Birzeit University as it involves human participants through interviews.

Due to the sensitivity of the situation of Jerusalem residents, whose presence in their city is continually targeted, all the interviewees were given full explanatory information about this study and its goals, enabling them to decide whether or not to be interviewed. They were assured that their names would be kept anonymous, be it ordinary camp residents or members from the

group of construction developers, as they could potentially be affected by any revealed data. This promise helped in securing more information and details from the interviewees, who wished to talk, but at the same time, wanted to remain anonymous since any sensitive information might reach the Israeli authorities and harm them. Moreover, I modified some details regarding certain interviewees, when these details could make him/her known, including place of origin, position, or place of work for example.

As a researcher, I was responsible for providing the interviewees with full information and details on the research goals. Every interviewee was given a consent form, signed by my supervisor and stamped by the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Birzeit University, explaining the purpose of the study. The interviews were conducted only after the interviewees provided their verbal consent since mostly they did not wish to sign any papers. As the interviewees are Arab Palestinians, the forms were prepared in Arabic. The interviewees were assured that they would have easy access to the university, faculty and the PhD programme to seek further information on the study whenever needed. In order to protect the identity of the people that I contacted, I chose to use pseudonyms for all of them in this research. This way, I protect them against any repercussions of any type.

Most of the photos in the research are my own, taken during my fieldwork visits to the camp during the period between 2018 and 2020. I also used other maps and photos, especially old photos that portray the Shu'fat Refugee Camp during past periods from websites of several organizations, including UNRWA. All those photos and maps are well-cited and documented in

this research. The collected data and interviews are kept in protected files on an external drive that only the researcher can access.

1.6. Research Structure

Following this chapter one introduction, chapter two addresses the broad research setting. This chapter sheds light on the history of Shu'fat Refugee Camp as with regard to the origins of its residents, the gathering in the Old City of Jerusalem and the establishment of the camp in its current location in the mid-sixties. The chapter brings into focus the particular case of the Shu'fat Camp, which did not receive special attention in the previous literature. It introduces significant data and a better illustration of the workings of UNRWA in dealing with refugees and non-refugees, Jordanian policies in Jerusalem and moving refugees from Mu'askar camp in the Old City of Jerusalem to the current location of the Shu'fat Camp. It also highlights the conditions of the refugees following their transfer in the mid-sixties, in addition to the special status of the camp after 1967 as it became the only Palestinian refugee camp under direct Israeli jurisdiction. Chapter two likewise situates Shu'fat Camp within the Zionist settler colonial project as part of Jerusalem and also a Palestinian refugee camp.

In chapter three, I delve into the research arguments. This chapter shows how Shu'fat residents chose resistance by focusing on urban self-development. The chapter distinguishes two phases of the construction boom that have taken place in the camp since its establishment. The first phase took place between 1970s-1990s inside the original boundaries of the camp, and the second in the surrounding areas of expansion of the camp after the year 2000. The chapter also highlights the Israeli "center of life policy" that caused new developments in the camp.

Chapter four shows how some refugees have gone into real-estate and commercial construction, leading to the socio-economic transformations that will be discussed in chapter five. The chapter shows that these developers were transformed from poor refugees into rich investors by taking the initiative to acquire land and develop it.

Chapters three and four illustrate how these developments played a significant role in thwarting Israeli policies in Jerusalem. They also reveal a high degree of agency on the part of camp residents. The appearance of a group of construction developers and their construction initiative created a living space, allowing Jerusalemite returnees to buy or rent apartments in Shu'fat, thus enabling them to protect their residency status in Jerusalem. In this way, they subverted the intention of the Israeli policy of pushing out Palestinians from Jerusalem through the "center of life policy" while also becoming wealthy in what can be understood as a dual socio-economic transformation of one small group of camp refugees.

Chapter five discusses the impact of increasing construction and developments on the general spatial and socio-economic situation in the camp. It demonstrates how the camp witnessed significant socio-economic changes at various levels. Several socio-economic indicators were highlighted in this chapter, including the expansion of the camp boundaries, population, crowdedness, education, health, workforce, women's status, and commerce. I conclude with a presentation of results of the study and an elaboration on the principal concepts of my research in chapter six.

CHAPTER TWO

2. Historical Background: The Making of Refugees

2.1. Introduction

The history of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp cannot be viewed separately from the history of Palestine in general and particularly the history of Jerusalem. Unfortunately, very few studies examine Shu'fat Refugee Camp as the main subject of their research (see O'Donnell 1999; Badawy et. al 2015). Shu'fat Refugee Camp was largely researched either as part of the Jerusalem periphery or as part of Jerusalem in general (see Allabadi and Hardan 2016; Alkhalili 2017c).

The present chapter fills this void by stitching together three types of sources: first, the available literature on the history of Palestine, Jerusalem and its surroundings; second, newly released documents and correspondence from the Arab municipality of Jerusalem dating back to the early sixties and third, additional primary data I gathered through personal interviews with camp refugees.

This historical background traces the origins of Shu'fat Camp residents and the changes they have faced. I learnt from the personal interviews that the camp's original residents are comprised of three different groups and backgrounds. First, there are the refugees that were expelled from their towns and villages in the wake of the 1948 war. People of this group were made refugees twice. The first time was in 1948, when they were thrown out of their towns and villages and gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem by the International Committees of the Red Crescent (ICRC) before they were transferred to UNRWA. The second time occurred in 1965, when they

were moved from the Old City to the current location of the Shu'fat Camp, about four kilometers northeast of Jerusalem.

Second, there are the long-term inhabitants of the Old City of Jerusalem that migrated to the city before 1948 and settled in the Sharaf Quarter, particularly migrants from Hebron. Finally, there are the migrants that arrived in the Old City during the fifties; these are mainly poor Palestinians from the Hebron and Ramallah villages that were seeking work in Jerusalem and settled in the Jewish Quarter or what was then called the "Mu'askar" camp.[41] People of these two groups were non-refugees, who were only transformed into refugees when they were moved to Shu'fat Camp.

2.2. The making of refugees

2.2.1. In the aftermath of the *Nakba*

The 1948 *Nakba* resulted in the expulsion of about two thirds of the Palestinian people. Expelled Palestinians included refugees from Jerusalem's western villages such as Beit Thul and Al Walajeh who gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem. They would later become inhabitants of the Shu'fat Camp. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the news of the Deir Yassin massacre pushed inhabitants of the surrounding villages to leave their homes and land out of fear for their lives and their families' lives. However, not all Palestinians left their villages immediately, many remained in their homes until their towns and villages were captured by Jewish groups. Nonetheless, they remained on alert and prepared for the moment when they would be expelled from their villages.

[41] The name "Mu'askar" camp was mentioned in the official documents of the Palestinian municipality of Jerusalem in the sixties and its official correspondence with the Jordanian authorities. It was also used in the al-Difa' newspaper in the sixties. The name also appears on the official UNRWA website. For more about the name, see the next sections in this chapter.

This was the case of the residents of Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem. Recalling the effect of the Deir Yassin massacre, Um 'Umran[42] said, "after Deir Yassin we were afraid that the same thing will happen to us in Beit Thul. The people remained on alert. Those who owned cattle, had already moved their cattle to other villages and towns, where they have relatives or friends a long time before the occupation of the village. We continued with our normal daily routine inside the village during the day, while in the evening we used to leave our homes to spend the night in the caves on the outskirts of the village in preparation for the moment rampaging armed Jews would occupy and destroy the village," an event that actually did occur at midnight while villagers were outside their village on July 18, 1948 (Khalidi 1992).

However, the Old City of Jerusalem was not their first destination after expulsion. Interviewed refugees recalled how they and the rest of the people of Beit Thul fled to many villages in the Ramallah area, which were the nearest to them. For example, some found refuge in Rafat village

[42] Interview with Um 'Umran (nickname), 84, originally from the destroyed Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, at her home in Ras Khamis-Shu'fat Camp on December 26, 2018. In documenting the history of the Shu'fat Camp refugees in this thesis, there will be much dependence on the narrative of Um 'Umran. Out of the interviewed people of the first refugee generation that experienced the *Nakba* only four were fully aware of the *Nakba* and expulsion events; they were of different backgrounds. They are: First, Um 'Umran was a poor villager from Beit Thul. She first took refuge in Rafat village and then moved with her family to the Old City of Jerusalem to occupy empty houses there. She experienced the relocation in 1965. Second, Abu Firas was originally from Qatamun neighbourhood in west Jerusalem. He was from a somewhat wealthy family. He had his first refuge in 1948 in the Old City of Jerusalem but not in the Jewish quarter. His family rented a house in the Old City. They left Jerusalem for Jordan and then returned and again rented a new house in the Old City before they bought land in Shu'fat to build a family house in its current location in Ras Khamis (several meters outside the original UNRWA boundaries of Shu'fat camp). They have been living in Shu'fat since 1960, five years before the establishment of Shu'fat camp. He did not experience the 1965 relocation process. Third, Um Khalil was originally from 'Imwas village that was destroyed in 1967. She arrived in the camp after the 1967 war. Fourth, Um Jihad was originally from Hebron and was married to a man originally from Dura village, Hebron. They were living in the Sharaf Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem before 1948. They rented a house in the Sharaf Quarter and did not live in the empty houses in the Jewish Quarter. In 1965, her husband alone moved voluntarily to Shu'fat Camp in order to get an UNRWA house. She refused to move to Shu'fat with him and remained in the Old City with her children. She joined her husband in the camp only after 1967. I found that the story of Um 'Umran was rich in details, expressing the refugee experience of most of the first generation of the 1948 refugees of the camp who experienced the 1948 expulsion, life in the Mu'askar camp in the Old City of Jerusalem, and the 1965 relocation to Shu'fat.

until the early fifties when news spread about the empty houses in the Jewish Quarter. When they heard of those empty houses and that people were occupying them, they moved to the Old City to occupy houses there. Interestingly enough, it is Beit Thul refugees, who led the current urban and socio-economic transformations in the camp.[43]

Beit Thul refugees were not the only ones to leave their first place of refuge to occupy empty houses in the Old City of Jerusalem. For example, refugees from Lydda recalled that their first refuge was Birzeit near Ramallah before they decided to leave for Jerusalem.[44] It is worth mentioning that other non-refugees from the Ramallah villages of Qatanna, Beit ʻUr, and Beit Luqya, also migrated to Jerusalem in the early fifties and joined the refugees in the Old City after they heard of empty houses there.[45] This is why people from these Ramallah villages also live in Shu'fat Camp today even though their villages were not occupied by Israel in 1948 and their inhabitants were not expelled by war.

It is worth to note here that Jerusalem was familiar to those rural refugees, who were expelled from the Jerusalem western villages. Jerusalem had always been a destination for these *fellahin* before the *Nakba*. They were used to visiting the city for many reasons, whether to sell their agricultural products or to benefit from the city's services of health, education, and shopping or simply to pray in the Al Aqsa Mosque. Thus Jerusalem was the main place most of them would

[43] This will receive an extensive explanation and analysis in the coming chapters in this study.
[44] Interview with Um Ashraf (nickname), 65, originally from Lydda at her home in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp on December 9, 2018.
[45] Interview with Mrs. Iman (nickname), 52, originally from Qatanna village, northwest of Jerusalem, at her apartment in Ras Khamis on December 29, 2018.

think of to seek refuge. With the beginning of expulsion during the *Nakba*, rural refugees filled the compounds of Al Aqsa Mosque and the Old City streets, not knowing where to move else.[46]

Meanwhile, many other urban refugees, especially those who fled from the new Jerusalem neighbourhoods west of the city, such as Qatamun or Talbiya or further west, like Latrun, etc., had the Old City of Jerusalem as their first place of refuge (Tamari (ed.) 2002, 1). Some of them had Jerusalem as a temporary station until they had the opportunity to travel to Jordan and settle there.[47] Some others found a temporary place to live with relatives in the Old City, whilst others rented homes or simply rooms in the different quarters of the Old City (Vatikiotis 1995, 141). When asked how he left Qatamun in 1948, and where he settled first, Abu Firas said, "In 1948, I was 12 years old, studying in the 'Omareya School in Baq'a Tahta near Qatamun. We were living in a beautiful house. My father was a butcher, having his own shop in Qatamun. People of Qatamoun, mostly Christians, were considered of good economic and social status in Jerusalem as mostly they were working as government employees during the Mandate era. ….. We were six sons and two daughters and when the Jews started their attack on Qatamun, my father was worried about us and decided that we should leave. We first settled in Bab Hutta in the Old City of Jerusalem. We rented a small house until the Jews started shelling the Old City. One of the shells landed close to our own house. We were afraid and this time, my father decided to leave for Jordan. We lived in Sweileh for several months. We worked in selling bread and *Ka'k* to gain our living there. In early 1949, we returned to Jerusalem and again, rented a new home in Bab Hutta. As we lost our house and business in Qatamun, we decided to start a new life in our new

[46] Interview with Dr. Nazmi Jubeh of Birzeit University on June 20, 2019.
[47] Interview with Dr. Nazmi Jubeh, ibid.

location. I and my brothers worked in a slaughter house in Shu'fat village, which we used to reach on foot on a daily basis."[48]

However, refugees not capable financially of renting a living place were housed by the Red Cross (ICRC) in the partly destroyed Jewish Quarter that Jews were forced to evacuate during the war (Benvenisti 1976, 70). This was possible as in the wake of the 1948 war, Jewish residents in the Jewish Quarter left Jerusalem as their homes were battered by the war. They fled to the western part of the city, which came under Israeli control (Benvenisti 1976, 69). The precise number of the Jews that left the Old City of Jerusalem is not known (Dumper 1992, 33). Meron Benvenisti said 1,700 Jews fled from the Jewish Quarter in the 1948 war (Benvenisti 1976, 69), whilst other sources mention 2,000 civilians and 350 Haganah troops (Vatikiotis 1995, 144). 'Aref Al 'Aref said 1,249 Jews of the quarter surrendered to Arabs in 1948, 913 of whom were women, children and elderly that were released and handed over to the ICRC to move them to the Jewish neighbourhoods outside the walled city, whilst the rest including 332 male fighters and four female fighters were taken as prisoners of war. Men were transferred to detention centers in Jordan and the women were returned to Israel (Al 'Aref 2012, 478-481).[49]

The refugees that were settled in the Jewish Quarter by the ICRC, were from many different backgrounds, cities, towns, and villages, but most of them were rural refugees from the villages

[48] Interview with Abu Firas (nickname), 83, originally from Qatamun, west of Jerusalem, at his home in Ras Khamis-Shu'fat camp, on December 23, 2018.

[49] Perhaps the figures that are provided by Al 'Aref in this regard are the closest to the truth, taking into consideration the sensitive posts that he held in Jerusalem. In addition to being a political activist since the twenties, he received a senior post (قائم مقام) in Palestine during the British Mandate in 1933. He kept his post until 1948 (Source: Wasserstein 2006, 180-182). During Jordanian rule, he was appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem during the period between 1951 and 1955 (Source: Fishbach 2005, 81). His positions granted him a good opportunity to reach the official documents and data to use in his writing.

of Ramleh, Jerusalem, Bir Saba', Gaza and Haifa (O'Donnell 1999, 46; Benvenisti 1976, 70).[50] The gathering of refugees in the Jewish Quarter grew into what was called Mu'askar refugee camp after the ICRC handed its management to UNRWA in 1949 (Benvenisti 1976, 70; O'Donnell 1999, 46; Dumper 1992, 36).

Interestingly, the name "Mu'askar Camp" in the Old City of Jerusalem was not familiar to the refugees interviewed in Shu'fat Camp. They only mentioned the name "Jewish Quarter" or "Sharaf Quarter." This may indicate that the name "Mu'askar Camp" was only used in formal documents of UNRWA and the Jordanian authorities. The term '*Mu'askar*' in Arabic means camp in English, whether a refugee camp or a military camp, although it is mostly used to describe a military camp. In the Arab Jerusalem municipality correspondence (of which several copies were obtained by the author) the term 'Mu'askar Camp' or the 'Mu'askar Quarter' (camp quarter) are used. This may indicate that the Arab municipality of Jerusalem wanted to avoid using the name 'Jewish Quarter' and called it the camp (*Mu'askar*) quarter, especially as it was inhabited by refugees and thus the name was adopted officially with the passing of time.[51]

[50] *Supra* note 40.

[51] This explanation was supported by K. T. of the Maps Department at the Arab Studies Society – Orient House, during an interview with him at his office in Dahiyat el-Barid on February 24, 2019. The term "Camp of the returnees" was also used to refer to Mu'askar Camp in the Old City in the correspondence of the Arab Municipality of Jerusalem. In fact, refugees in general were referred to as returnees during the Jordanian era in Palestine. The term was widely used in the al-Difaa newspaper in the sixties.

2.2.2. Establishment of UNRWA

Figure 2.1: UNRWA offices– Shu'fat refugee camp. Source: Author, November 5, 2018.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established upon a UNGA Resolution in 1949 to serve the Palestinian refugees. On its official website, UNRWA states that it is responsible for serving all registered Palestinian refugees in its areas of operation. Its definition of Palestinian refugees is, "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict."[52] According to the website, UNRWA services include "primary and vocational education, primary health care, relief and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement, microfinance and emergency response, including in situations of armed conflict".[53]

UNRWA continued activities begun by the ICRC and other international humanitarian organizations.[54] UNRWA found itself facing a chaotic process of refugee registration and

[52] UNRWA website. https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (Accessed September 15, 2020).
[53] UNRWA website: https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do (Accessed on September 15, 2020).
[54] Besides the ICRC, the other international humanitarian organizations that assisted the Palestinian refugees in the wake of their expulsion in 1948, and before UNRWA assumed its responsibilities in 1950, included the League of the Red Cross Societies (LRCS) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). In 1954, the United Nations

handling an inadequate assistance roll. Non-refugees and poor people, who did not fulfill UNRWA's criteria of a refugee which includes losing both home and means of livelihood, were also included in assistance rolls. Thus, although UNRWA was mandated to serve Palestinian refugees, it also served other categories of non-refugees that registered to be eligible to receive assistance (Bartholomeusz 2010, 456). UNRWA faced this situation during its operations in the Old City of Jerusalem as it served refugees and poor Palestinians in the Mu'askar Camp.

UNRWA's serving non-refugees was confirmed by UNRWA Director in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, who stated, "UNRWA does not only serve refugees, but also non-refugee poor Palestinians. Those, who were moved from the Old City of Jerusalem in the sixties, were not only refugees, who left their villages, but also poor people, who joined the refugees in Mu'askar camp, especially migrants originally from Hebron and Ramallah villages, who arrived in the Old City in the early fifties. Some of those poor people received UNRWA cards in the Old City. Meanwhile, others were given UNRWA cards upon their arrival in Shu'fat camp in accordance with an agreement between UNRWA and the Jordanian government. They all now carry UNRWA cards."[55] Amongst the poor non-refugees who registered as eligible to receive assistance were people, who lost their means of livelihood, but did not lose their home and so UNRWA called them "economic refugees" mainly residents of frontier villages in Jordan, poor people in Jerusalem and Gaza, and Bedouins (Bartholomeusz 2010, 456).[56]

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established to handle all other cases of forced migration including Palestine refugees residing outside the UNRWA's five areas of operation (Source: Bocco 2010, 231).

[55] Interview with UNRWA Director in Shu'fat Camp, F.O.M. at UNRWA offices in Shu'fat Camp on March 27, 2019. This information was also confirmed during a follow up telephone call with him on September 22, 2020.

[56] For further information on persons, who are eligible to receive UNRWA services, see Takkenberg 1997, and the Danish Immigration Service Report 2020.

2.2.3. UNRWA assistance to Old City refugees and the poor

When it first assumed its responsibilities in 1950, UNRWA managed food distribution offices easily reached by the Palestinian refugees, wherever they were gathered. In terms of the refugees that gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem, a food distribution office was first established by humanitarian agencies in the Islamic Girls School, inside the compounds of Al Aqsa Mosque in 1948. When UNRWA assumed its responsibilities in 1950, it became responsible for the administration of this center. With the beginning of the school year, UNRWA was obliged to leave the school and open another center in the Tomatoma area, near Lion's Gate, to the east of the compounds of the Al Aqsa Mosque.[57]

In a manuscript diary by Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, Director of Al Aqsa Mosque and Supreme Guardian of Holy Places in Jerusalem during the Jordanian rule, recorded in the Khalidi Library,[58] in 1951 the Islamic Waqf Department in Jerusalem called for moving these offices to a location outside the compounds of the Al Aqsa Mosque due to the chaotic situation that the food distribution process created.

This process was viewed as desecrating the holiness of the site. Several letters were exchanged in 1951, describing this chaotic situation and calling on the Islamic Scholars Commission, UNRWA, the Jordanian Ministry of Construction and Development, and the Ministry of Interior to find another location. According to the Khalidi diary, this distribution office in Jerusalem served about 7,000 people from Jerusalem and its surrounding villages and neighbourhoods,

[57] Tomatoma refers to the yard in front of the sealed twin gates of the Jerusalem wall: Rahma Gate and Tawba Gate that are known as the Golden Gate. They are located at the eastern part of the wall near Lion's Gate. Palestinian Jerusalemites have always called the twin gates as Tomatoma Gate, applying the name also on the empty yard in front of them, quite outside of the city wall (Source: Al 'Aref 1999, 432). The reason behind this name is not known.
[58] KHD sij 10, Khalidi Library.

including Thuri and Silwan.[59] A letter, dated October 22, 1951, in Khalidi's diary states, "The Jerusalem military governor in 1948 allowed the distribution of food rations in the building of the Islamic Girls' School at King Faisal Gate and when the aforementioned school was needed, UNRWA asked for allocating another place and it was allowed to use the current location, known as 'Tomatoma.' The (Islamic) Council did not know that the distribution process would have such difficulties."[60] The letter was directed to the Head of the Islamic Scholars Commission and signed by Hassan Abu al-Wafa al-Dajani, Waqf Comptroller-General. Following several protest letters from Khalidi, Mohammed Shanqiti the Chief Sharia Justice, and other Waqf officials between June and October 1951, the distribution office was moved to a new location near Herod's Gate inside the walled Old City of Jerusalem but still outside the Al Aqsa compound.

Talking about her family members and some neighbours in the Old City of Jerusalem, Um 'Izzat said, "We all were having UNRWA cards. I remember we used to get food rations from an UNRWA center in Herod's Gate. … that was in the fifties."[61] Um 'Izzat was not a refugee, who was expelled from her home by war. She was living with her family in al-Wad Street in the Old City during the war. She stated that her father, who after 1948 served in the Jordanian police, had owned a building in Mamilla before 1948. They never lived in that house, which was rented to others. Due to the war and Israeli occupation of the western part of Jerusalem, they lost this house and so were registered as eligible for UNRWA assistance as they lost a source of living – the rental of their house.

[59] KHD sij 10-052, Khalidi Library.
[60] KHD sij 10-053, Khalidi Library.
[61] Interview with Um 'Izzat (nickname), 78, from Jerusalem, at her family home in al-Wad Street in the Old City on February 6, 2019. Her family owned their home in the Old City and did not move to Shu'fat camp in the sixties.

2.2.4. Closure of Mu'askar Camp

This situation continued until 1963, when the Jordanian government decided to close the Mu'askar camp and move the refugees. The Jordanian government chose a plot of about 203 dunums of land (50 acres) from Shu'fat village, north of Jerusalem to relocate them (Jubeh 2019, 49; Badawy et. al. 2015, 5-7; Benvenisti 1976, 70; O'Donnell 1999, 46). Two main reasons can be cited behind this decision: economic and humanitarian.

Economically, the Old City refugees would form a significant burden on the economy of the city and exhaust its infrastructure, without being charged for services due to their status as refugees. Additionally, they would not pay taxes of any kind to the government. This was probably one of the reasons they were moved to the new location outside city boundaries[62]. Moreover, the economy of Jerusalem was based on tourism (Dakkak 1981, 145), so the Jordanian government needed to prioritize the tourist sector in its planning projects. In 1963, the Jerusalem municipality proposed a development project for the Old City of Jerusalem, turning the Jewish Quarter into a "development center, with public buildings and parks," (Benvenisti 1976, 70) that required the movement of people.[63] The project would have benefitted the municipality economically. The building of a national park in the Old City, as was planned, would have attracted tourism to generate income. The project could have been deemed as a modernization project countering abject poverty. The Mu'askar Refugee Camp represented a poverty pocket that could have formed an urban problem for a modernization project, giving the Jordanian authorities strong justification to close it.

[62] Interview with K. T., ibid.
[63] This is confirmed by correspondence between the Arab Jerusalem municipality and the Jordanian government in the sixties (see Annex 1: Documents in this research).



Map 2.1: 1961 Jordan Tourism Map of Jerusalem. Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/1961_Jordan_Tourism_Map_of_Jerusalem.jpg

As Map 2.1 above demonstrates, the tourist sites in Jerusalem during Jordanian rule were concentrated primarily in the Old City; this gave the Jordanian government a good reason to design its planning projects in a way that promoted tourism in the Old City.

From a humanitarian point of view, the lack of maintenance of houses in the Mu'askar Camp in the Old City further deteriorated the living conditions of camp residents. According to Nazmi Jubeh (2019), destruction in the Jewish Quarter in the wake of the 1948 war was significant. A large number of buildings were either destroyed or damaged by the war shelling (Jubeh 2019, 47-48). Jubeh added that immediately after the war, the Jordanian authorities destroyed several damaged buildings that formed a real immediate danger to the safety and lives of the people in the quarter.[64] Thus for the above reasons, relocating the Old City refugees was necessary.

[64] Interview with Dr. Nazmi Jubeh, ibid.

2.2.5. Establishment of Shu'fat Refugee Camp

In a decree dated October 5, 1963, then Jordanian Prime Minister Hussein Ben Nasser ordered the transfer of Palestinian refugees gathered in the Mu'askar Camp in the Old City to a new location prepared by the "relevant authorities".[65] The decree also stipulated banning any refugee moved from the Mu'askar Camp from returning to live there. The Arab Municipality of Jerusalem, according to the decree, would be responsible for the demolition of the damaged houses in the camp after the transfer of refugees had been completed.[66]

Meanwhile, by 1965 UNRWA had established five hundred housing units in the new location in Shu'fat, northeast of Jerusalem (UNRWA 2015, 1; see Map 2.2 below). UNRWA also built two schools in the new location, one for boys and one for girls, offering free education up to tenth grade. It also built a health center, providing free basic health services for the refugees and 1,500 people were moved to the new location in 1965 (Benvenisti 1976, 70; Jubeh 2019, 49).

Map 2.2: The original UNRWA 500 housing units. Source: UNRWA, 2003.

[65] See Document 1 in Annex I in this research.
[66] See Annex I: Documents in this research.

The refugees, who were transferred to the new location, were disappointed with the conditions there, including the small-sized houses, few rooms and lack of infrastructure. UNRWA houses at that time lacked infrastructure of any kind. They were not even connected to basic services such as electricity, water, and sanitation. UNRWA erected several public toilets without doors in the camp streets, one for men and one for women in each neighbourhood, as confirmed by the contacted camp refugees. "When we needed to use toilet, my father always accompanied us to the public toilet in the camp and waited for us in front of the toilet until we finished because they were without doors. You know, we were little girls and could not go there alone, especially at night," Um Ayman said laughingly.[67] "The toilets were built in a kind of spiral way that they can stay without doors and no one can see through," hinted Mr. Yousef.[68] He explained that doorless pit toilets with spiral design were preferred to ensure good ventilation, especially as they were without windows.

UNRWA also installed a number of water taps, one in every camp neighbourhood which were supplied by a container, providing a limited amount of water for two or three hours a day for the use of all the camp residents (Cheshin et. al, 1999, 131). The amount of water available was insufficient. This water shortage forced families to recycle the little water available, using it sparingly, in order to meet their needs. Some refugees also used to bring water from the neighbouring village of 'Anata, one kilometre east of the camp. This was confirmed by interviewed refugees, including Um 'Umran,[69] who said, "When we finished washing clothes, we used the same water to clean the floors of the house... I used to bring water from 'Anata. I

[67] Um Ayman (nickname), 61, originally from Jaffa, interviewed at the Women's Center on October 25, 2018.
[68] Mr. Yousef, (nickname), 55, member of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp, at the committee headquarters on June 30, 2018.
[69] Um 'Umran, ibid.

used to carry two tins (cubic metal tins) full of water and walk, carrying them the whole way from ‘Anata to the camp.”

2.3. Shu’fat Refugee Camp under Israeli occupation

2.3.1. 1967 war and the annexation of Jerusalem

A new episode in Israel’s settler colonial project in Palestine began with the 1967 war. 3,300 Palestinian refugees were already living in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp by June 1967 (O’Donnell 1999, 47). In addition to the natural increase in the number of camp refugees, more Old City refugees continued to be brought to the camp until 1967 (Benvinisti 1976, 70). Like the rest of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a large number of camp refugees left their homes and headed towards the east for fear that the Jews would carry out massacres similar to those that had occurred in 1948. Some of them actually reached Jordan; others stopped in Jericho and stayed there until the war ended.[70] Some of the camp residents recalled that they did not go very far and hid in caves east of the neighbouring villages of ‘Anata and Hizma (the current location of Anatot Military Camp) where they spent several days until they were informed that anyone who left the caves carrying a white banner, a sign of surrender, would be safe and could return home. “We used whatever cloth we had around, we were able to leave the caves and returned home,” recalled Um ‘Umran.[71]

In the wake of 1967 war, new refugees arrived in the Shu’fat Camp, including refugees from the Moroccan Quarter that was demolished and thus displacing more than a hundred households. Other refugees joined the camp from the villages of Yalo and ‘Imwas that were completely

[70] Interviews with Um Ayman, ibid; Um ‘Umran, ibid; and Abu Firas, ibid.
[71] Interview with Um ‘Umran, ibid.

destroyed during the war, along with the village of Beit Nuba (Abowd 2000, 9-10, Masalha 1999, 85, 97-99).

With the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel defied international law and incorporated the eastern part of Jerusalem and the surrounding neighbourhoods including Shu'fat Refugee Camp, into the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality (O'Donnell 1999, 47). With this annexation of Jerusalem, Israel decided from the beginning to transform it into a settler colonial city[72] with a status different from the rest of the OPT. The Shu'fat Camp subsequently became the only Palestinian refugee camp in Jerusalem, falling under direct Israeli sovereignty (Karmi 2005, 7; Oppenheimer 2012, 79; UNRWA 2015, 1).

Immediately following the war, Israel conducted a population census in June 1967 (Tsemel 1999, 112). Some Shu'fat Camp refugees recalled how Israeli officials visited the camp houses during the census to conduct a headcount of the household members. They also mentioned that some people tricked the Israeli officers to ensure the return of their relatives who had fled to Jordan and not yet returned. They filled in false statistics including the names of their absent relatives. This plot was successful because the Israeli census department employed a number of different officers to carry out census work. When a different officer visited the refugee family a new family member would pretend to be the absent family head in Jordan and would provide family member names that were then counted in the census. This was the practice not only in Shu'fat Camp, but all over the newly occupied neighbourhoods of Jerusalem.

[72] *Supra* note (20).

The Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem, who were present in the city during the Israeli census, including residents of the Shu'fat Camp, were granted the status of permanent residents in the city and received blue identity cards (Badil 2006, 13). This status distinguished them from the rest of Palestinians in the WBGS, allowing them access to Israel, the ability to work there, and access to certain social and health services (Hawker 2013, 11; Karmi 2005, 7); however, they were not considered citizens of Israel, with the respective rights accorded to Israeli citizens (Graff 2014, 13). They were allowed to keep their Jordanian citizenship, granted to them by Jordan in 1949 and were treated as having the same status as foreigners, who wish to stay in Israel as stipulated in the "1952 Law of Entry to Israel" (Tsemel 1999, 112). According to Israel's Law of Entry, this permanent residency status is automatically revoked when the person changes his place of domicile to reside in another country. Israel considered living outside the boundaries of Israel and Jerusalem for seven or more years, for any reason, except for study, as a change of domicile and this included living in the West Bank (Tsemel 1999, 113). This situation also applied to residents of Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

Regarding the issue of refugee camps after the occupation of the remaining area of Palestine in 1967, Israel agreed to maintain the existing arrangements in the Palestinian camps and pay for water consumption. Israel's agreement came in an exchange of letters with UNRWA, constituting a provisional agreement (UNTS No. 8955, 1967), "pending a further supplementary agreement" (UNRWA 2016, 1) that has never been implemented.

2.3.2. Significance of a refugee camp in Jerusalem

The presence of a Palestinian refugee camp under direct Israeli jurisdiction has political significance as it will always raise the issue of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Shu'fat, as a refugee camp under direct control of Israel, created a dilemma for Israel vis-à-vis the people whom they themselves had expelled from their homes and lands in 1948. Since 1948, Israel has taken a firm position rejecting the right of return of Palestinian refugees guaranteed by international law. UNGA Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, paragraph 11 guarantees this right, since it "*Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; … Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."[73]

Israel's recognition of the presence of refugees with claims to property on land it occupied means it recognizes their right to return to their original towns and homes which it completely rejects. For Israel, the implementation of the right of return would threaten its demographic plans for a Jewish majority in occupied Palestine in general and particularly in Jerusalem. The demographic balance has always been at the heart of Israel's settler colonial policies in

[73] UNGA Resolution 194 (III). 11 December 1948, available at: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A.

Jerusalem which aim to confirm the Jewish identity of the city. Israel's demographic worries were expressed in 1949 by then Israeli Ambassador to the USA Eliahu Elath in an interview with Don Stevenson of the American Friends Services Committee (AFSC).[74] Eliahu said that "Israel would commit suicide if she took back all the refugees."[75]

In general, refugee status gives people a special identity that always evokes memories of their experience of expulsion and losing their land. Most of the Shu'fat refugees came from the villages west of Jerusalem, which have now become largely Jewish neighbourhoods. Being geographically close to their places of origin further promotes their refugee identity and desire to return.[76] The contacted first generation refugees that lived the experience of expulsion in 1948 or 1967, showed a profound melancholic longing for their place of origin. The interviews brought back a sense of nostalgia for the past. "Of course I know where it was!!" said Um Khalil firmly, when I asked if she still remembers the location of her home in 'Imwas.[77] Um Khalil's daughter, who joined the interview at this point, said they used to visit their original village 'Imwas and her mother showed them the location of the house, which does not exist today.

Abu Firas also showed deep nostalgia for his house in Qatamoun when he said "we have a very beautiful house! It is two stories." He said it in the present tense as if seeing it in front of him at the moment. He added, "Our house is still standing as it is in Qatamun until today. Although we

[74] American Friends Service Committee is a Quaker organization "devoted to service, development, and peace programs throughout the world," (Source: AFSC website, accessed on September 27, 2020).
[75] AFSC, nd. "Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return": https://www.afsc.org/resource/palestinian-refugees-and-right-return, (accessed on September 27, 2020.) AFSC was one of the humanitarian organizations that assisted the Palestinian refugees during the *Nakba* and in its aftermath before UNRWA assumed its responsibilities in 1950.
[76] It was estimated that approximately 86 percent of the Palestinian refugees live within a 100-mile radius of their original living places that they were expelled from in 1948 (Bowker 2003, 66).
[77] Interview with Um Khalil, (nickname), 87, originally from 'Imwas destroyed village, at her home in Shu'fat Refugee on January 3, 2019.

have built a new life outside Qatamun, we remain in the hope that we will return some day. But with the passing of years our hopes have withered and we realize that we will not be able to live in our house again."[78]

Even the younger generations that did not experience life in their places of origin showed insistence on the right of return. They confirmed that they will return immediately if they are given the opportunity. For them it is their right and they insist on it.[79]

2.3.3. First *Intifada*: improving the camp's political reputation

"What do you want to know about Shu'fat Camp? I'll tell you. It has always been called 'Chicago Camp,' believe me," a refugee youth, running a barber's shop on 'Anata Road told me in an informal conversation in July 2018. I heard this name used for the camp several times during my fieldwork and informal conversations with the camp residents. This name, 'Chicago Camp' which has been used to describe the camp from the late seventies and early eighties, entails a pejorative dimension to the camp, which was widely considered a space filled with poverty, drugs, crime and collaboration with the Israeli authorities (Hilal and Johnson 2003, 64).

Although drug dealers and collaborators were only a small group in the camp, the camp was stigmatized as being an undesired spot during that time. The drug problem in the camp was actually so serious that drugs were sold openly in the camp, turning it into a supplier of drugs of the Jerusalem area. [80] Talal Abu 'Afifa (2004) argued that the occupation authorities played a

[78] Interview with Abu Firas, ibid.
[79] Interviews with Mr. Yousef, ibid; Um Ayman, ibid and Um Ashraf, ibid.
[80] Interview with Mr. Ahmed (nickname), 54, one of the First *Intifada* activists from 'Anata village. He was interviewed on the phone on April 12, 2020.

significant role in spreading drugs in the Jerusalem area in general by encouraging drug dealers, facilitating their activities and tempting them with money with the ultimate goal of turning Jerusalem youth into drug addicts incapable of performing any resistance activities (Abu ʻAfifa 2004, 31-32). This claim was also confirmed by Mr. Yousef, a former member of the Popular Committee who was one of the leading members of the Youth Social Club in the seventies and early eighties.[81]

The Youth Social Center, considered as the first national institution in the camp, tried as of the seventies to combat the camp's drug problem. The beginnings of the Center return to the early sixties, when a group of youth refugees initiated the establishment of the club to provide cultural and recreational activities for refugee youth that gathered in the Old City of Jerusalem. UNRWA allowed the center to perform its activities in one of the rooms of its school in the Old City and when the Old City refugees were moved to Shu'fat Camp, the club continued to operate from a room in the new school in Shu'fat. Only in the seventies did UNRWA grant the club members a separate building to house their activities. The activities of the center included cultural, social and sports activities.[82] In the seventies, fighting the spread of drugs that were destructive to the camp's youth became one of the main goals of the center or the '*Nadi*' (club), as it is called by the camp refugees. However, the efforts of the club members were limited as Israeli intelligence services targeted them with imprisonment and continual raids on the center every now and then.

[81] Ibid.
[82] Interview with Mr. Mousa, (nickname), 67, originally from Malha, at the Child Center in Shu'fat Refugee Camp on March 27, 2019. He was one of the initiators of the Club in the Old City of Jerusalem and now he is active in managing the Child Center in Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

This perpetuated accusations that the intelligence services were responsible for flooding the camp with drugs.[83]

The conditions of exploitation, and marginalization, under which the camp refugees were living, in addition to their withering hopes of return, all represent potential motivators of revolt and resistance that Israel was aware of and wanted to suppress beforehand. According to Frantz Fanon, "Colonial exploitation, poverty, and endemic famine drive the native more and more to open organized revolt. The necessity for an open and decisive breach is formed progressively and imperceptibly, and comes to be felt by the great majority of the people. Those tensions, which hitherto were non-existent come into being" (Fanon 1963, 238). Spreading drugs amongst the camp youths was then one of Israel's means to suppress any revolting spirits and to tighten control on Palestinian Jerusalemites in general and particularly camp refugees. The ultimate goal is to protect the Zionist settler colonial project and accomplish it without impediments. But general events on the ground and the eruption of the First *Intifada* proved that Israel's policies to suppress forever the resistance of Palestinian Jerusalemites have failed.

The First *Intifada* of 1987-1993 was a crucial turning point in the life of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp as it allowed the camp to gain a good political reputation. The *Intifada* represented an occasion for camp residents to unite against drug dealers and protect their children from addiction. A strong local leadership was formed in the camp, representing all the PLO factions, particularly the Fatah Movement, under the umbrella of the Unified Leadership of the Palestinian *Intifada* (Abu 'Afifa 2004, 24). In addition to *Intifada* resistance activities against the Israeli occupation, the local leadership performed social activities. It worked hard to 'clean' the camp of

[83] Interview with Mr. Yousef, ibid.

drug dealers. By threatening punishment, they succeeded to a large extent in sabotaging drug dealer's work and minimizing their effect in the camp, although not completely. The strong presence and influence of the *Intifada* leadership was able to transform the camp into a politically active space.[84]

Meanwhile, the participation of the camp refugees in *Intifada* activities from the beginning of its eruption, which resulted in arrests and martyrdom amongst the camp residents, improved the picture of the camp politically. The camp youths participated in stone-throwing activities, which made it subject to continual Israeli raids and curfews. Many of the camp activists were arrested and several youths were shot dead by the Israeli soldiers during confrontations. The camp residents sought the help of activists from nearby 'Anata village to bury three martyrs in the village cemetery at midnight on three different occasions during the *Intifada*, thus avoiding confiscation of the bodies by the Israeli authorities.

For example, on March 10, 1990, an Israeli sniper shot dead a nineteen-year old youth during evening confrontations, as the camp youths were throwing stones at Israeli soldiers at the camp's entrance. His friends rushed him to the Saint Joseph Hospital in Sheik Jarrah, where he was immediately pronounced dead. His friends did not want the hospital to keep his body for fear that Israeli authorities would hold it; therefore, they moved the body from the hospital. They contacted the *Intifada* activists in 'Anata village and arranged for his burial in the 'Anata cemetery. After they arrived with the martyr's body in 'Anata, they informed his family of his martyrdom. All his family members arrived in 'Anata to bid him the last farewell before he was

[84] Interview with Mr. Ahmed of 'Anata, ibid.

buried at 2 am.[85] The next day, the raging camp youths clashed with Israeli soldiers and yet another thirty-four year old man was shot dead and in the same way buried in ‘Anata.[86]

2.3.4. Settler colonial land grab policies in Shu’fat Camp

Since its occupation of Jerusalem in 1967, Israel always aimed to obtain as much land as possible, but without its inhabitants. The area of the Shu’fat Refugee Camp is not an exception. Amir Cheshin et al. (1999, 130) argued that Israel never meant to keep the camp as it is, but was planning to transfer its people elsewhere and use the camp’s space to create continuity amongst the surrounding Jewish settlements.

The Shu’fat Camp is surrounded by three of the eight so called “ring neighbourhoods” of Jerusalem and a network of roads from three directions – north, south and west. The settlements of Neve Yaakov, established in 1972,[87] and Pisgat Ze’ev, established in 1982, border the camp from the north and French Hill, established in 1968, borders it from the south, thus suffocating it and preventing its expansion. The camp is also cut off from Shu’fat village from the west by a bypass road that is part of Israel’s network of roads, connecting Jewish settlements in the area with the center of the city. The camp is only open towards the Palestinian village of ‘Anata from the east, although the settlement of Maaleh Adumim, established in 1975, borders both from the east.

[85] Interview with Muna (nickname), 55, the sister of the Shu’fat Camp martyr, at her place of work on September 22, 2020.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Neve Yaakov settlement was first established in 1924 during the British Mandate. It was evacuated in the wake of the 1948 *Nakba* war and recaptured by Israel in 1967 and in 1972 a new Jewish settlement was constructed, (Sources: Mattar, Ibrahim. 1983. “From Palestinian to Israeli: Jerusalem 1948-1982.” Journal of Palestine Studies 12, No. 4: 57-63 and Fendel, Hillel and Chaim Silberstein. 2014. “Jerusalem’s Neve Yaakov: 90-Year-Old ‘Settlement:’” https://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/columns/keeping-jerusalem/jerusalems-neve-yaakov-90-year-old-settlement/2014/02/20/ (retrieved on December 21, 2019).)

Also according to O'Donnell (1999, 47), Israel planned to remove the inhabitants of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and use the space to create territorial continuity amongst the Jewish settlements of French Hill, Pisgat Ze'ev, Neve Yaakov and Maaleh Adumim; however, it failed to convince the refugees to leave as they refused cash bribes offered by settler groups to encourage them to leave. None of the contacted residents in the Shu'fat Camp said that they had ever been subject to such bribes nor had they faced any attempt to be expelled from the camp by physical force or even heard of others that were subject to these measures. O'Donnell (1999) did not reveal her source of information, however, Israel's intentions to get rid of the camp residents can be supported by Israel's demand at the Camp David conference in 2000 to dismantle the Shu'fat Camp along with Al Zu'ayim village in order to achieve Jewish territorial continuity (Klein 2003, 91). Moreover, the "confession" of former Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek that Israel declared the camp area a "green zone" with the goal of preventing Palestinian expansion until the time came to revoke the green zone declaration and enable construction of Jewish housing (Weizman 2012, 50) confirms Israel's intentions. In fact Israel's goal of grabbing land without its people has always shaped the colonial policy of Israel in Palestine, emphasizing it as a settler colonial regime that is based on the dispossession of land and elimination of the indigenous people (see Sayegh 1965; Patrick Wolfe 2006).

However, Israel's plans to grab the land of the Shu'fat Camp did not succeed, especially as the camp's population is rapidly increasing, using every available space around them. Moreover, the expansion of the camp boundaries over empty lands surrounding the camp left no space for the expansion of the Jewish settlements of Pisgat Ze'ev and French Hill towards the camp. These

facts ran counter to Israel's demographic and expansion plans in Jerusalem. Shu'fat Camp with its expanded area, intensive urban construction, and increased population made it difficult for Israel to remove the camp and its people to implement its settlement continuity plans, leading it to direct the expansion of these two settlements to other directions.[88]

2.4. The post-Oslo era: Great expectations … little achievement

The most significant political change in the life of Shu'fat refugees can be linked to the Oslo Agreement, signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993 which led to the establishment of the PA in 1994. Shu'fat Refugee Camp, as well as the rest of the Palestinian camps, towns and villages, was primarily dominated by the Fatah Movement. Immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, a huge festival was organized in the camp in celebration of the emerging political era in Palestine. I was one of thousands of people who attended the festival representing all the Palestinian neighbourhoods in the Jerusalem district. The main gathering was in the Youth Social Center in the middle of the camp, which couldn't absorb all the participants that flooded the camp streets. Palestinian flags were hoisted over the camp houses, while enthusiastic speeches and slogans were heard through loudspeakers. Hopes were high that a resolution to the refugee problem and the Palestine issue in general was imminent. Expectations were bigger than the realities on the ground, particularly as the agreements on the issues of refugees and Jerusalem (that the camp residents represent) were deferred to the final status negotiations, which never materialized. However, the Oslo Accords brought to the forefront the dream of return amongst the refugees who held the belief that the end of occupation was imminent.

[88] The next chapter will focus on the expansion of Shu'fat Refugee Camp, preventing the expansion of the surrounding Jewish settlements towards the camp.

2.4.1. Establishment of the Popular Committee

In 1996, the PA decided to establish popular committees in the Palestinian camps to serve the refugees under the umbrella of the PLO Department of Refugees Affairs.[89] These committees are responsible for enhancing the level of social, health, educational, cultural, and economic services in the camps. The popular committees also play a political and mobilization role, serving as the contact point between the camp refugees and Palestinian leadership. They became the most important governing bodies in the camps (Hanafi 2010, 8). The popular committees are elected internally after the selection of a general commission. The committee members are usually composed of representatives of the different PLO factions and independents in the camps (Hanafi 2010, 10).

In the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, the first such committee was established in 1996, when an 11-member committee was elected.[90] The composition of the committee members confirmed the domination of the Fatah Movement in the camp as five out of the eleven members were Fatah affiliates whilst another five that ran as independents had Fatah links. The eleventh elected member was affiliated with the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[91]

Under the Oslo agreements, the PA is not allowed to operate in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp as it is located within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. This situation weakened the performance

[89] The Department of Refugee Affairs was established by the PA in April 1996 with the goal of serving the camps that remained without local representation after the PA in 1994 nominated members of municipal councils in the Palestinian cities and villages, excluding the refugee camps. The decision to establish popular committees in refugee camps was taken by the Palestinian cabinet, in its meeting held in Gaza in November 1996 (Hanafi 2010, 9).
[90] Interviews with Mr. Yousef, ibid.
[91] Interview with Mr. M. S., 57, Head of Popular Committee of Shu'fat Camp, originally from Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, at the committee headquarters in Shu'fat refugee camp on March 27, 2019. The first elections were honest that time according to Mr. M. S. and Mr. Yousef, ibid. However, they said that later on Israel tightened conditions on the committee members by arresting them and they no longer can hold such elections. The committee members are now nominated by the general commission.

of the camp's Popular Committee, which remained under Israeli control. Thus, its activities were restricted and remained limited to the implementation of infrastructure projects in the camp in cooperation with UNRWA.[92] Head of the Popular Committee said "Today, we cannot arrange a political conference in the camp for fear that Israel will arrest the committee members and stop its activities. The situation in Shu'fat camp is different from the rest of the Palestinian camps and in order to strengthen ourselves, we have recently joined efforts and established the Shu'fat Camp Institutions Committee, consolidating the institutions in the camp, including the Child Center, Youth Social Center, the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp, the Popular Committee, and Al Quds Charitable Society."[93] He said that the Israeli authorities are not allowing them to accomplish anything. He himself has been arrested several times since he assumed his responsibilities as head of the Popular Committee about six months before I interviewed him in March 2019.

The lack of achievement of the institutional coalition in the camp can also be related to some form of tension between these institutions. Although none of the members of these institutions ever talked about this tension, I noticed this matter on various occasions. I will not discuss these tensions here as they are not within the scope of this research. However, these institutions are part of the legacy of the post-Oslo era, overwhelmed by neoliberal ideology and focused on institution building, taking into consideration that all the camp institutions, except the Youth Social Center, were established after Oslo.

[92] Interview with Mr. M. S. ibid.
[93] Ibid.

2.4.2. Shu'fat Refugee Camp today

Several factors gave the Shu'fat Refugee Camp its specificity today, prompting the need for further study. The construction of the separation wall around Jerusalem in the early 2000s transformed the Shu'fat Refugee Camp into an isolated peripheral space, despite its proximity to the Old City of Jerusalem, thus promoting its significance as a study area. Once considered marginalized space, today, the Shu'fat Refugee Camp has strong political, social, and economic significance.

The camp refugees are distinguished by their legal status as both refugees and Jerusalemites. Thus they claim two main rights in the Palestinian cause: the right of return and the right to Jerusalem city.

The geographical location of the camp as the only Palestinian refugee camp in Jerusalem and at the same time still under direct control of Israel gives it a special political significance as a symbol and eternal reminder of the Palestinian cause, landlessness, and exile. As a Palestinian refugee camp, under direct jurisdiction of Israel, Shu'fat Refugee Camp is distinguished from the rest of the Palestinian refugee camps in Palestine and the diaspora.

The refugee status of its original inhabitants further distinguishes it from the rest of the outskirts of Jerusalem, such as Kufr Aqab. The camp is also full of paradoxes. Although it is well known as a hub for drug dealers and criminals, it is also acclaimed as a space for resistance against the Israeli occupation, revealing high spirits of agency amongst its people.

Shu'fat Refugee Camp was first established to accommodate 1948 refugees, expelled from their original towns and villages. Today it is home to tens of thousands of non-refugee Jerusalemites. Both refugees and non-refugee Jerusalemites, residents of the Shu'fat Camp, share an experience of displacement as a result of the on-going Israeli settler colonial plans to eliminate Palestinians and erase their presence with the goal of replacing them.

Also, the geographical location of the camp between Jerusalem and the West Bank encouraged West Bankers to live there for various reasons that will be discussed in the coming chapters. Thus, socially, the camp's population is distinguished with heterogeneity and diversity of origins and backgrounds.

Economically, the Shu'fat Refugee Camp today hosts considerable economic activities, benefitting the local community and the surrounding area. The influx of the returning Jerusalemites increased demand on housing, consumer goods and services at all levels. This development helped in creating new job opportunities in the construction and service sectors whith increased construction of commercial high rise buildings, and the opening of new schools and health centers in the area. It also helped in stimulating local commerce with the appearance of hundreds of small businesses in the camp's area.

Apart from the positive impact of the new developments in Shu'fat Refugee Camp, these developments also had a negative impact of gathering a large population in a very limited, suffocated and marginalized area. The most significant impact in this regard is the environmental damage due to the heavy pressure on the already poor infrastructure and services in the camp

area. Moreover, the camp area, during the past two decades, witnessed increased crime rates and insecurity. It is the convergence of all of the above mentioned factors that bestows a distinctive specificity on the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

In the next chapters I will delve more into the answers of the research questions, demonstrating how Shu'fat refugees utilized all resources of power and economic practices at hand to contribute to preventing settlement continuation on the surrounding land. Later chapters will also show how the bottom-up strategies and actions of the camp refugees to expand the boundaries of their camp and bring economic gains for a small group of camp residents had a socio-economic impact on the camp and bring about serious political results.

CHAPTER THREE

3. Resisting Colonialism through Urban Self-Development

Figure 3.1: Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, January 3, 2019.

3.1. Introduction

This chapter tries to answer the first minor question of the thesis: What are the processes of socio-economic differentiation that have taken place in the Shufat Refugee Camp since its establishment in the mid-sixties?

With settler colonialism as my theoretical frame, I will also build on the analysis of Lila Abu Lughod (1990) in agreement with Michel Foucault (1978) with the goal of exploring mechanisms of power and resistance in Shu'fat refugee camp. According to Abu Lughod, resistance should not be viewed as an expression of power, but rather as a diagnostic of power, especially in "particular situations" (Abu Lughod 1990, 42). She specifically builds on Foucault's quote, "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault 1978, 95-96). Abu Lughod stated that "where there is resistance, there is power," (Abu Lughod 1990, 42).

This is a suitable way to study the power of the marginalized or what we may call power from below that is expressed through resistance: the resistance that is performed as a reaction to certain situations; it does not follow a particular ideology; and it is not meant to overthrow the authority, but rather it is a means to overcome precariousness and marginalization.

In our case, it is the Shu'fat refugees' resistance against their precariousness, domination and encampment in deteriorating conditions, as well as their status as displaced people relying on humanitarian aid. Their main goal is to improve their conditions and meet the growing needs of their families without considering national liberation or ending the occupation through their practices and actions.

This research has traced the workings of the socio-economic power of the Shu'fat Camp refugees through their urban actions and practices that are seen as forms of unorganized collective resistance. Abu Lughod's work is important in helping us to present "unlikely forms of resistance" and to understand how "intersecting and often conflicting structures of power work together …. in communities that are gradually becoming more tied to multiple and often nonlocal systems" (Abu Lughod 1990, 42). Studying Bedouin women's forms of resistance, Abu Lughod diagnoses forms of authoritarian power imposed on women. However, in this research, I will be diagnosing forms of power from below of the marginalized through their unlikely forms of resistance. These are revealed in the unorganized collective resistance of the Shu'fat Camp residents.

In order to extend the understanding of the unorganized collective resistance, I draw on Asef Bayat's concept of collective action[94] and social non-movements (Bayat 2013) to explain the different intertwined situations in this study. Although Bayat did not actually define his concept of "social non-movements", the description that Bayat provided for his concept confirms that ordinary people are not passive. In his book *Life as Politics: How ordinary people changed the Middle East*, Bayat introduced the concept social non-movements, which "refers to the collective actions of non-collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations" (Bayat 2013, 15). Bayat defined the ordinary people in his book to include urban poor, women, and youth who struggle to survive, ensure a living space, and improve their living situation.

Shu'fat Camp residents represent a real example of these social non-movements in their actions to ensure a dignified life during the different phases of their history. Considering their collective actions as a form of resistance, we can diagnose sources of power that pushed the camp residents to act, defy and resist the settler colonial regime that transformed them into refugees, separated them from their homes and lands and left them in marginalization and precariousness. Thus Bayat's concept of "social non-movements" can be an important analytical framework for exploring the collective action of the Shu'fat Camp residents within a settler colonial context.

[94] Asef Bayat was not the first to use the concept of collective action. In his *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Mancur Olson (1965/1971) used the concept to develop a theory of political sciences and economics, arguing that "groups of individuals with common interests usually attempt to further those common interests" (Olson 1971, 1). In this study I am not in a position to discuss Olson's theory but I rather build on Bayat's use of the concept as he connects it with other concepts that are of concern in this thesis, such as social non-movements.

Becoming a refugee not only involves movement or displacement from one place to another, it also involves being forced to create a relation to a new place. The refugee is forced to squeeze into that new place and utilize it to its limits so he can fulfill his natural human need for housing and space. This chapter will show how urban construction can be viewed as a source of resistance and power at the hands of the Shu'fat refugees to overcome the marginalization, imposed by their status as refugees within a hegemonic settler colonial regime.

In this chapter I want to explore the type of power ordinary people possess that enables them to change their lives. I am also interested here in socio-economic transformation and development to resist settler colonialism.

My data (unfortunately very limited, as mentioned before) allow me to follow in detail the processes of socio-economic differentiation in Shu'fat Camp. In particular, I want to show why and how urban construction helps to subvert colonialization by limiting or erasing its intended effects of marginalization. This is the resistance I am analyzing in the case of Shu'fat camp. Along this line several research questions will be addressed at different points in this chapter.

3.2. Construction development in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp

Figure 3.2: Shu'fat Refugee Camp - 2006. Source: Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp.

Palestinian refugee camps were established as temporary spaces until the Palestinian refugee problem is resolved. However, the protracted situation of the refugee camps encouraged an urbanization process at different socio-economic levels (Bshara 2014, 14). The Shu'fat Refugee Camp witnessed a continual process of urbanization accompanied by socio-economic differentiation since its establishment in 1965. As of 1995, this transformation in the Shu'fat Camp began moving at a fast pace for reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter.

My research shows that the Shu'fat Refugee Camp witnessed two phases of a construction boom since its establishment in the mid-sixties. The first phase took place mainly inside the original UNRWA camp boundaries as of the late seventies and extended through the eighties and into the nineties. This phase was first distinguished by horizontal construction and then a shift to verticalization due to the growing number of camp refugees.[95] This phase also witnessed the first initiative to expand the camp's boundaries towards the east in the late eighties and nineties.

[95] Interview with Head of Popular Committee, ibid.

However, the really significant expansion of the camp boundaries took place during the second phase of construction from the early 2000s onward. This phase took the form of commercial high rise buildings to meet the increasing demand for affordable housing. This demand was caused by the Jerusalemites, who had been living outside the Jerusalem municipality borders and were forced by the "center of life policy" to return to live in the city to protect their residency status. The density of construction in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp dissolved the original boundaries of the camp and expanded its area. This proved to have a major impact on the general socio-economic situation in the camp as will be discussed in the coming sections of this chapter.

3.2.1. First phase of the construction boom in Shu'fat Camp: 1970s-1990s

According to the contacted refugees, before the 1967 war, all camp refugees had similar living standards with no significant differences as all of them lived on UNRWA rations. After losing their land in the wake of the 1948 war, all the refugees received UNRWA assistance and they were obliged to conduct any work that was available to them. UNRWA employed many of them at its facilities but this was not enough to overcome the high level of unemployment amongst them. "We all were the same." This is a sentence spoken by nearly all the interviewees.

However, signs of slight socio-economic differentiation could be traced through their narratives as some of them were able to renovate their houses in the camp or build a simple wall around them during the sixties, whilst others could not afford this action. This meant that some refugees were capable of investing some money in improving their conditions at early stages of the camp life. Refugees capable of doing that included people who already had employment in the Old

City of Jerusalem and maintained that work after they were moved to Shu'fat in the mid-sixties in addition to shop owners in the camp. The refugees who turned parts of their houses in the Old City of Jerusalem into small shops and consequently lost them upon their movement to Shu'fat camp were provided with new shops that UNRWA built for them in the camp as compensation.[96]

These were amongst the privileged in the camp to have a source of income at that time. However, the most privileged were the refugees, whom UNRWA employed in its facilities. Upon an agreement that was reached between UNRWA and Jordan and signed on March 14, 1951, UNRWA was to prioritize the employment of Palestinian refugees when employing personnel to provide services in the refugee camps (UNTS No. 394, 1951). This agreement applied to UNRWA works in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp when it was established in 1965. Employment at UNRWA facilities helped many of the camp refugees improve their economic conditions as confirmed by the refugees themselves. For example, Um 'Umran said, "After we moved to Shu'fat, my husband worked for the agency (UNRWA) as a gardener and he was getting JD 75 per month which was considered a large amount at that time. When he started working for the agency and getting a salary, UNRWA stopped providing us with food support. UNRWA employment regulations stipulated that refugee employees would no longer be entitled to this benefit unless they agreed to a JD 5 cut from their salaries. He agreed to this salary cut so that we could continue to receive food support. With his work with UNRWA, our economic conditions subsequently improved and we were able to expand our house and build a wall around it."[97]

[96] Interview with Um 'Umran, ibid.
[97] Ibid

The post-1967 era in the Shu'fat Camp was characterized by a relative improvement in the socio-economic conditions of Shu'fat Camp refugees. The illegal incorporation of Jerusalem, including Shu'fat Camp into the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, granted the camp refugees a new status, allowing them access to work in Israel and to receiving certain social benefits in addition to health services (Hawker 2013, 11; Karmi 2005, 7).

Access to the Israeli labour market opened new work opportunities for them, while at the same time making them dependent on the Israeli economy. Like most of the Jerusalem and West Bank workers in Israel, the camp refugees worked mostly in blue-collar fields that do not require an academic education, including construction, cleaning, and car repair (Klein 2001, 24). The elderly, who could not work and were above retirement age, received a monthly allowance. The wages of the Jerusalem and West Bank workers in Israel were lower than those of Israeli citizens; however, they were quite good for those that were unemployed (Ellman and Laacher 2003, 10).

The refugees' narratives revealed the emergence of a real estate market in the camp after 1967. The refugees were renting and selling their houses. The houses were sold or rented mainly to displaced Palestinians in the wake of the 1967 war, particularly inhabitants of the Moroccan Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem[98] and the destroyed villages of 'Imwas and Yalo,[99] as they became homeless after Israel destroyed their living places.

[98] Interview with Mrs. Manal (nickname), 38, at gym center – Shu'fat Camp on October 28, 2018.
[99] Interview with Um Khalil, ibid.

In the late sixties and early seventies, UNRWA houses were sold for JD 50-70[100] and leased for about JD 15 a year.[101] As the cost of living spiked and the houses were renovated and improved by the refugees in the late seventies, the prices of UNRWA houses in the camp increased to reach about JD 1000 in the late seventies and early eighties. All this happened without UNRWA's interference.

This kind of real estate sector in the camp was limited to some of the camp refugees, who were fortunate enough to be able to buy land or houses in other Jerusalem neighbourhoods, seeking better conditions and bigger houses. The story of Mrs. Iman expresses this trend amongst the camp refugees, "My late father was renting a small shop for mending shoes in the Old City of Jerusalem. I do not know how we moved from the Old City to Shu'fat Camp. I was not born yet that time. But I know that my father maintained his work in that shop until his death in 1984. My mother worked in sewing to help my father raise us. My brothers did not continue their education. They worked in Israel to support my father. Two of them worked as taxi and bus drivers and the rest worked in Israeli factories. In 1983, one year before my father passed away, we had already saved a good amount of money to purchase a house in Semiramis,[102] leaving the UNRWA house in Shu'fat Camp." [103] But these refugees who were able to find a living outside the camp were in fact rare.[104] The overwhelming majority of the refugees never left the camp.

[100] Interview with Um Jihad, ibid. In the early seventies, her husband bought the UNRWA house of his neighbor to expand his own house.
[101] Interview with Um Khalil, ibid.
[102] Semiramis is about thirteen kilometers north of the Old City of Jerusalem at the entrance to Ramallah,
[103] Interview with Mrs. Iman, ibid.
[104] There is no exact number of the refugees, who were able to purchase land or house in other Jerusalem neighbourhoods outside Shu'fat Camp in the eighties. During fieldwork, I met two people, who said that their families left the camp to find a better living in other Jerusalem neighbourhoods in the eighties: One in Semiramis and one in Beit Hanina. However, with the growing number of their families, some of the family members returned to live in their UNRWA house in Shu'fat Camp as they could not purchase or rent a house in Jerusalem due to the deepening housing crisis in the city.

According to camp residents, in the late seventies and early eighties more refugees were able to save some money to invest in renovating their houses or constructing additional rooms, wherever space was available around their original UNRWA houses. This was done in order to meet the natural increase in family members. Any additional construction would have needed written authorization from UNRWA (Bocco 2010, 248). However, not all refugees abided by this requirement. When asked about UNRWA's response to the expansion of the camp houses, Mr. Mousa, one of the camp refugees said, "Whether the agency (UNRWA) knew about it or not (the new construction), people did not care and the agency always avoided any confrontation with the refugees."[105] Whether UNRWA avoided confrontation with the camp refugees, or lost control of them, the refugees acted as if they owned their UNRWA houses.[106]

What power do poor people possess to enable them to make changes in their lives? Sociologists agree that there should be resources of power in the hands of marginalized people, enabling them to get over regulations imposed on them (Piven 2008, 3). So, what are the resources in the hands of Shu'fat refugees? We can diagnose this source of power when we consider that the simple real estate market in the camp is a form of resistance. I consider this failure to adhere to UNRWA's regulations as the first step towards further forms of resistance by camp refugees that are to follow in this chapter. The refugees' action and form of resistance are not directed against UNRWA *per se* as much as it is directed against their own precarious situation that they want to

[105] Interview with Mr. Mousa, ibid.

[106] This development of Shu'fat Camp is similar to the development and changes that other Palestinian refugee camps experience in the Middle East during the same period of time. Despite the fact that refugees do not officially own their houses or the land where their houses are built, informal economies and governance have emerged in other Palestinian refugee camps as refugees sell and rent houses that officially they do not and cannot own (see for example Mohammed Kamel Dorai's (2011) work on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and their urban development; see also Diana Martin 2015).

overcome. At the same time, resisting their precariousness is resisting the colonial power that caused it.

I may attribute this development in Shu'fat camp to two factors. The first is the increasing politicization of the camp refugees, especially during the First *Intifada* of 1987-1993, which made them feel that they possessed the power to master their lives and space. The second factor, which is the most compelling, is the failure of both UNRWA and the Jerusalem municipality to take into consideration the refugees' growing needs of housing as their families are naturally increasing. These two factors, along with the diminishing hope of return, made the refugees work on proving themselves as people capable of resisting their situations, fending for themselves, fulfilling their growing needs, and getting over the hardships they experienced in their lives.

Badawy et al. (2015) attributed UNRWA's lack of intervention in refugee construction expansion to a change in UNRWA's planning authority. It was strict in the first period until 1960, providing each family with only an eighty meter square plot of land to live in. Later these parameters were less strict, enabling the building of extensions (Badawy et al. 2015, 34).

Studying such developments in other Palestinian refugee camps, Khaldoun Bshara (2014) and Sari Hanafi (2009) attributed the failure of the camp refugees to adhere to UNRWA's regulations to the agency's limited assistance to refugees as of 1982 and halting the mass distribution of food rations (Bshara 2014, 16). According to Bshara, this made the camp refugees feel free of the burden to comply with UNRWA's "order of things." The refugees no longer felt obliged to abide by UNRWA rules in order to get food rations and assistance. In any case, they did not get any

such assistance from that time on. Mr. Mousa's words, quoted above, also hint that UNRWA no longer possessed the means to control the people and force them to abide by its rules and regulations.

Food rations were also used by UNRWA as a bio-power tool to depoliticize refugees, according to Hanafi (2009, 503). This means that food rations served a larger purpose than simply providing refugees with food to survive. According to the analysis of Hanafi, they served as UNRWA's tool to control the refugees and force them to abide by its rules. In order to get food to survive, the refugees needed to follow UNRWA's regulations, including the requirement to obtain a construction license if a refugee needed to expand his home. In their analysis, Bshara and Hanafi referred to Palestinians in all the refugee camps and not only the Shu'fat refugees as additional construction was witnessed in nearly all Palestinian refugee camps during the same period of time.

Any authority needs to possess some tools to control people under its supervision and if food rations were the main tool in the hands of UNRWA to control the refugees and master them, according to the analysis of Hanafi and Bshara, the question arising is: what is the point in UNRWA relinquishing that tool by completely stopping food rations, especially as the assumed domination by UNRWA was not reported by the camp refugees?

The narrations of the camp refugees only gave evidence, proving that UNRWA always avoided any clashes with the refugees and did not interfere in their actions. For example, UNRWA did not even interfere when one of the refugees decided to demolish one of the public latrines in

front of his house in order to build a wall around his house although this latrine was built by UNRWA itself and serves all the camp refugees.[107] Explaining UNRWA's failure to interfere in the actions of the camp refugees in this regard, the UNRWA director in the camp said that "UNRWA is not mandated to interfere in the actions and practices of the refugees. UNRWA's main role is the administration of services."[108]

3.2.1.a. Horizontal expansion

The work of some refugees for UNRWA and the new work opportunities during the seventies caused a degree of economic segregation amongst the camp refugees. The more privileged, who were working for UNRWA and in the construction sector in Israel, were able to invest their earnings in purchasing land and building new houses outside the camp boundaries but they still did not relinquish their houses inside the camp.

For example, one of the refugees was able to buy a piece of land, several meters outside the original western boundaries of the camp to build a new home. He left his UNRWA house for his newly married son as stated by Um 'Umran: "My husband saved some money from his work for the agency (UNRWA) and bought half a dunum of land from a Shu'fati owner to build this house, where we are sitting now. This area is called Ras Khamis, outside the camp. We bought it for JDs 1,200 at that time (estimated around 1975). But we did not have the entire amount (of money) that time, so we borrowed from relatives and friends. The land was mountainous. My husband levelled it with his own hands. He did not use a bulldozer or any machine. We then had

[107] Interview with Um Jihad, ibid.
[108] A follow up telephone call on September 22, 2020, with UNRWA Director in Shu'fat Camp, ibid.

a builder build this house. The construction of the house cost us only JD 450 that time. We left the agency (UNRWA) house inside the camp for my son."[109]

That was not the only case, in which refugees gathered savings to buy land and construct a house outside the camp boundaries. Um Ashraf also said that her husband was able to buy a piece of land in Dahyet As-Salam and built a two storey house for his sons to live there.[110]

However, seeking housing outside the camp boundaries by the camp refugees was not a widespread practice during the seventies and eighties as many were not capable of buying land. The majority of the camp refugees tried to fulfill their need for additional rooms with horizontal expansion of their UNRWA houses that took place on the public space in the camp itself. This caused the narrowing of internal roads and a lack of public space in the camp. In the late eighties, horizontal expansion reached its limits with very narrow lanes to reach houses.[111] This created the need for vertical expansion.

[109] Interview with Um 'Umran, ibid.
[110] Interview with Um Ashraf, ibid.
[111] Interviews with Mr. Yousef, ibid and Head of Popular Committee, ibid.

3.2.1.b. Vertical expansion

Figure 3.3: Vertical expansion in Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, January 3, 2019.

With the natural increase in family members and the growing need for more space for new spouses in the camp, horizontal expansion reached a saturation point and camp refugees started building vertically by adding more storeys to their original UNRWA houses. In 2017, it was estimated that about 47% of the camp houses possessed more than two storeys and again, this vertical construction was not authorized by UNRWA (Careccia 2017, 9). The vertical construction was deemed as posing safety hazards since the foundations of UNRWA houses were designed to hold no more than two floors (UNRWA 2015, 3; Badawy et.al. 2015, 7). Thus far no collapses have been reported.

Vertical construction was also improperly planned and designed allowing nearly no space between houses and forming rows of terraced houses with jarring designs. This chaotic situation inside the camp confirms UNRWA's loss of control over informal construction in the camp. The UNRWA director in the Shu'fat Camp said UNRWA is not mandated to monitor the practices of refugees, but, those that exceed its construction rules are no longer qualified for UNRWA's maintenance services. According to him, "UNRWA offers maintenance services to UNRWA

houses up to two storeys only and any refugee, who exceeds this number of storeys, loses his right to maintenance services."[112]

Commenting on the increased construction inside the camp horizontally and vertically, the Head of the Popular Committee in the camp said that the camp's population is increasing rapidly and the small UNRWA houses are no longer suitable for accommodating large families. "The people want a dignified living for them and their children. That is the minimum of the needs of the human being."[113]

In addition to the hazards that vertical construction poses for the lives of inhabitants, other problems appeared that are associated with infrastructure. Additional storeys, overcrowding and improper installation of infrastructure increased the burden on the already poor water and sewage networks in the camp, thus creating further sanitation, health and environmental problems. According to UNRWA, "Due to the rapid population rise, the (sewage) network quickly became insufficient, with sewage pipes frequently clogging and adding to the unsanitary conditions of the camp. Residents responded by building their own sewage lines, sometimes connecting them to storm-water channels. In times of flooding, storm water mixed with sewage overflows into streets and shelters, causing health concern" (UNRWA 2015, 2). Although this may reveal the agency of the residents, who were forced to bear the responsibility of providing themselves with their needs of infrastructure to overcome the worsening conditions, it also indicates the need for serious UNRWA intervention to improve the quality of public infrastructure to avoid the problems arising in the camp.

[112] A follow-up telephone call with UNRWA Director in Shu'fat Camp on September 22, 2020, ibid.
[113] Interview with Head of the Popular Committee, ibid.

Moreover, the expansion onto the streets and public spaces risks the health of refugees in emergency situations. Very narrow pathways to reach the houses mean that an ambulance or a fire vehicle would not be able to access these houses in emergency situations. In order to overcome this problem, in 2013, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) introduced fully equipped mini-ambulances (*traktoron*) to use in areas with narrow streets, including Shu'fat Refugee Camp. These mini-ambulances help paramedics in reaching patients more easily.[114]

By the late eighties and early nineties, the camp area had become nearly fully saturated with both horizontal and vertical construction whilst the camp's population continued growing. Camp residents complained that UNRWA has no plans to meet the housing needs of the camp's natural growth. Asked about the reasons behind the absence of such plans, the UNRWA Director confirmed that it is a political issue that he has no answer for.[115]

The Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp is working on improving the camp's infrastructure by implementing vital projects. Head of the committee said, "We applied for many funded infrastructure projects and we won several of them. Currently, we are supervising a project to improve the sewerage system in the camp. We are trying our best to serve our camp people and improve their conditions."[116]

[114] PRCS website:
https://www.palestinercs.org/index.php?page=post&pid=22758&catid=4&parentid=67&y=1&langid=2
[115] Interview with UNRWA Director, ibid.
[116] Interview with Head of the Popular Committee, ibid.

3.2.1.c. First initiative to expand camp boundaries

Map 3.1: Location of Sheikh Lulu *waqf* land. Source: POICA, http://poica.org/2001/07/sharons-demolition-campaign-in-Shu'fat-camp/

The impact of the First *Intifada* and the politicization of the camp refugees on developments in the Shu'fat Camp can explain the establishment of the Sheikh Lulu[117] neighbourhood on *waqf* land[118] outside the northeastern boundaries of Shu'fat Camp in the nineties. The appropriation of the *waqf* land by about 35 of the camp refugees in 1989-1990 and the construction of private family houses later on was deemed the first practical move to expand the boundaries of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp in the nineties (Alkhalili 2017a, 62). The total area of this land, which is part of 'Anata village, is approximately 53,773 square meters.

However, this move was not without its human and financial costs. In July 2001, Israeli bulldozers demolished 17 newly built houses in the neighbourhood, 14 of which were already inhabited. The demolition took place within 24 hours of notifying the house owners of the

[117] The land was named after its endower Sheikh Lulu, one of the warriors, who accompanied the Muslim Leader Salah Eddin el Ayyoubi in his campaign to free Jerusalem from the Crusaders (Alkhalili 2017a, 67). The residents of the Shu'fat Camp area give it different names. They also call it the *Awqaf* neighbourhood or the *Hursh* (forest) neighbourhood.

[118] *Waqf* (plural: *Awqaf*) means endowment. Based on (Fakher Eddin and Tamari 2018 and Al 'Aref 2012) Waqf is the dedication of any kind of assets, whether land or buildings for a charitable public use. In Jerusalem, there are different types of endowments. First; there is the "philanthropic endowment" (*Waqf Khairi*), including Sheikh Lulu land, mentioned in this chapter. In this case, rentals of these endowments refer to the Islamic *Waqf* Department. Second, there is the "generational endowment" *(Waqf Dhurri*), such as many of the buildings of the Old City of Jerusalem, including those in the Jewish Quarter. In this case, rentals of these houses refer to Muslim Jerusalemite families.

demolition decision, thus giving no chance for the owners to petition against the demolition order. The demolished houses consisted of 25 apartments, providing living space for 122 people (POICA 2001).

During the Jordanian rule over the West Bank and Jerusalem, the land was planted with pine trees and after the 1967 occupation of the OPT, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) planted it with more pine, cypress, and eucalyptus trees (Ibid, 67). The intervention of the JNF in foresting the neighbourhood was not without colonial goals. Forestation is used by the JNF to claim land as it is used as a means to demarcate Israeli space and therefore help in dispossession of Palestinian land. The JNF considered itself as "making use of areas that Arabs could not," (Long 2009, 61-66). According to Shaul Ephraim Cohen (1993), the forestation in the Jerusalem area was meant to create a 'green belt' for Israel to claim land, especially lands with ambiguous or disputed ownership and to prevent its Palestinian use, leaving it for Jewish expansion when needed. Cohen stated that afforestation of open areas in Jerusalem was meant for emphasizing Israeli presence in the city. "(T)he extended green belt would touch upon the land of a number of Palestinian neighborhoods within the city, some sixteen villages bordering it, and the nonresidential areas that lay between them. This effort to encompass Jerusalem in an afforested belt caused and continues to generate significant conflict," (Cohen 1993, 1-2). This indicates that the Zionist movement used several means to appropriate land for the purpose of accomplishing its settler colonial goals in Palestine. Forestation of Palestinian land was one of these means.

An Arab guard was appointed by the Israeli civil administration to guard the forest, but with the eruption of the First *Intifada*, he withdrew, and Israel did not appoint another person. The

absence of the guard encouraged a group of 35 camp refugees to enter the land, fence it, and use it for construction later on. Each person erected fences around a piece of the land to claim it as their own. The Shu'fat refugees who initiated the appropriation of this *waqf* land were mostly politically engaged people during the *Intifada* that considered their action as national action to protect the empty and idle land against expropriation. One of them is Abu Mohammed, who was quoted in Noura Alkhalili (2017a, 67) as saying: "We were the sons of the refugee camp and the main activists of the First *Intifada*. During that time, we planned to attack (invade) this land and not anyone could do this."

However, cutting the trees and construction did not start immediately. It was only after the establishment of the PA in 1994 and the approval of President Yasser Arafat that the refugees were encouraged to go forward with the construction, with financial support from Orient House.[119] Thus, the construction took place only in the late nineties, after which the refugees approached the *Waqf* Administration to legalize this action. They reached an agreement with the *Waqf* Administration to lease the land for rentals, considering that the refugees were protecting the land against confiscation, (Alkhalili 2017a, 67-70).

These developments significantly impacted the lives of Shu'fat refugees. The above mentioned general economic improvement of some of the refugees, due to opening more work opportunities in the Israeli labour market, helped them to sustain and above all improve their livelihoods after UNRWA limited its assistance. Politically, the refugees became aware that there was no hope in

[119] Orient House is the PLO Headquarters in Jerusalem in the 1980s and 1990s. Israel closed Orient House on August 10, 2001 (Source: http://www.orienthouse.org/about/index.html).

the near future of returning to their original villages and so, they had to bear the responsibility of fulfilling their growing needs and survive.

3.2.2. Second phase of construction boom in Shu'fat Refugee Camp – 2000s

Figure 3.4: Ras Shehada – Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, June 20, 2019.

The second phase of the construction boom in the surrounding area of the Shu'fat Camp began in the early 2000s. It took the form of a surge in high rise buildings for commercial purposes, that are built on Shu'fat *Musha'* land[120] in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills, northwest and south of the camp, respectively. This new construction was meant to absorb Jerusalemites, seeking an address within the Jerusalem boundaries (Graff 2014, 20-21; see also Alkhalili 2017b). According to Mohammed Muhsen (2019), between 2005 and 2018, more than 200 high-rise commercial buildings were built in the two areas of expansion in the camp. Each building consisted of no less than 8 storeys, including about 32 apartments each. [121]

Our argument here is that this second phase of the construction boom in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada was a direct result of the Israeli discriminatory policies in Jerusalem since 1967, and

[120] *Musha'* land is the Arabic word for "common" land. *Musha'* land was a system of land tenure in the Levant since the Ottoman period.
[121] More details on the land purchase and development will be discussed in the next chapter of this study.

specifically the new "center of life policy."[122] This section will focus on these policies that are driven by Israel's settler colonial logic and demographic plans of ensuring a Jewish majority in the city (Bimkom 2014, 83).

3.2.2.a. Israel's discriminatory planning policies in Jerusalem since 1967

Since 1967, Israel has been implementing discriminatory planning policies against the Palestinians in Jerusalem. Several characteristics distinguish these policies. First, Israel is interested in isolating Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian areas for political reasons. According to Nadav Shargai (2010, 6), "Linking the built-up Palestinian areas within Jerusalem to the built-up Palestinian areas outside of it can only reinforce the Palestinian demand to recognize the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem as a single political entity," which Israel is trying to prevent. Second, the eastern part of Jerusalem was left without a master plan; it thereby left a large part of Palestinian construction in the city including the Shu'fat Camp area, illegal and subject to demolition (see El-Atrash 2016 for further details). With this Israel gave itself the right to decide what is legal and what is not in the city according to its goals and interests. This in turn led to an increase in the cost of land, licensed construction, and rentals in Jerusalem thereby causing a deep housing crisis in the city. This situation negatively impacted Palestinian residents, who were obliged to find alternative ways to meet their own housing needs. As of the eighties, tens of thousands of Jerusalemites sought better construction and living conditions outside the city's municipal boundaries, where rentals are cheaper and there is more freedom to build without paying high licensing fees (Badawy et.al. 2015, 5).

[122] More details on the "center of life policy" will be provided in the next section of this chapter.

Living in the ʻAnata village, five kilometers northeast of Jerusalem, I witnessed first-hand the development of mobility of Jerusalemites in the peripheral areas of Jerusalem as ʻAnata was directly impacted by this mobility. During the eighties and early nineties, the real estate sector in ʻAnata village prospered due to the mobility of Jerusalemites into the village. This situation impacted the entire rental and construction sector, which is one of the main sources of income for the village residents.

Prior to this mobility of the Jerusalemites into the village, the construction sector in ʻAnata was exclusively focused on building private houses. However, it started taking the form of housing projects for commercial purposes to meet the increasing demand of Jerusalemites for affordable housing in the village. Unlike spaces within the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality, construction in ʻAnata village, which is located well outside the northeastern Jerusalem municipal boundaries, was not subject to the planning regulations that the Jerusalem municipality imposed on Palestinian construction under its jurisdiction. ʻAnata residents are not required to pay Arnona taxes[123] nor are they obliged to pay high prices for construction licenses. The real-estate market flourished in ʻAnata village and continued to absorb more Jerusalemites until the beginning of the twenty-first century as Israel started tightening conditions on the Palestinian Jerusalemites living outside of Jerusalem.[124]

[123] Arnona Tax is a municipal tax that is imposed on buildings and land property and is paid annually (Source: Jerusalem municipality website: https://www.jerusalem.muni.il/en/Municipality/Services/Arnona/Pages/Default.aspx (Accessed October 30, 2018).

[124] More research is necessary and suggested on the mobility of the Palestinian Jerusalemites from Jerusalem to the surrounding West Bank villages during the eighties such as Bir Nabala, ar-Ram, Kufr Aqab, Abu Dis, and ʻEizareya, in addition to ʻAnata.

Israel's settler colonial measures and policies in Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular never stopped, on the contrary, they continued and assumed different dimensions over time. In the wake of the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993, Israel started implementing new conditions on the ground in Jerusalem. The goal was to prevent any possible settlement with the Palestinians regarding the city, and instead pushed towards promoting its demographic plans in favour of the Jewish majority (Shargai 2010, 6). One of Israel's means to achieve its demographic plans in Jerusalem was the so called "center of life policy"[125] that Israel began implementing in 1995, thereby forcing tens of thousands of Jerusalemites already living outside the city's boundaries to return to live in the city.

The "center of life policy" does not apply to Jews (Badil 2006, 30). It was first adopted upon a high court ruling in 1988, during deliberations of the case of Mubarak 'Awad, who left Jerusalem in 1970 for the USA for education and returned in the eighties, using his US passport. When 'Awad applied to renew his Jerusalem identity card in 1987, the Ministry of Interior rejected his application on claims that 'Awad was no longer a resident of Jerusalem.[126]

Again, the Israeli Ministry of Interior started implementing the so called 'center of life policy' in 1995 with the goal of revoking the residency status of Jerusalemites living outside of the city as part of its demographic plans in Jerusalem (Jefferis 2012, 94-96). However, the "center of life policy" proved counterproductive to Israel's plans (Karmi 2005, 11). Instead of resigning to their fate, the Jerusalemites returned to the city *en masse*. These Jerusalemites did not want to lose the privileges their identity cards granted them, including social benefits and access to work

[125] HCJ 282/88: Mubarak 'Awad vs 1. Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, and Police Minister, May 9, 1988-June 5, 1988: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/1430_eng.pdf.
[126] Ibid.

opportunities in Israel. Thus, the Shu'fat Refugee Camp became an affordable option for them (Karmi 2005, 11) despite its miserable conditions including chaos, crowdedness and lack of services. Thousands of these Jerusalemites could not afford to live in expensive Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Beit Hanina, Shu'fat and Sheikh Jarrah. In addition, the housing crisis in Jerusalem was still serious and there weren't enough empty apartments to absorb all returning Jerusalemites.

The housing crisis in Jerusalem is manufactured to suite the Zionist settler colonial project and its plans for demographic change in Jerusalem with the goal of getting Palestinians out of the city and tightening Jewish control. Forcing Palestinians out of their city and displacing them is one manifestation of the logic of elimination and exclusion in which settler colonialism is grounded. Israel tries to achieve this goal with its discriminatory planning policies in Jerusalem. Israel's Master Plan for the city, called "Jerusalem 2020" which was published in 2004 ensures this vision by enhancing Jewish settlement construction and expansion, whilst limiting Palestinian housing construction.

However, the determination of Jerusalemites to return to live within the city boundaries posed a real challenge to Israel's plans for demographic change. As a result, the Israeli planning institutions were obliged to change the population target in 2020 to 60 percent Jews and 40 percent Arabs instead of 70 percent Jews and 30 percent Arabs as was planned during the seventies and eighties (Shargai 2010, 5).

This systematic attempt to displace Palestinian Jerusalemites from their city is situated perfectly within the context of Israel's settler colonial project, which aims to evacuate Jerusalem of its Palestinian inhabitants. It is part of Israel's systematic exclusion policy to get rid of the Palestinians of the city, which is represented clearly in the "center of life policy."

Although their Jerusalemite identity cards allow them access and free movement in Jerusalem and Israel, Jerusalemites are actually restricted in their movement and have limited options as to where they can live in their city. Israel's colonial policies since 1967 forced Jerusalemites to gather in spaces that Israel is no longer interested in, away from spaces that are intended for Jews. Despite all these restrictions and pressure, Palestinian Jerusalemites were able to resist Israel's colonialist policies to displace them from their city. They proved that they possess agency and power to protect their existence in their city. This was revealed when they took advantage of the legal status granted to them by the Israeli regime itself to return to live within the drawn boundaries of their city. Their action can best be understood as a collective unorganized action to return massively to live in the city, foiling the colonial plans to displace them. This form of resistance is another diagnosis of power that the marginalized possess. It is the power of survival.

3.2.2.b. Revocation of residency status

"When I married in 1992, it wasn't possible to live with my wife at our small family home in the Old City (of Jerusalem). We rented a two-room apartment in Beit Hanina. The rent was high. I decided then that it would be better for us to buy a cheap and nice apartment in 'Anata village. Thus instead of paying that sum for a rent, I would use it as a monthly payment for the apartment

that will become my ownership. Things don't always move as you wish them to be. I lived in 'Anata apartment for three years and even before I finished paying its price, I decided to return it to the contractor and lose some of my money and seek an apartment within the boundaries of Jerusalem. Israel was serious in revoking identity cards of those living out of Jerusalem. And here we have settled in Shu'fat Camp."[127]

These were the words of Nidal, 52, during an interview in 2017, thus confirming that the main reason forcing Jerusalemites to return to live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries is their fear of the revocation of their residency rights in the city. Based on data from the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER)[128] in Jerusalem and B'Tselem,[129] the table below provides statistics regarding Jerusalemite ID card revocations in Jerusalem since 1967.

Table 3.1: Statistics on revocation of residency status of Palestinian Jerusalemites since 1967

Statistics on revocation of residency status of Palestinian Jerusalemites since 1967	
Years	**No. of revocations**
67-69	678
70-79	926
80-89	1300
90-99	3273
2000-2009	8086
2010-2018	861
TOTAL	**15124**

As the table above shows, the total number of revocations of Jerusalem status between 1967 and 2018 was estimated at about 15,124. The recorded revocations soared in the nineties and reached their peak in the 2000s, which indicates the role of the "center of life policy" in these revocations.

[127] Interview with Nidal (nickname), 52, a Jerusalemite returnee, living in Ras Shehada, on January 10, 2017.
[128] JCSER is a non-profit human rights organization, established in Jerusalem in 1997 by a group of Palestinian lawyers with the goal to offer legal support to Palestinian Jerusalemites against the Israeli discriminatory policies in the city: http://www.jcser.org/arabic/?page_id=17
[129] B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories is an independent human rights organization, established in Jerusalem in 1989 by a group of Israeli academics and activists with the goal of documenting Israel's human rights violations against Palestinians: https://www.btselem.org/

Anita Vitullo (1998, 10-11) called the "center of life policy" one of Israel's "social policies" that actually impacted the daily lives of Palestinian Jerusalemites as it was Israel's "means of economic and political control over" the Jerusalemites, along with the Arnona and insurance policies.

Graham Usher (1998, 21) considered the "center of life policy" a reinterpretation by the Israeli Interior Ministry of the law governing residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites. He wrote: "In the past, East Jerusalem's Palestinians could lose their residency status if they lived outside the city for seven or more years or took a foreign passport. Under the new interpretation, residency can be revoked if Palestinians fail to produce evidence that "their center of life" is within Jerusalem's municipal borders."

Focusing on Israel's policies of revocation of Jerusalemites' residency status, whilst examining the Israeli municipal policies in East Jerusalem, Ardi Imseis, describing the "center of life policy", stated that this policy is especially harsh because it "applies retroactively and irrespective of the present residency situation of the individual in question" (Imseis 1999, 1061). Living in Jerusalem in the past does not grant a Jerusalemite, currently living outside of it, the right of residency; meanwhile, current living in the city also does not grant right of residency for a Jerusalemite, who in the past lived outside it. Moreover, Israel continues to apply tough procedures to make it hard for Jerusalemites to prove that Jerusalem is their center of life with the goal to strip them their right to live in the city," (Ibid, 1061-1062).

In order to prove to the Israeli Ministry of Interior that their center of life is Jerusalem and avoid residency status revocations, Jerusalemites must abide by a list of requirements. According to Nazmi Jubeh (2015, 17) when Jerusalemites needed to register a newborn, apply to obtain an identity card, make changes on the details of identity cards, or apply for health insurance, social security, or pension, they were obliged to present to the Israeli Ministry of Interior a long list of official documents, proving that Jerusalem is their center of life. These documents, according to Karmi (2005, 10) and Badil (2006, 30), included receipts, proving they have paid the *arnona* tax on property, paid telephone and electricity bills and other documents, proving locations of work and schools of children. If anyone failed to present any of these documents, he would be subject to the revocation of his residency status in the city. Thus the "center of life policy" has actually become a policy of 'NO LIFE' for the Palestinians as Dr. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian called it in one of our discussions in late 2019.

The so called "center of life policy" represented a turning point in the life of Shu'fat Refugee Camp. The influx of returning Jerusalemites into the camp significantly impacted the urban and socio-economic situation in the camp and its surroundings.

Jeannie O'Donnell (1999, 44) wrote that the direct impact of this law on the residents of the Shu'fat Camp is that they no longer seek better housing outside the camp and insist on staying there despite its dire conditions. O'Donnell (1999) was one of the first researchers to conduct a detailed and in-depth study of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. She said that the residents of the camp, in both their status as refugees and Jerusalemites, struggle to achieve a normal life under Israel's discriminatory colonial policies in Jerusalem. Thus, Shu'fat refugees struggle to gain the rights

they are entitled to due to their unique status. As refugees that were expelled from their towns and villages by a settler colonial regime, Shu'fat camp residents do not relinquish their right of return, which Israel has always denied. As Jerusalemites, Shu'fat refugees suffer under Israel's discriminatory policies against the Palestinian presence in the city, which Israel considers as defying its demographic plans in the city.[130]

Omar Karmi (2005, 7) estimated that approximately 25,000-30,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites, living outside Jerusalem, were forced to return to live in the city in the nineties as a result of the implementation of this policy. The movement of the returning Jerusalemites into the Jerusalem municipal boundaries was first witnessed in the late nineties in the area of Kufr Aqab, north of Jerusalem, (see for example Khamaisi 2013; Dajani et al. 2013; and Saqqa 2015). The influx of these Jerusalemites into the Shu'fat Refugee Camp started several years later around the year 2000.

As well as Nidal, quoted above, most Jerusalemites living in 'Anata sought to move to the nearby Shu'fat Refugee Camp, only one kilometer to the west. Some of them sold their homes in 'Anata, whilst others simply left them empty, hoping to return later.

This situation was not exclusive to Jerusalemites in 'Anata, but in other areas as well. In an interview with Um Mahmoud, a resident of Ras Shehada, she said: "We were living in Daheyat el-Barid. My husband said we will move temporarily to Shu'fat Camp. He said that we will be living there for several months only until we prove (to the Israeli authorities) that we are living in

[130] Further analysis of the significance of the presence of a Palestinian refugee camp under direct Israeli jurisdiction can be found in chapter two of this thesis.

a Jerusalem area and then get back to our home. We have been living in the camp for fifteen years now and there is no sign that we will return to our home in Daheyat el-Barid."[131] Mostly, Jerusalemites sought a living in areas of expansion of the Shu'fat Camp in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills outside the UNRWA boundaries of the camp (See map 3.1 below).

Nonetheless, many of the non-refugee Jerusalemites lived inside UNRWA boundaries of Shu'fat Camp. There is no exact number of the non-refugee Jerusalemites living in UNRWA houses as owners or tenants. For UNRWA the original camp houses are still in the names of their original refugee inhabitants as UNRWA does not recognize selling or rental transactions, although it did not interfere to prevent them.[132] Non-refugee Jerusalemites have been purchasing or renting UNRWA houses in the camp as early as the beginning of 2000s in the wake of Israel's tightening conditions on their presence in Jerusalem, and so the issue is not very new. In an interview with Um Anas in 2018, she said "When we left our house in Daheyat el-Barid in 2005 in order to live inside Jerusalem to protect our IDs, we couldn't buy a new home, so we rented one of the old UNRWA houses inside the camp. … The owner of the house built a more spacious house in 'Anata and moved to it several years before we arrived in the camp."[133]

Um 'Omar, on the other hand, said they bought an UNRWA house in 2012. She said, "Yes, we bought an UNRWA House six years ago. The house is made of blocks and pillars. But it was renovated and clean."[134] Asking for information about the original owner of the house, she said,

[131] Interview with Um Mahmoud (nickname), 55, January 5, 2017.
[132] Interview with UNRWA Director, ibid.
[133] Interview with Um Anas (nickname), 65, originally from Beit Jibrin destroyed village, at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp on November 8, 2018.
[134] Interview with Um 'Omar, (nickname), 62, originally from Hebron, at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp, on November 8, 2018.

"He is a contractor, who built several new buildings. He moved to live with his family in an apartment of one of his buildings in Ras Shehada." She explained that they bought the house for about NIS 150,000. They paid half the amount in cash as down payment, and the rest in deferred checks to be covered on a monthly basis.[135] The interviewees did not report any intervention of UNRWA in the sale or rental of the houses.

[135] A follow up telephone call on September 19, 2020, with Um 'Omar, ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. From propertyless refugees to construction developers

Figure 4.1: Ras Khamis buildings – view from the Shu'fat village. Source: Author, February 24, 2019.

4.1. Introduction

This chapter tries to answer the second minor question: What are the pathways by which Shu'fat refugees entered into the real estate market in the camp?

The development of the urban construction sector in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp led to an unequal distribution of wealth and the creation of new strata divisions in the camp. The most striking development in this regard was the emergence of an economic elite stratum from the poor refugees, who benefitted from the high demand on housing in Jerusalem. This stratum of refugee construction developers emerged as a result of their involvement in the fast-growing commercial construction sector, which they initiated and which in turn enhanced their wealth. They mostly had no previous history or association with the field of construction, yet they became familiar with the field after they acquired Shu'fat land, adjacent to the camp.

In this chapter, I will focus on the refugee construction developers that were responsible for the urban construction in the camp's area of expansion in the Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills.

These investors were transformed from poor and propertyless refugees into rich building contractors, who were responsible for the second phase of construction in the camp area, expanding the camp's boundaries and leading socio-economic transformations in the camp area over the past two decades.

4.2. Construction developers' profile

The movement of returning Jerusalemites into the area of the Shu'fat Camp began after a group of camp refugees, who were originally from Beit Thul destroyed village, launched a campaign in the year 2000 to purchase *Musha'* land[136] belonging to the Abu Khdeir family of Shu'fat. This land borders the camp in the hills of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada.

Map 4.1: The location of area of expansion of Shu'fat Camp - Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills. Source: POICA, http://poica.org/2001/06/the-status-of-jerusalem-reconstructed-israels-unilateral-actions-determine-the-future-of-jerusalem/

[136] *Supra* note 120.

4.2.1. Significance of Beit Thul refugees

It is interesting that the refugees of Beit Thul origin, which comprised the largest number of refugees from one place of origin in the camp,[137] and the majority of the construction developers, played a significant role in the socio-economic transformations in the camp. They showed that they are wise enough to seize the opportunity at the right time and can take initiative without resigning to their fate. Their wisdom was confirmed first during the 1948 war, when they were able to understand the Deir Yassin massacre and the 1948 war events and quickly moved their cattle, belongings and any movable assets to other areas before their village was occupied. Their goal was to minimize as much as possible their war losses and at the same time to find a source of living when they would be expelled from their village, as they felt this was an imminent matter as mentioned in chapter two of this study.

Their wisdom was also revealed when they "chose" their place of refuge. Although the Old City of Jerusalem was not their direct destination after expulsion, they wanted to benefit from the empty houses in the Jewish Quarter. When they heard of the empty houses, dozens of them immediately moved from the Ramallah western villages where they had initially taken refuge to Jerusalem to occupy these empty houses. On the one hand, they would have a house to live in and on the other hand, they would benefit from living in the city that formed an economic and service center for Palestinians at that time.[138] With that, the Beit Thul refugees were able to accumulate historical-cultural experience that helped them later on after the First *Intifada* to move to another level of wisdom and to become involved in real estate.

[137] According to the Encyclopedia of Palestinian Camps, number of Palestinian refugees of Beit Thul origin, living in Shu'fat Refugee Camp reached in 2008 about 1447 people, followed by 1178 refugees of Lydda origin, (Source: http://palcamps.net/ar/camp/88/. A detailed table of the number of refugees, based on their place of origin is found in Appendix IV in this thesis.
[138] Interview with Um 'Umran, ibid.

Through my fieldwork, I found out that the evolving construction sector in the camp's area of expansion is mainly sponsored by about ten refugees. Five out of the ten refugee construction developers are originally from Beit Thul village and one has ancestors from his mother's side in Beit Thul. This seems logical since refugees originally from Beit Thul comprise the majority of the camp refugees, according to Mr. Yousef of the Popular Committee[139].

These refugees embarked on the construction of dozens of commercial skyscrapers in the Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills although they were neither rich, nor were they originally construction developers. Mostly they were drivers or workers in different sectors in the Israeli labour market. The table below provides a brief background of the most significant developers in the camp area whether refugees or non-refugees.

Table 4.1: construction developers' survey

Construction developers in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp						
No.	**Who - origin**	**Starting construction work in the camp**	**No. of commercial buildings**	**Previous work**	**Other activities**	**Notes**
Developer 1	Refugee – Beit Thul	2000	10 buildings (Ras Khamis, 'Anata Rd., Ras Shehada).	Driver	Social reformer at camp level.	Lives in a new home in Ras Shehada.
Developer 2	Refugee – Beit Thul	2000	1 building (Ras Shehada)	Owning shop for women clothes in the camp.	Well known social reformer at Jerusalem level.	
Developer 3	Refugee – Beit Thul	2001	3 buildings	Construction worker in Israeli settlements.	Owns a kids play center.	
Developer 4	Refugee - Qatanna	2002	5 buildings (Ras Khamis, Ras Shehada)	Plumber in Jerusalem and Israel		Lives in a new home in Ras Shehada
Developer 5	Refugee - Beit Luqya	2006	2 buildings (Ras Khamis, 'Anata Road)	Construction contractor in Israel.	Active in financially supporting local	Lives in an apartment in one of his housing projects in Ras

[139] Ibid.

					events in the camp.	Shehada
Developer 6	Refugee – Beit Thul	2006	5 buildings (Ras Khamis, Ras Shehada)	Construction contractor in Israel	Having furniture store in ‘Eizareya.	Still living in UNRWA house in the camp
Developer 7	Refugee – Beit Thul	2006	2 buildings (Ras Shehada)	Civil engineer in Israeli company	Owns a celebrations hall in ‘Anata Road.	
Developer 8	Refugee – Beit ‘Ur	-------	--------			Lives in an apartment in one of his housing projects in Ras Shehada
Developer 9	Refugee – Beit Thul	--------	----------			Still living in the camp
Developer 10	Non-refugee Jerusalemite	2008	2 buildings	merchant		Living outside of the camp
Developer 11	Non-refugee Jerusalemite	2007	2 buildings	Construction contractor in Israel		Living outside of the camp
Developer 12	Non-refugee Jerusalemite	2006-2008	2 buildings	Construction contractor in Israel		Living outside of the camp
Group of developers						2 or 3 developers cooperate to construct a building together and they share profits

According to the table, there are only two refugee developers, who were originally construction contractors (developers No. 5 and 6), whilst the rest included a driver, a merchant, and workers. Developers No. 11 and 12 are non-refugees, originally construction developers, who embarked on the building of commercial buildings in the camp area after the completion of the separation wall in the area in 2006.

4.2.2. Taking a risky leap into the real estate market

One may wonder why these people took such a risky step to purchase land and construct high rise buildings at a time when there is a risk of demolition by the Israeli authorities.[140] It was clear from the interviews with construction developers that their main incentive was the opportunity

[140] The Israeli policy of demolishing Palestinian houses whether on security allegations or on allegations of unlicensed construction, is one of Israel’s policies to force the Palestinian Jerusalemites out of their city (Source: OCHA 2018).

for economic gains. As they mostly worked in the Israeli market, their jobs were not profitable enough to accumulate capital to start a project to improve their family conditions. Although some of them were able to save some money, it was not enough to purchase a piece of land in Jerusalem and build a house there.

The increasing demands of life and the deteriorating conditions in the camp directed their attention to the empty and unused land, surrounding the camp. They all lived under the same deteriorating living conditions and have the same economic ambitions. Thus, land acquisition and commercial construction became the economic basis for them, through which they can accumulate capital and secure a dignified life and mostly get out of the camp's miserable houses and environment.[141] They wanted to get rich. They wanted a better future for themselves, their families and children. They wanted a future that is much better than the miserable past of their ancestors. Improving one's life is a central issue for all individuals in all societies and "a key measure by which people judge the success or failure of their own lives," (Heiberg 1993b, 276). Marian Heiberg wrote that "(t)he belief - or lack of it - that the course of one's life has in general been better than the lives of one's parents and that one's children are destined to experience still further improvements is a central, albeit indirect, indicator of an individual's evaluation of his or her life situation. How individuals view their lives in retrospect and the optimism or pessimism with which they gauge the future of their children are pivotal psychological aspects of total living conditions," (Heiberg 1993b, 276).

[141] Interviews with construction developers Abu Mansour, (nickname), refugee, originally from Beit Thul village, February 15, 2017; Sheikh Salem, ibid; Abu Mujahed, (nickname), refugee, originally from Beit Thul destroyed village in western Jerusalem. He was interviewed on the phone on July 10, 2019; and Mr. Zuheir (nickname), refugee, originally from Beit Thul village in western Jerusalem. He was interviewed on the phone on February 9, 2020.

4.3. Land acquisition and development

Figure 4.2: Ras Shehada Hill – the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, 2000. Source: POICA, http://poica.org/2001/06/the-status-of-jerusalem-reconstructed-israels-unilateral-actions-determine-the-future-of-jerusalem/.
The website presented this photo as Ras Khamis Hill, but as a person, who is familiar with the entire area, I confirm that this photo is for Ras Shehada Hill and so I modified the name above the photo.

The land of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada belongs to several families from Shu'fat, including the Abu Khdeir family, which claims the largest share of the land. There are also the families of Dar 'Issa, Sweilem, Abu Nei' and Du'eis.[142] Until the eighties, the members of these families cultivated the land and grew wheat and barley. However, they gradually stopped using the land with the increasing demand of the Israeli market for construction workers. As well as the rest of Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem villages, *Shu'fati* people were encouraged to seek more financially profitable jobs in the Israeli market, leaving the land.

Other reasons for the *Shu'fatis* to abandon their land were linked to the eruption of the First *Intifada* as the camp area became a field for nearly daily confrontations between the camp's youth and Israeli soldiers. The *Shu'fatis* were further forced to abandon this land in the late eighties when Israel constructed part of the ring road west of the Shu'fat Camp, linking Pisgat

[142] Interviews with Mr. 'Imad Abu Khdeir, 63, an architect, living in Shu'fat. Interviewed with the help of supervisor Dr. Helga Baumgarten of Birzeit University. He was sent written interview questions. His answers to the questions were received on October 29, 2020.

Ze'ev and Neve Yaakov settlements, north of Jerusalem, with the southern parts of the city. The road separated this land from Shu'fat village to the west.[143]

4.3.1. Land acquisition

The intensive process of land acquisition in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills by the camp refugees in the year 2000 was called by many of them and the people of the surrounding area a '*hajma'* on the land. Literally, '*hajma'* means an attack or invasion that reveals a kind of land hunger. The term was first used by the *Shu'fati* people to describe how the camp refugees first encroached on the land. In the year 2000, the refugees actually tried to squat the land as they did in the late eighties with the *waqf* land of Sheikh Lulu neighbourhood discussed earlier. But Shu'fat residents stopped them.[144]

Abu el-'Abed of Shu'fat recalled that one day in the year 2000, they received news from friends that the camp refugees had invaded their land in Ras Shehada and started fencing it off. They immediately headed to the targeted land. They quarreled with the refugees and kicked them out of the land. In the wake of this incident, social reformers from both the camp and Shu'fat intervened and it was agreed that any refugee who wanted a piece of land must buy it from its owners. The agreement also stipulated that any *Shu'fati* that wants his land in these areas must develop it immediately; otherwise, he must sell it. Several *Shu'fati* landowners did not sell and

[143] Interview on the phone with Abu el-'Abed (nickname), (nickname), 58, from the Abu Khdeir family in Shu'fat and one of those *Shu'fatis*, who sold land in Ras Shehada to the camp refugees in 2003, interviewed on the phone with on October 5, 2020.
[144] Interviews with Abu el-'Abed and Mr. 'Imad Abu Khdeir, ibid.

preferred to use the land for personal projects; however, the majority decided to sell whether to the camp refugees or to others.[145]

A similar *hajma* by the camp refugees also took place in the same year against land adjacent to the newly built Sheikh Lulu neighbourhood to the east of the camp. This land belonged to several families from ʻAnata village. In the same way, the *ʻAnati* landowners expelled the refugees from the land and agreed that anyone that wants to use the land must buy it from its owners. This further expanded the boundaries of the camp to the east towards ʻAnata village. A surge of high rise buildings have since appeared on this land and nearly dissolved boundaries between ʻAnata and the camp.[146]

This explains why it was called a "*hajma*" on the land. It is the invasion of the land by refugees to squat it. Although the refugees were prevented from squatting the land, people continued to use the term to describe the intensity and acceleration by which the land was acquired and developed in such a short period of time. "Approximately eighty percent of the constructed buildings in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada were built between 2000 and 2010," explained Head of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat camp.[147]

Commenting on the record speed with which all these commercial buildings appeared, Abu Mansour, a construction developer from the camp, explained, "Generally Israel demolishes homes when they are separate and isolated, but when it finds a number of homes, close to each

[145] Ibid.
[146] Interviews with Mr. Ahmed of ʻAnata, ibid, and interview with Mr. Maher (nickname), 56, one of the owners of a concrete factory in ʻAnata, providing concrete for the construction in Shu'fat Camp, interviewed on the phone on April 16, 2020.
[147] Interview with Head of the Popular Committee, ibid.

other are newly built, it gets hesitant in conducting mass demolitions, as this will evoke tension and lead to fierce confrontations in the camp. They (Israeli authorities) send demolition notifications, but the demolition itself is postponed and mostly ignored in this case. In order to achieve this result, we (construction developers) try to finish the construction as quickly as possible. This is why all these buildings appeared during the same period of time, and today, after more than ten years, they remain standing un-demolished."[148]

Abu Mansour's words reveal that the work tactic, based on speed, synergy and density of construction, is used by the camp refugees as a source of power, enabling them to defy Israel's regulations on construction. Here also, the empowerment of construction developers is due to Israel placing them in a tough situation where they need to fend for themselves to overcome the hardships Israel is creating in the way of their development.

For the purpose of this study, I will be using the term 'land acquisition' to express the action of the refugees in acquiring the land. Land acquisition in the Shu'fat Camp took several forms: In very rare cases, a refugee simply occupied a piece of land and started razing it in preparation for initiating construction on it before he came to terms with the landowners. As he started work on the land, its owners were obliged to sell it to him at a cheap price and upon his conditions (Alkhalili 2017b, 14). However, the dominant form of land acquisition in the camp area was one in which the refugee reached an agreement with one of the landowners to purchase the land before he started using it.

[148] Interview with Abu Mansour, ibid.

Sheikh Salem was one of the social reformers in the camp who interfered in resolving the land dispute between the camp refugees and *Shu'fati* landowners. He was also one of the first people to buy a piece of land and construct a commercial building in Ras Shehada. In the words of Sheikh Salem, "I and my brothers gathered our savings and bought a piece of land in Ras Shehada and built a 6-storey building for sale. I started the construction in Ras Shehada in late 2000. I then led the process of purchasing Shu'fat land to expand the camp boundaries as I contacted Abu Khdeir family of Shu'fat for purchasing common land in Ras Shehada and Ras Khamis. I convinced them that if their land is left empty, it will turn into the hands of the Jews for settlement."[149]

According to Sheikh Salem, the land in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills was cheap in 2000. One dunum of land was purchased for 15,000-20,000 JDs only. Some refugees could afford to buy the land immediately from their savings, or by gathering the savings of their families or friends (several brothers or friends together).

The increasing demand on land led to soaring prices in these areas. During the period of 2003 and 2004, one dunum of land was sold for 23,000 JDs, whilst in 2010 it was sold for 35,000 JDs. Today the price of one dunum of land in the camp's area of expansion ranges between 250,000 and 300,000 JDs.[150] Both the land owner and the developer agree on the payment method. The refugee can pay the price of land in cash or promise to dedicate a certain number of apartments in the to-be-constructed building to the land owner. He can also pay part of the price in cash and the rest in the form of apartments or deferred checks. In the case of Sheikh Salem, the payment

[149] Interview with Sheikh Salem, (nickname), 58, originally from Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, at the Youth Social Center in Shu'fat Refugee Camp on June 25, 2019.
[150] Interview with Abu el-'Abed, ibid.

was in cash as he gathered his savings along with those of his brothers to purchase one *dunum* of land in Ras Shehada as mentioned earlier.[151]

However, there are many cases, in which the owner of the subdivided plot of land enters into partnership with the refugee construction developer. The land owner provides the land, whilst the developer bears full responsibility for the construction and marketing of the building. This method in developing the land is revealed in the following story of Abu Mujahed, a refugee construction developer.

Abu Mujahed stated, "My beginning in the field of construction was unique. During my life, I did different types of work, especially in Israel. I worked in cleaning hotels. In the late nineties I bought a Ford Transit and worked in transporting people between Jerusalem and Shu'fat Camp for several years. I learnt that Shu'fati people started selling their common land in Ras Shehada to the refugees. That time, I did not possess enough money to buy land, but I was obsessed with the idea of getting land to invest in construction and improve my living situation. One day, in 2000, I went to see my Shu'fati friend, who owned a scrap workshop in Ras Shehada. The idea immediately sparked my mind. 'Why don't you invest this land instead of keeping it as is?' I asked him. We discussed the idea together. I am saving some money to start the construction. We agreed that we share the profits as fifty-fifty. We put the design and started digging the land. Then we spread the word that we are going to build apartments for sale. I started receiving phone calls from people, who want to buy apartments. Down payments started pouring on us helping us to continue the digging and construction works. The construction of a five-storey building finished in about a year and half, by which time, all the apartments were already sold. This first

[151] Interview with Sheikh Salem, ibid.

experience encouraged me to look for other partners to construct my next two buildings. I became famous in this field in the area. By 2008, I already built three buildings and became capable of purchasing land and investing in more such buildings without partners. After the construction of the separation wall, I was sure that Israel is no longer concerned with this part of Jerusalem. I continued purchasing land and investing in construction until I built ten buildings, seven in Ras Shehada and three in Ras Khamis. In choosing the land to buy, I always avoided land, abutting the separation wall or the military checkpoint in order to avoid the possibility of demolition. I have also built a separate house in 2012 for me to live with my family. I left my UNRWA house in the camp for my brother to expand his house."[152]

However, the issue of land acquisition in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills was somewhat problematic and vague. Most of the land had no registration in the Land Department or *Tabo*.[153] The land was originally *Musha'* land for the extended Shu'fati families. It was individually subdivided into private plots without following the full legal procedures of surveying the land and deciding whose share is located where. Thus the land selling process was somewhat unclear that we can consider as semi-legal land tenure. The land sale process is generally accomplished upon an irrevocable power of attorney at a notary office. Legally, this power of attorney is temporary and valid for fifteen years, during which time the selling should be registered in the

[152] Interview with Abu Mujahed, ibid.

[153] *Tabo* is a land registration process that was initiated during the Ottoman period in the late nineteenth century. Every person that wanted to register a piece of land privately in his name was obliged to pay fees for the title deed. In order to avoid paying the fees, most of the Palestinian *fellahin*, who were generally poor that time did not register their land officially. During its rule of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Jordanian government initiated a process to survey and register Palestinian land. Approximately 37.5% of the West Bank land was settled by 1967. When Israel occupied Palestine, large areas of land were still unregistered. In 1968, the Israeli military Command issued the Military Order No. 291 to halt all underway land registration processes in the West Bank and Jerusalem that were initiated during the Jordanian period and banned any new registrations. This situation enabled Israel to expropriate the Palestinian land (sources: Bisharat 1994; Badil 2013; and Tabo website: https://www.tabo.ps/blog/ar. (Accessed on 2, September 2018))

official institutions. But since the land is not officially registered and does not have Tabu, this registration never takes place.[154]

4.3.2. Land development and Israel's relentless intervention

Although the camp refugees benefited from Israel turning a blind eye to the construction in the camp area of expansion, Israel's relentless interventions to create obstacles and make Palestinian life difficult did not stop. Abu Mujahed, quoted above, was wise in choosing land far from the separation wall and the checkpoint. Three buildings were reported to have been demolished during the years 2017 and 2018. Two buildings were built close to the separation wall in Ras Shehada, whilst the third was built close to the separation wall, between Ras Khamis and the Pisgat Ze'ev settlement. When they were demolished they were still under construction. One of them was only two storeys, whilst the other two were four storeys each.[155]

Besides these limited demolitions, the Israeli authorities were reported to have interfered in the process of land development many times during the early 2000s, prior to the completion of the separation wall around the camp in 2006. Their main goal was to stop construction work.[156] In these cases, the Israeli police arrested construction workers and confiscated work vehicles, such as ready-mixed concrete pumps and mixers. However, work often resumed at the first possible opportunity.[157]

[154] The information was confirmed during an interview with a lawyer from Jerusalem, who asked for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information on July 24, 2019.
[155] Interview with Mr. Maher, ibid.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

Here again the issue of power that normal people possess to be able to make change in their lives arises. The resistance action in combatting the Zionist settler colonial machine, represented by Israeli soldiers, and ignoring their orders and oppressive measures by resuming work is a real diagnosis of a source of power not only in the hands of the construction developers, but also all the parties taking part in the construction process in the camp, including construction workers and the owners and workers of the concrete factory. The resource of power here is the understanding of the psychology of the occupier. The prolonged occupation by Israel has created a kind of relationship between Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers, in which the Palestinians no longer fear their occupier.

The First *Intifada* played a significant role in breaking fear barriers. On the one hand, the Palestinians became highly politicized, and on the other hand they had direct encounters with Israeli soldiers at checkpoints, during confrontations and arrests. The daily confrontations and stone throwing activities, in particular, led the way for a kind of 'cat and mouse game' between the Israeli soldiers and the Palestinian youth. This game always characterized the confrontations with Israeli soldiers. During the First *Intifada* when the youth threw stones at the soldiers, who in turn tried to chase them, the Palestinian youth would always flee. This is a form of *sumoud* and resilience.

With the same 'cat and mouse game' the Shu'fat refugees, most of whom had experienced the game during the First *Intifada*, practiced it in overcoming the Israeli regulations on construction. Empowered by understanding the psyche of their occupier, they became aware of when and how to challenge the occupier and how to overcome the hardships Israel creates in front of them. This

effect also extends to include the construction workers, many of whom were arrested on the spot, as well as the owners of the concrete factory, whose vehicles were confiscated; however, the detention of workers and the confiscation of the vehicles did not go smoothly. Clashes and fist-fights took place with the Israeli soldiers. "We have no other choice. We want to work. We fight with them. We beat them and they beat us. They arrest us. But we have to resume our work. It is our source of living," said Mr. Maher, owner of a concrete factory from 'Anata, who had his vehicles confiscated several times from construction workshops in the camp.[158] The latest incident in which the Israeli soldiers confiscated a ready-mixed concrete pump, belonging to Mr. Maher's factory, took place as late as November 8, 2020. The vehicle was working in a construction workshop in Ras Khamis when Jerusalem municipality personnel, escorted by Israeli soldiers broke into the workshop, stopped the work and confiscated the pump on the pretext that a vehicle with West Bank plates is not allowed to work in Jerusalem, in addition to which the construction itself was unlicensed.[159]

Figure 4.3: The Jerusalem Municipality personnel confiscate a ready-mixed concrete pump from a construction workshop in Ras Khamis. Source: Ready-mixed concrete factory in 'Anata village, November 8, 2020.

[158] Ibid.
[159] Interview with Mr. Maher, ibid.

This issue not only concerns Israel's attempts to halt construction *per se*. It also concerns attacking the livelihood of Palestinian workers in an oppressive measure that adds to Israel's harsh colonial violence. It is an attempt to crush Palestinians and put their mere lives at risk by targeting their source of livelihood. Israel uses every brutal strategy at hand to tyrannize Palestinians with the goal of silencing their struggle and emphasizing their colonial will and the colonial upper hand. But the Palestinians, who have long resisted Israel, do not know desperation. They insist on combating the colonial power, their subjugation and attempts to annihilate their steadfastness.

Taking Israel's continual intervention into consideration, Sheikh Salem argued that the refugees' initiative to buy the land protected the Shu'fat land against Jewish expansion and settlement building, especially as the land was deserted and unused, and so it was, for him, a national action.[160]

This makes sense. If the land had been left empty, it would have turned into the hands of the Jews, for the expansion of the neighbouring settlements. Since the French Hill settlement borders Ras Shehada and Pisgat Ze'ev borders Ras Khamis, the expansion of any of the settlements would be on this land.

For the *Shu'fati* families, who, as mentioned earlier, abandoned the land and stopped cultivating it after being separated by the ring road, they were no longer interested in it. Thus selling the land to the camp refugees was a wise decision. On the one hand they will benefit financially from those abandoned plots of land and on the other hand, the land will not be expropriated by

[160] Interview with Sheikh Salem, ibid.

Israel, especially after they learnt that Israel is planning to expropriate this land to build what it called the "Jerusalem Eastern Gate" settlement on this land to create continuity between the settlements in the area.[161]

On its website, the Palestinian Observatory of Israeli Colonization Activities (POICA),[162] reported in 2001 that Israel was planning to construct the so-called Eastern Gate colony on the hills of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada. The goal was to create settlement continuity between the settlements of the French Hill in the south and Pisgat Ze'ev in the north, thus threatening the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, which would have been trapped in the middle. The website reported that Israel has always dismissed applications for construction licenses on Ras Khamis Hill and in 1997 it imposed a fine of NIS 150,000 on a Palestinian family that built an unlicensed house on the hill. According to the website, the planning project of the "Eastern Gate includes industrial zones, gardens, parks and swimming pools," and is planned to absorb about 2,000 Jewish settlers.[163]

The forestation of the *waqf* land northeast of the Shu'fat Camp by the JNF was also part of this settlement plan as Israel tried to prevent Palestinian construction in the area in the early 2000s with the demolition of 17 Palestinian houses in Sheikh Lulu neighbourhood as mentioned earlier (Alkhalili 2017a, 67-70, POICA 2001).

[161] Interview with Mr. 'Imad Abu Khdeir, ibid. further details on the "Jerusalem Eastern Gate" settlement will be presented in the coming sections in this chapter.
[162] POICA website was launched by ARIJ – The Applied Research Institute- Jerusalem, with the goal to monitor and assess environmental degradation, caused by Israel's activities on Palestinian land, especially land expropriation and settlement expansion:
[163] POICA website: http://poica.org/2001/06/the-status-of-jerusalem-reconstructed-israels-unilateral-actions-determine-the-future-of-jerusalem/

4.3.3. Investing customers' money

The construction work is financed by the developer himself. There are no loans, whether government or bank loans, to support the construction. If the savings of the developer are not sufficient to resume work, he depends mainly on money generated from customers.

The construction developers begin their work advertising apartments for sale the moment they set up the construction designs. The selling process starts even before the construction is complete. The down payments and monthly payments they receive from customers help them to proceed with construction work. We can say that they work with other people's money. They used customers' checks to pay for construction material and ready mixed concrete. A concrete factory owner told me he never received a check with the name of the developer, but rather with names of the customers. In fact this method in developing the construction work is used on a large scale all over the West Bank and Jerusalem and is not specific to the Shu'fat Camp.

The developer's dependence on the installments paid by the customers was also confirmed by Mr. Zuheir, a construction developer from the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, who said that he purchased three dunums of land in Ras Khamis from its *Shu'fati* owner in 2003 for 23,000 JDs per dunum. He paid 40,000 JDs in cash and promised the rest in deferred checks. Not much money was left for construction work. He was only able to level the land and was obliged to stop the work for several months until he could secure some more money. He started spreading the word that he is planning to construct a building. Only after he started receiving down payments from the customers, was he able to resume construction work.[164]

[164] Interview with Mr. Zuheir, ibid.

4.4. Impact of land development in the Shu'fat Camp area

4.4.1. Economic impact

The new construction sector in the Shu'fat Camp had a positive economic impact. It mitigated unemployment rates amongst workers, especially West Bank workers who sought work in the new construction in the camp. The refugee construction developers hire West Bank construction contractors who accept prices lower than Jerusalemite contractors. The benefit here is mutual. The West Bank contractor and workers get work and the developer can save a good amount of money. They also provide a source of income for the concrete factories in the surrounding areas of the camp that sell the ready mixed concrete for the construction of these buildings. The owner of a concrete factory in 'Anata said his factory started operating in 2001; one year after construction in the camp began to flourish with the goal of benefitting financially. "At that time (2001), there were no concrete factories in 'Anata and the camp refugees used to buy concrete from factories in Ramallah and Ar-Ram. Today we are deemed the main provider of concrete for construction in the camp."[165]

Moreover, the construction sector in the camp area provided construction related jobs, mostly available for West Bank workers. These included building material, plastering, aluminum, metal and concrete fittings for sewerage and water systems, electrical work, plastics, PVC pipes, carpentry, stone cutting, and cast iron foundries.

The success of the refugee developers in constructing dozens of commercial buildings without their being demolished by the Israeli authorities encouraged other non-refugee Jerusalemite construction developers, mostly professionals in the construction field to conduct their own

[165] Interview with Mr. Maher, ibid.

construction projects in the area. They seized the opportunity of Israel turning a blind eye to construction in the area, especially in the wake of the construction of the separation wall in 2006. Thus, the action refugees took in developing the land served as a test for other Jerusalemite construction developers to ensure there were no barriers to the success of their investments. This also indicates that the refugees' actions were actually risky.

4.4.2. Spatial impact

As a result of land acquisition and development by the camp refugees that led to the expansion of camp boundaries, the camp area increased from 203 dunums[166] of land in 1965 to 535 dunums of land in 2018 (Mohsen 2019). Following is a table of selected years on the growth of the Shu'fat Camp area.

Table 4.2: Expansion of Shu'fat Refugee Camp area: Selected years since establishment of Shu'fat Camp in 1965

Expanding area of Shu'fat Refugee Camp Selected years since establishment of Shu'fat camp in 1965[167]	
Year	**Area per dunum[168]**
1965	203 dunums of land[169]
1997	370 dunums of land.[170]
2018	535 dunums of land.[171]

[166] One dunum of land comprises 1,000 square meters.
[167] Years were selected based on availability of data for the researcher.
[168] Dunum is a space unit, widely used in Palestine for measuring land. The one dunum of land equals 1,000 square meter.
[169] UNRWA 2015. "West Bank; Fact Sheets." Profile: Shu'fat Camp: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/Shu'fat-camp (Accessed May 15, 2017)
[170] Muhsen 2019.
[171] Mohsen 2019. However, according to Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2019 - Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research. "Jerusalem - Area of Quarters, Sub-Quarters and Statistical Areas, 2019," area of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp in 2018 reaches 370 dunums of land. It seems that the statistical yearbook has not included the areas of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills.

The following aerial maps show expansion of Shu'fat Refugee Camp between 1985 and 2018.

Map 4.2: The Shu'fat Refugee Camp, 1985. Source: Popular Committee in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

Map 4.3: The Shu'far Refugee Camp, 2000. Source: Maps Department – Orient House.

Map 4.4: The Shu'fat Refugee Camp, 2018. Source: Maps Department – Orient House.

According to the above maps, in 1985 (Map 4.2), construction in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp was nearly exclusive to the original UNRWA boundaries of the camp with the exception of several scattered houses in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills to the south and northwest of the camp, respectively.

In 2000 (Map 4.3), there appeared to be the beginning of camp expansion, especially from the eastern part where the Sheikh Lulu neighbourhood was established and more construction appeared in the Ras Khamis Hill. The ring road that separated Ras Khamis and the Ras Shehada hills from the Shu'fat village to the west also appeared.

In 2018 (Map 4.4), we rarely saw any empty space without construction in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills. There also appears the separation wall, snaking around the camp, surrounding it from three directions, south, north and west. The commercial construction started in Ras Shehada Hill, which is closer to the West Bank borders with Jerusalem. However, after Israel began constructing the separation wall in the camp area in 2006, the construction extended to Ras Khamis hill, which is closer to the Jerusalem neighbourhoods. Over the past two decades, this new surge of commercial buildings in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills dramatically expanded the camp boundaries.

The Shu'fat Camp name has come to refer to the entire area, including Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada, which are not part of the original UNRWA boundaries of Shu'fat Camp. This is due, on the one hand, to the proximity of these areas to the camp boundaries with the heavy

construction in these areas dissolving the original camp boundaries. On the other hand, the construction developers that bought the land in these areas and sponsored the construction boom there, are mainly refugees from Shu'fat camp, this further emphasizes the naming.

4.4.3. Thwarting Israeli settlement goals

Figure 4.4: General panoramic view of the location of Shu'fat Refugee Camp. View from 'Anata village to the east. Source: Author, May 3, 2020.

While some refugee construction developers present their activity as political, as an example of national struggle for space and above all living space and enabling people to return to Jerusalem, obviously they acted all along according to business rationale, as capitalists trying to make a good profit. The construction sector in the camp made substantial profits for these developers to improve their economic situation and that of their families.

However, this unplanned urban sprawl in the camp area nonetheless achieved important political results. It turned into a political struggle against Israel's settler colonial project. It enabled thousands of Jerusalemites to return back to Jerusalem and maintain their Jerusalem IDs, thus preempting Israel's "center of life policy", and representing a real challenge to Israel's settler colonial demographic plans in Jerusalem in favour of the Jews.

Furthermore, the dense construction in the Shu'fat Camp area created a serious obstacle to Israel's plans to create settlement continuity amongst the Jewish settlements in the camp area. The new construction has formed a cement lump as a serious fact on the ground that cannot be reversed, blocking Israel's plans for a settlement expansion towards the camp area. This reveals how settler colonial plans can be thwarted by the collective action of indigenous people. Israel's plan for settlement continuity between Pisgat Ze'ev and the French Hill settlements is now not possible.

The settlement continuity plan, if implemented by removing Shu'fat Camp, could have resulted in cutting physical continuity between Jerusalem and the rest of the surrounding Palestinian communities to the east. However, the expansion of the boundaries of the camp and the heavy Palestinian construction in the area prevented the accomplishment of this settlement plan and saved some sort of Palestinian continuity, although Israel is working relentlessly to prevent that. The construction of the separation wall and separating the camp from Jerusalem is one and major form of Israel's colonial attempts in this direction.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. Socio-economic Impact of Construction Development in the Shu'fat Camp

Figure 5.1: Crowded entrance to Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author October 17, 2018.

5.1. Introduction

This chapter tries to answer the third mirnor question of the thesis: How have the post-1995 developments in Jerusalem impacted the Shufat Refugee Camp socioeconomically?

A simple look at the volume of urban construction in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp area displays the significant impact on the demographic and socio-economic situation in the camp in the wake of the expansion of the camp's boundaries and the mobility of returning Jerusalemites to the city after 1995.

The increased construction and population growth in the camp area imposed growing demands on various services, such as education and health. At the same time, the availability of these services played an important role in attracting more Jerusalemites to continue to pursue living in the camp area. A comparison between the socio-economic situation in the area pre and post 1995

shows that significant changes took place in this regard that impacted the overall quality of life in the camp area.

5.2. Impact on population structure in the Shu'fat Camp

5.2.1. Population structure and crowdedness

The population of the Shu'fat Camp has grown significantly since its establishment in 1965. As the camp area has expanded and more returning Jerusalemites have poured into the camp, an exact population number cannot be estimated for many reasons. Most important is the absence of an official census of the population that settled in the camp area, whether Israeli, Palestinian or UNRWA.

Moreover, there is high mobility in and out of the camp area. New people moved into the camp, whilst many others who couldn't bear living in such dire conditions are moving out and seeking better places to live. Thus, population estimates differ from one institution to another. For example, the Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem Municipality estimated that by 2017 the population of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp reached 20,400 people,[172] whilst other estimations reported 24,000 people, of whom 12,500 were registered refugees in the same year (Careccia 2017, 9).

UNRWA is only concerned with the population of the area within its boundaries and thus only provides figures of registered refugees. UNRWA Director stated that 14,730 registered refugees

[172] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2017. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Population of Jerusalem by Population Group, Quarter and Sub-Quarter, 2016."

live in the camp today.[173] However there is significant gap between the number of registered refugees and the actual population.

The population density in the camp is clear in spite of the absence of an official population census. As noted in the previous chapter, according to the estimates of researcher Mohammed Mohsen (2019) more than 200 residential buildings were constructed in the area after 2005 and each building consists of no less than eight storeys, containing nearly 32 apartments. Building on this information, I can estimate that 200 buildings have approximately 6400 apartments. I assume that all apartments are occupied with an average household size of four members per apartment. Consequently, we can estimate that about 25,600 people live in the area of expansion of the Shu'fat Camp. Thus, if we add this to the 14,730 registered refugees in the camp, we estimate the average total population of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and its area of expansion to be approximately 39,730. However, this number never appeared in any records or any source.

Thus, the camp area is considered as "one of the most densely populated areas of the occupied Palestinian territory, second to the Gaza Strip" with population density estimated at 50,000 inhabitants per square kilometer (Careccia 2017, 9).

[173] Interview with UNRWA Director, ibid.

Following is a table of the growth of the Shu'fat Camp population in selected years, based on various Palestinian and Israeli sources. The given figures were not based on an official census.

Table 5.1: Population growth in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp: Selected years since establishment of the camp in 1965.

Population growth in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp: Selected years since establishment of the camp in 1965[174]	
Year	**Population number**
1965	1,500[175]
1967	3,300[176]
1983	5,019[177]
1996	10,314[178]
2008	11,066[179]
2012	15,070[180]
2014	18,230[181]
2015	19,480[182]
2016	20,400[183]
2017	21,360.[184]
2018	App. 24,000[185]
2020	App. 39,730[186]

[174] Years were selected based on availability of data for the researcher.
[175] Benvenisti, 1976, 70.
[176] O'Donnell, 1999, 47.
[177] Encyclopedia of Palestinian camps: http://palcamps.net/ar/camp/88/2/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A9
[178] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. 1996. "Palestinian Locality Population: Revised Estimates for 1996. Ramallah-Palestine.
[179] Encyclopedia of Palestinian camps (Ibid).
[180] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2014. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Population of Jerusalem by Age, Quarter, Sub-Quarter and Statistical Area, 2012."
[181] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2016. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Sources of Population Growth in Jerusalem, by Quarter and Sub-Quarter and Statistical Area, 2015," p.12.
[182] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2016. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Sources of Population Growth in Jerusalem, by Quarter and Sub-Quarter and Statistical Area, 2015," p.12.
[183] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2017. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Population of Jerusalem by Population Group, Quarter and Sub-Quarter, 2016."
[184] Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2018. Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, "Population of Jerusalem by Population Group, Quarter and Sub-Quarter, 2017."
[185] Interview with Mr. Yousef, ibid.
[186] This figure includes residents of the entire area of Shu'fat Refugee Camp, including those residents living within the original camp's UNRWA boundaries and residents living in the camp's area of expansion in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada, as estimated by the author of this research (see previous paragraph).

The population growth in the camp area further amplified the crowdedness and heterogeneity in the camp. Currently, the population of the Shu'fat Camp and its surroundings consists of the following categories of people: First, there are the original registered refugees of the camp, whose number increased from 1,500 in 1965 (Benvenisti, 1976, 70) to about 14,730 registered refugees.[187] Despite their continual natural growth, most refugees do not seek to move outside the camp, especially after the 1995 implementation of the "center of life" policy in Jerusalem.

Second, there is the influx into the camp of non-refugee Jerusalemites that seek affordable housing within the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality to protect their residency status.

Third, there are several thousand West Bankers, carrying Palestinian identity cards, many of whom are registered refugees. The West Bankers settled in the camp for different reasons. Some of them live with their Jerusalemite spouses in the camp to maintain the Jerusalem residency status of their spouses and children (Hilal and Johnson 2003, 62). Others arrived in the camp, looking for work in the prospering construction sector after they lost their work in Israel in the wake of the Second *Intifada* of 2000 as Israel strictly limited the number of West Bank workers allowed to enter Israel. Meanwhile, others are outlaws wanted by the Palestinian authorities and stay in order to be out of reach of the Palestinian security apparatuses, which are not authorized to operate in the camp. The contacted camp refugees confirmed that the presence of these outlaws in the camp increased the crime rate.

[187] Interview with UNRWA Director in Shu'fat Camp, ibid.

The establishment of a bus line in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp was critical due to camp over-crowdedness and the need to serve an increasing number of people who commute between the camp and Jerusalem on a daily basis, particularly students and workers in the Israeli labour market. The bus line was established in 2004 as part of the Consolidated Travel Association that was established by the Israeli Ministry of Transportation (MAS 2017, 3) to serve all the southern and northern bus lines from and to the eastern part of Jerusalem. However, the five-minute drive from the camp to Jerusalem generally takes about half an hour and sometimes during rush hours it can take up to an hour due to the long queue at the checkpoint, waiting to be checked and allowed access, and the traffic jams it creates.

5.2.1.a. The Jerusalemite newcomers: calculating gains and losses

Despite the dire conditions in Shu'fat Camp in terms of overcrowdedness and lack of services, several factors made the returning Jerusalemites seek housing in the camp. They were encouraged by the low price of apartments compared to the expensive Jerusalem neighbourhoods. In these expensive neighbourhoods, such as Beit Hanina, Shu'fat, Beit Safafa and Sheikh Jarrah for example, the price of land, construction and rentals soared in light of the absence of government housing schemes for the Palestinian Jerusalemites to overcome the deep housing crisis in the city.

These returning Jerusalemites were neither rich nor very poor as they were capable of buying flats. Fieldwork revealed that although they live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries in the camp area, they prefer to maintain their original address in Jerusalem neighbourhoods, such as the Old City, Beit Hanina, Silwan and Thuri for their legal documents out of fear that the area

could be excluded from Jerusalem as Israeli officials threaten, leading them to lose their residency status.

This indicates that people feel insecure in their living situation and might be subject to another wave of mobility towards the inner spaces of the city if Israel further tightens its measures against them. Shu'fat residents did not hide their fears. In an interview in 2019 with one of the camp residents, he said "The situation is getting worse every day. Who knows what the situation will be tomorrow if Israel decides to get the camp and its residents out of the jurisdiction of Jerusalem? Where will we go? At least now we are still considered living in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem that they (Israel) decided is for us. If things get worse, I am afraid we will end up living in tents inside Jerusalem."[188]

I attribute people's fears to several reasons. The first reason might be referred to the semi-legal method in which the land was purchased by construction developers. The land is not formally registered and the construction itself is illegal. Moreover, the method of purchasing the apartments is also semi-legal.

Like the process of purchasing land, the purchase of the apartments takes place upon an irrevocable power of attorney, which is legal but temporary and the purchase needs to be registered in the official institutions within fifteen years of the duration of the power of attorney. But since the construction itself is illegal, this registration never takes place. At the same time, the land, on which the building is constructed, is not officially registered.[189] This situation keeps

[188] Interview with Ayman, nickname, 28, a Jerusalemite returnee, at his home in ʻAnata Road on January 17, 2019.
[189] Interview with a lawyer from Jerusalem who asked not to be identified, ibid.

the buildings, in which they live, under constant threat of evacuation and demolition any time Israel decides to implement such a decision as part of its oppressive colonial policies in Jerusalem.

The second reason is their fear of the Israeli official threats to relinquish areas that remain on the West Bank side of the separation wall. This is understandable. In 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed his intention to withdraw the "blue" Jerusalem identity cards from Jerusalemites living in areas behind the separation wall. Such a decision could affect more than 100,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, Kufr Aqab and Sawahreh.[190] Although Israeli officials are no longer talking about this, Palestinian Jerusalemites do not forget this as they are aware of the fact that Israel, as a colonial entity, can implement whatever plan it wishes at any time to oust the Palestinian residents of the city.

Nonetheless, they have no other choice. They were obliged to accept this semi-legal situation and got used to it as a solution for their original and larger fear of losing their residency rights in the city. For them the cost of losing their residency rights is much higher. When calculating gains and losses, their action to live in these threatened areas is a form of unorganized collective resistance against Israel's oppressive threats. They challenge, assuming that their inaction would bring them higher losses than taking such a risky action. Thus, resistance occurs when the cost of inaction is higher than the cost of action (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 183).

Moreover, when fear is collective, its effect diminishes and encourages people to work hard to survive without allowing this fear to dominate them, particularly as they are now used to this

[190] Al Jazeera website: https://www.aljazeera.net/news/alquds/2015/11/1. (Accessed September, 19, 2020)

situation that is also shared by other Jerusalemites, living in other areas that are left behind the wall. This sort of collectivism is an important element in the collective resistance of indigenous people, revealing the power to challenge and struggle for their collective right to live in their city.

5.2.1.b. Identity and sense of belonging

It is natural for any person to have multiple identities. As well, Shu'fat refugees have developed multiple identities and sense of belonging mostly related to their dual representation as refugees and as Jerusalemites. As mentioned earlier, the number of registered refugees grew significantly from 1,500 in 1965 to about 14,730 today. Very few refugees that witnessed the 1948 *Nakba*, are still alive in Shu'fat Camp. The majority were born after the *Nakba* and the 1965 transfer of refugees from the Old City of Jerusalem to the current location in Shu'fat Camp. This means that most of the camp refugees do not have actual memories of their original villages. Nonetheless, they still carry the identity of their original villages.

Moreover, although Shu'fat Camp and the rest of the Palestinian refugee camps were established as temporary spaces until a political solution can be reached, the refugees developed a sense of belonging to the camp.

Through my research in Shu'fat Camp, I noticed different types of identities and feelings of belonging amongst the camp refugees. First, there are the individuals that feel a sense of belonging to the group. This appears when the individual identifies himself as a refugee, either by belonging to the 'group' of Palestinian refugees, as a resident of Shu'fat Camp, or when he simply identifies himself/herself as belonging to their village of origin.

Second, there is the collective belonging to the place. This type of belonging appears when the individual considers himself as representing the entire group of camp refugees. He/she uses the term "we are," as opposed to "I am" when discussing an issue concerning the camp. They may even consider themselves representing all the refugees from the same place of origin but they happen to live in the Shu'fat Camp. For example, a refugee originally from Lydda, considers himself as representing all refugees from Lydda. "We are the '*Liddaweya*.'"

Third, there are those with multiple belongings. This type is very rooted in Shu'fat Camp. They see themselves as Shu'fat Camp Refugees that also belong to their place of origin, in addition to being Jerusalemites, living in Jerusalem.

Fourth, due to all the previous points, a crisis of belonging is evident in the Shu'fat Camp. I felt this crisis when I headed to the Women's Center in the camp the morning of Thursday, October 25, 2018, and saw the Jerusalem municipality vehicles working on removing piles of garbage at the camp entrance. The Jerusalem municipality workers worked on cleaning the camp for two days although this is UNRWA's responsibility. This action came in the wake of a threat from the Jewish Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat to strip UNRWA of its responsibilities in the camp, placing the camp under the direct jurisdiction of the municipality and revoking the refugees of their status as camp residents.[191]

[191] Middle East online website. "Israel threatens to remove UNRWA from occupied Jerusalem": https://middle-east-online.com/en/israel-threatens-remove-unrwa-occupied-jerusalem, (accessed on September 19, 2020).

Figure 5.2: Garbage problem in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. *Left:* Piles of garbage at the entrance to the camp. Source: Author October 17, 2018. *Right:* Jerusalem municipality bulldozer is removing garbage in the camp. Source: Author October 25, 2018.

When I arrived at the center, I asked the women there about their perspectives regarding the threats from the Jerusalem municipality. Suddenly, the women formed a kind of unorganized focus group on the issue. They were divided into two parties. The first party completely rejected the intervention of the municipality in the camp. "I want to remain a refugee. We can never ignore the role the agency (UNRWA) has played in the refugee issue. It is enough that we receive medicine for free. Israel grants us health insurance, but we have to pay for medicine," one of the women said. "The Israeli municipality is not concerned with serving us. It only wants to force us to pay taxes," another woman said.

Meanwhile, the women, comprising the second party, were pleased with the municipality's action in removing the garbage. "The camp will get cleaner. The agency (UNRWA) is no longer capable of serving us. The piles of garbage are destroying everything beautiful in the camp," a woman said. "The schools need development and it (UNRWA) is not doing anything in this regard," another woman said.

These mixed/contradictory feelings amongst camp residents reveal rebellious spirits that long for improvement and a better life. However, the intervention of the Israeli municipality incurs costs. Although the municipality's interventions bring better services and above all maintain the Jerusalem status of the camp, ousting UNRWA from the camp and Jerusalem contradicts the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Those that support the municipality's intervention are thirsty for a clean camp and a dignified life, regardless of the party involved.

Meanwhile, those who are against the municipality's intervention are not revolting any less against the dire conditions in the camp, but they look deeper into the issue. They look beyond the act of just cleaning the camp. For them, they want a clean camp, but who is doing it matters to them. They have deeper insight into the real intentions of the Israeli municipality, which is not concerned about the interests of the camp refugees as much as it is concerned with its own interests in Jerusalem and tightening control over the camp residents.

5.2.2. In-house crowdedness in the Shu'fat Camp

Levels of in-house crowdedness are high in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.[192] Nearly all the contacted refugees complained of the lack of privacy as they are living in crowded houses with an average household of 5-6 members. This number might not seem high and is perhaps not significantly different from other parts of the OPT.[193] However, the rooms in UNRWA houses

[192] The Graduate Institute of Development Studies at the University of Geneva (IUED) considers that *"Crowding is measured both by the occupancy per room and by the floor area per capita. Levels of house occupancy are considered normal when no more than three household members share a room, including bedrooms and living rooms,"* (Source: Bocco et. al. 2007, 92). In this, IUED is adopting the definition of slum by UN-HABITAT (See: UN-HABITAT: State of the World's Cities 2006/7. "Slums: Some Definitions." http://mirror.unhabitat.org/documents/media_centre/sowcr2006/SOWCR%205.pdf),

[193] The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 2018 estimated the average household size in Palestine at 5.0 individuals. PCBS reported a decline in the number in comparison to 5.8 individuals in 2007 (Source: PCBS 2019). The average household number in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp is also close to it in other Palestinian refugee

are small in size and so privacy is nearly absent. Even with the horizontal and vertical expansion of houses to accommodate new couples in the family, the problem continues with the increasing number of new families in every household, thus deepening the problem of lack of privacy.

5.3. Impact on the socio-economic situation in Shu'fat Camp after 1995

This section looks at the socioeconomic situation in Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Given the lack of official data in this regard, I will try to trace this data through changes on several socioeconomic aspects in the camp area, including health and education services, women's status, employment and the labour force.

5.3.1. Education



Figure 5.3: Pupils leaving UNRWA girls school in Shu'fat Refugee Camp at the end of a school day. Source: The Author, December 23, 2018.

Educational institutions in the Shu'fat Camp area increased significantly after 1995. This indicates that the increasing population in the camp area also increased demand on schools and kindergartens. This demand called for the opening of new schools in light of the fact that

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camps. For example, the average household number in the refugee camps in Jordan reached 5.1 individuals in 2018 (Source: PCBS: The International Day of Refugees 20/6/2019: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=3486).

UNRWA schools, which were the only such facilities in the camp until 1995 serve only children of registered refugees.

Prior to 1995, there were only two UNRWA schools, one for boys and one for girls. Today there are more than fifteen kindergartens and schools with a notable expansion of educational services on the high school level.[194] In order to meet the increasing number of the refugee population in the camp, UNRWA built two new schools after 1995. UNRWA schools provide free basic education to about 1,500 refugee students up to the tenth grade.[195] Although education in UNRWA schools is free, many of the camp refugees send their children to private schools in the area or even outside of the camp, increasing the dropout rates in UNRWA schools (Careccia 2017, 19).

School dropout is most significant in UNRWA's boys' school.[196] Grazia Careccia (2017, 19-20) attributed this to the poor quality of education in UNRWA camp schools. Moreover, the double shift method in UNRWA schools[197] adds to the school dropout rates. Students placed in the second shift often feel it is difficult to attend school in the afternoon, which discourages them from attending classes (Development Center 2016, 15).

[194] Like the rest of the Palestinian educational system, the school system in Shu'fat Camp is based on three cycles: kindergarten for children four to five years old, ten years of basic school, and two years of secondary or high school. Students, who reach the twelfth grade take the General Secondary Examination (*Tawjihi*) that is prepared by the Palestinian Ministry of Education and includes all Palestinian Tawjihi students in the *OPT*. Admission into Palestinian universities is determined upon passing this exam. However, as Jerusalemites, carrying the Jerusalem ID cards, the camp refugees are allowed to take the Israeli General Exam (*Bagrut*) after finishing the twelfth grade as a requirement to enroll in Israeli universities.

[195] UNRWA website: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/Shu'fat-camp. (Accessed October 2, 2020).

[196] In 2015, UNRWA said that dropout rates for its boys' school are the highest in the West Bank (UNRWA 2015, 1). Eighty students dropped out amongst male students in the ninth and tenth grades in 2015 and partial dropouts were estimated at an average of 5-6 students every day. In addition, everyday a group of students leave school during the mid-day break (source: Development Center 2016, 21).

[197] UNRWA adopted this method in teaching with the goal of overcoming the problem of the shortage in study rooms in its schools due to the increased number of refugee children.

Based on interviews with camp residents, dropout rates amongst boys in the camp can also be attributed to the fact that the camp residents generally encourages girls to study and continue their education, whilst boys were generally encouraged to head to the Israeli labour market to help their fathers in supporting the family.[198] Why, it is asked, is there a need to invest in education at a time when working in blue collar jobs in Israel can bring more money than working in any white collar job anywhere else! Nonetheless, over the years, UNRWA helped in promoting the national identity of Palestinian refugees. UNRWA schools mostly hire Palestinian refugees as teachers, who made sure to pass the refugee experience to the new generations and to strengthen their national identity.

In addition to UNRWA schools in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, the Women's Center in the Shu'fat Camp established a secondary school for girls in 2009 that is registered with the Palestinian Ministry of Education. Students pay nominal annual fees to attend the school, as in other government schools in the OPT. The school serves about 200 female students of different backgrounds: refugees, non-refugee Jerusalemites as well as West Bankers. It also employs female teachers of different backgrounds including West Bankers[199].

About 14 private schools in the camp are registered with the Jerusalem municipality and the Israeli Ministry of Education. Private schools in the camp are operated either by refugees from the camp or from various local societies, some of which are religious in nature, such as the al-

[198] Interview with Mrs. Amina (nickname), 37, originally from Hebron, at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp on December 9, 2018.
[199] Interview with Ms. Samira (nickname), 28, project coordinator at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp on December 26, 2018.

Iman and Nur el-Huda Schools. Some of the private schools provide kindergarten education along with school education. Nonetheless, other schools provide only kindergarten education (see table 5.2).

The camp schools and kindergartens altogether absorb more than 6,000 students, mostly Jerusalem ID card holders whether refugees or non-refugees. They employ more than 500 teachers, most of whom are West Bankers as shown in table 3.5 below.[200]

Table 5.2: Survey of Schools and kindergartens in Shu'fat Refugee Camp
Source: Author's field survey in January and February 2020.

Name of school	Est. year	location	Supervising authority	Stage	Notes
Shu'fat Boys' First Primary School	1964	Shu'fat Refugee Camp	UNRWA		Boys Refugees
Shu'fat Girls' First Primary School	1964	Shu'fat refugee camp	UNRWA		Girls Refugees
Shu'fat Boys' Second Primary School	1999	Shu'fat refugee camp	UNRWA		Boys. Refugees
Shu'fat Girls' Second Primary School	2014	Shu'fat refugee camp	UNRWA		Girls Refugees
Ahbab ar-Rahman Kindergarten and primary School	1995	Shu'fat camp – main 'Anata Rd.	Private. Owner: refugee	Kindergarten and primary classes	Mixed. Originally kindergarten that is turned into primary school in 1997. Refugees and non-refugees.
Al-Faqih Kindergarten and School	1995	Shu'fat refugee camp	Private. Owner: refugee	Kindergarten, primary and secondary classes	Mixed. Originally kindergarten that is turned into primary school in 2000 and in 2014 added high school classes. Refugees and no-refugees.
Ruwwad al-Mustaqbal school and kindergarten	2000	Ras Khamis	Private	Up to ninth grade	Mixed. 600 students and 25 teachers from the camp and West Bank. Refugees and non-refugees.

[200] The numbers are estimated upon author's fieldwork, taking into consideration that not all schools provided complete information in this regard.

Al-Masira Girls' Secondary School	2009	Within UNRWA boundaries	Registered at the PA Ministry of Education	Secondary classes	Girls. 200 students. Refugees, non-refugees and West Bankers.
Riyad al-Majd kindergarten	2009	Ras Shehada	Private	kindergarten	Mixed. Refugees and non-refugees.
Ar-Razi Primary and Secondary School for Girls	2010	Ras Shehada	Private. Owner: refugee	Primary and secondary	Mixed: Primary, 250 students. 800 secondary girls students. Refugees and non-refugees. At least one parent should be carrying Jerusalem ID card in order to allow student to study in the school. 120 teachers, 80% West Bankers.
Ar-Razi Primary and Secondary School for Boys	2013	Ras Khamis	Private. Owner: refugee	Primary and secondary	Boys. 600 students, Jerusalemites. Refugees and non-refugees. 30 teachers, mostly West Bankers.
Ajyal Kindergarten	2013	Two branches in Ras Shehada and Ras Khamis	Private	3 kindergarten grades	Mixed. Approx. 150 students, 15 teachers (WB, Jerusalemites, refugees & non-refugees)
Dar el-Iman Kindergarten	2014	Shu'fat refugee camp	Private	Kindergarten	Mixed. Refugees and non-refugees.
Al-Mutanabbi Comprehensive School for Boys	2014	Ras Shehada	Private	Secondary classes	Boys: All Jerusalemites: students and teachers must carry Jerusalem ID cards.
Nur el-Huda Kindergarten and School for Girls	2016	Ras Shehada	Private	Up to 8th grade.	Kindergarten: Mixed. 180 students. Girls: 200 students, refugees and non-refugees.
Nur el-Huda School for Boys	2018	Ras Shehada	Private	Primary classes till 7th grade.	Boys. 350 students. Established after the original Nur el-Huda School separated boys from girls. Refugees and non-refugees.
Bunat al-Mustaqbal Kindergarten	2014	'Anata Road	Private	Kindergarten	Mixed. 180 students
Smart Kids Kindergarten	---	3 branches: Ras Khamis, Ras Shehada, Daheyat a-Salam	Private	Kindergarten	Mixed.

Establishment of non-UNRWA schools and kindergartens in the camp began in 1995. On the one hand this reflects the increased camp population with the need for more schools and educational services and on the other hand it indicates an increased interest by Shu'fat refugees in investing in the education of their children to minimize illiteracy in the camp. The 2017 census conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated illiteracy rates amongst individuals over age of 10 in the Shu'fat Camp to be at 2.1%.[201]

An increased awareness of the importance of higher education was also revealed during interviews. Mrs. Amina[202] said, "I always encourage my children to excel in their study. I want them to continue their higher education as it is the only way for them to get out of the miserable life in the camp." Regarding higher education, mostly, the camp refugees couldn't afford to support the education of all their children; therefore, some of their children sought other paths to provide funding for their education, including seeking help from national and political institutions such as Orient House during the nineties.[203]

Meanwhile, other refugees worked hard to ensure that their children received an education. A widow, Um Khalil worked in cleaning homes, hospitals and monasteries to support her children and their education. She boasted that her eldest son completed his education in Islamic *Shari'a* and that he now works as a mosque *Imam*.[204]

[201] Data obtained by the author from the PCBS.
[202] Interview with Mrs. Amina, ibid.
[203] Interview with Um Jihad, ibid.
[204] Interview with Um Khalil, ibid.

The 2007 PCBS census estimated that 7.3% of Shu'fat refugees carry higher education degrees, amongst whom 6.2% are males and 8.5% are females.[205] Nonetheless, the tough economic conditions of the camp residents make them more interested in work as opposed to education as Mrs. Manal complained. She said that her husband did not allow her to continue her higher education because he wants her to care for the children and home. However, he did not object to her work in a women's gym center to improve their economic situation.[206]

The availability of educational services and facilities in the Shu'fat Camp introduced many benefits at various levels. Economically, opening schools and kindergartens in the camp area was a successful investment. Owners of private schools benefitted financially from the influx of Jerusalemites into the camp area.

Moreover, the availability of educational facilities in the area helped provide employment opportunities for a significant number of teachers, and administrative employees of different backgrounds, including West Bankers and refugees.

The crucial benefit in this regard is fulfilling the needs of the newcomer Jerusalemites to school their children inside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries. Jerusalemites need to prove that their children are registered in Jerusalem schools to confirm to the Israeli authorities that Jerusalem is the center of their life. Thus, with the availability of these schools, in light of the general classroom shortage in the eastern section of Jerusalem (Maimon 2019, 3), the returning

[205] Rates are received by the author from the PCBS.
[206] Interview with Mrs. Manal, ibid. (See also previous section on dropouts in UNRWA schools).

Jerusalemites secured one of the conditions that Israel imposes to maintain their residency status in the city, thereby encouraging their steadfastness.

5.3.2. Health

Figure 5.4: UNRWA Health Center – Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, October 17, 2018.

In terms of the health sector, several health centers are available in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. UNRWA operates one health center that it built upon establishment of the camp in 1965. The UNRWA health center provides the camp refugees with free "primary health care, including reproductive health, infant and child care, immunizations, screening and medical check-ups and treatment."[207] There is also a medical laboratory, run by UNRWA (ARIJ 2012, 8). But UNRWA provides health services only to registered refugees in the camp.

[207] UNRWA website: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank/Shu'fat-camp, (accessed October 17, 2020).

Figure 5.5: One of the private health centers in Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, October 17, 2018.

With the expansion of the Shu'fat Camp and the growing population, about nine private profit-making health centers opened in the camp since the early 2000s. These centers, like many others in Jerusalem and the rest of Israel, act as health service providers on behalf of the official health insurance organizations, known as *Kupat Holim* (patient funds) in Israel – *Clalit, Meuhedet, Leumit and Maccabi*. They provide full health services for Jerusalemites, members of the Israeli health insurance, including the camp refugees. They offer free medical consultations to members of the Israeli health insurance, who buy medicine from pharmacies for discounted prices as members of the health insurance. They also provide specialized medical care, medical lab tests and X-Ray services at discounted prices.

The profit-making private centers also serve West Bankers in the area, who are required to pay full prices for health services, whether medical consultation, lab tests or X-Ray services as they are not entitled to the Israeli health insurance.

Refugees can benefit from both the UNRWA health services and the Israeli health insurance. Many of the camp residents, especially seniors whom I met during fieldwork, spoke of suffering from chronic diseases such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and joint pains in their legs that require constant medication. Mostly, they prefer the free medication that UNRWA Health Center

provides them. Nonetheless, they are obliged to utilize their Israeli health insurance for the treatment of more sophisticated conditions. They use it as a last resort after UNRWA's free health services are exhausted with no tangible results in the treatment.

Furthermore, from the early 2000s about ten private dental clinics and four pharmacies opened in the camp area, as shown in Table 3.6 below. All ten dental clinics are private and several of them belong to dentists from the West Bank. The four pharmacies in the camp area are also privately owned but they too operate upon contracts with the patient funds to sell medicine at discounted prices for *Kupat Holim* members.

Table 5.3: Number of health facilities in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp
Source: Author's fieldwork survey in February 2020.

Health facility	Number
Health centers	9
Dental clinics	10
pharmacies	4
Physical therapy center	1

These different medical facilities are mainly located on the 'Anata Road. Many of them are owned by refugees from the Shu'fat Camp that invested in them to benefit financially from the growing population in the area.

5.3.3. Employment and Workforce

The status of the Shu'fat Camp refugees as Jerusalem residents, carrying special Jerusalem identity cards that enable them to move freely and work in Israel enabled a large number of camp refugees to enter different sectors in the Israeli labour market. It is estimated that generally 54%

of Palestinian Jerusalemite households depended in their living on work in the Israeli labour market during the period 2015-2017.[208]

Shu'fat Camp refugees, as part of the Palestinian Jerusalemite population, are not an exception to this equation. According to data of the ARIJ institute[209] (2012, 8), 70% of the camp refugees work in different jobs in the Israeli labour market. Upon fieldwork for this research, these rates did not change. The high rate of camp residents, working in the Israeli market was confirmed during interviews with camp residents. Most of the family members of the interviewed people, and those contacted in the camp work in Israel -- in restaurants, hotels, elderly day care facilities and construction (UNCTAD 2013, iv). They also work as drivers or workers in Israeli factories, Israeli cleaning companies, and butcher shops.

This significant dependency on the Israeli economy, taking into consideration the discriminatory treatment of Palestinian Jerusalemite workers, confirms Israel's exploitation of and discrimination against the Palestinian workers. In 2013, UNCTAD estimated that the average wage of Palestinian Jerusalemites is 50% lower than it is in the western part of Jerusalem although the Palestinians in the eastern part of the city share the same costs of living as Jews in the western part of the city. This is a primary factor behind the increased rates of poverty amongst Palestinian Jerusalemites that was estimated at more than 75% of households (UNCTAD 2013, 10). This is all part of Israel's colonial policies in Jerusalem that are directed towards squeezing the efforts of the colonized Palestinian population to benefit its own economy

[208] PCBS (2018), *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*: 53-58.
[209] ARIJ - the Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem was established in 1990 as a non-profit organization with the goal of promoting sustainable development of the OPT.

in what was called by David Harvey (2006) as accumulation by dispossession that is based on the exploitation of the indigenous people.[210]

Commercial sector in the camp: An attractive economic hub for outsiders

The large population growth in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp increased demand on consumption products and thus attracted new businesses and dealers from the surrounding areas. This in turn pushed forward the trade sector in the camp and hundreds of commercial stores, mainly consumption goods, were opened in the camp area. Although the trade sector in the Shu'fat Camp and its expansion area is huge, it is run mainly by traders from outside the camp, people from different West Bank cities.

Through the fieldwork I found that the high population density in the camp and its surroundings attracted dozens of merchants and traders that already have businesses in different parts of the West Bank, such as Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah to open new businesses in the area, expanding their original work.

For the camp refugees, working in Israel is more profitable than opening their private businesses. For example, in the Israeli labour market, a skilled worker receives between NIS 500 and NIS 600 per day, whilst the wage of an unskilled worker is not less than NIS 300 and a truck driver receives a minimum of NIS 12,000 per month in the Israeli market. So, for them, there is not much value in bothering themselves with a business that will not be as profitable.

[210] More on Harvey's concept of accumulation by dispossession is to be discussed in the next chapter.

More than two hundred commercial stores[211] and shops have been opened in the camp area since commercial building construction began around the year 2000, creating a kind of shopping corridor along the ʻAnata Road. There are different types of shops including bakeries, clothes, shoes, groceries, supermarkets, electrical appliances, photo studios, women accessories, eyeglasses, mobile phones and their accessories, furniture, textile, household appliances, gifts, fruit and vegetables and shawarma, grilled chicken, barbeque, restaurants, etc. However, only a small number of these stores are registered with the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI).[212]

According to an ACCI survey in 2017, the results of which were obtained by the author, there are 289 different types of shops and commercial stores in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp and its area of expansion. However, only 27 businesses are officially registered at the chamber. Mr. Sami of the ACCI explained that the refugee merchants in the camp avoid official merchant registration in any institution in order to avoid the undesirable consequences, including imposition of taxes by the Israeli authorities or being asked to register their businesses with Israeli institutions that impose high licensing fees. He added that even some of them report to the chamber that their shops are located in a West Bank area, such as ʻAnata village, the closest to the camp in order to avoid taxation by the Jerusalem municipality.[213]

Part of the business boom in the camp area is due to Israel generally turning a blind eye to developments in the area, particularly after the construction of the separation wall around the

[211] Interview with Mr. Sami (nickname), an official at the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI), at his office in Arram on March 25, 2019.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

camp in 2006. For example, Jerusalem municipality employees do not reach these areas very often to collect taxes.[214] This also encouraged Jerusalemite merchants who already have shops in the center of the city or other Jerusalem neighbourhoods either to move their businesses to the camp area or to open new branches there in order to benefit financially from the population boom in the area.

The commercial stores in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp are located in three main areas. The first is on both sides of the main road in the middle of the camp; the second is on both sides of the 'Anata main road, and the third is along the branch roads inside the camp, especially the road, linking the center of the camp with the new construction in Ras Khamis Hill.

A high level of competition was revealed amongst the merchants. This competition was exhibited in different ways. However, the real competition mainly takes place regarding the location of the stores. The stores closer to the populated complexes are of higher value than those farther from these complexes. Shops on the 'Anata Road are considered of the highest value because they are closer to a large population complex of newcomers to the area. Moreover, the 'Anata Road enjoys constant movement of people from the camp, day and night. The rental of a commercial store on the 'Anata Road reaches about NIS 1,500, whilst it is cheaper in other areas.

[214] In certain cases, and without previous notice, the Jerusalem municipality personnel, escorted by Israeli soldiers, raid the Shu'fat Camp after imposing a curfew on the entire camp area. They enter commercial stores and houses to collect taxes, fines or any other unpaid fees required from the camp residents. Mostly, the store owners close their doors the moment they hear that the municipality personnel are in the area. However, others do not have enough time to close before the municipality officials reach them. Such a campaign took place on 23 August, 2018. During this campaign, municipality personnel and a police force, escorted by Israeli soldiers, entered the camp area. The police issued about 30 traffic tickets to Palestinian residents in the camp (source: https://alquds-city.com/news/29275, (Accessed on November 8, 2020)).

Regarding the shops in the center of the camp, they are mostly owned by refugees and their customers are also refugees, unlike shops on the ʻAnata Road, where the customers are both refugees and non-refugees. The refugee shop owners inside the camp struggle to reach more customers. For example, a falafel shop owner moved his shop from an internal neighbourhood in the camp to the center area. The refugee shop owners inside the camp consider themselves as not benefitting economically from this influx of the newcomers to the camp area. They complained that the increasing number of shops on the ʻAnata Road negatively impacted their work as residents, particularly newcomers who live in the new buildings in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada, prefer shopping in more diversified shops along the ʻAnata Road outside the original camp boundaries.

Some refugees opened restaurants and shops on ʻAnata Road, seeking economic gains. One of the camp refugees who owns a restaurant on the ʻAnata Road, said he opened his restaurant in the year 2000 with the goal of benefiting from the new construction boom in Ras Shehada. He wanted to invest the money he saved from his past work in an Israeli restaurant in the western part of Jerusalem by opening his own restaurant on ʻAnata Road. He said, "In the early 2000s as the construction work started booming in Ras Shehada, the work of the restaurant was high, serving all the construction workers in the area. However, nowadays, as the pace of construction in the site became slower, the restaurant work decreased as well."[215] The restaurant owner thought in the beginning that he would also benefit from the people that were going to inhabit these buildings, but the results did not occur as he wished. People rarely enter the restaurant,

[215] Interview with Mr. Sa'eed, (nickname), a refugee restaurant owner on ʻAnata Road, at his restaurant on July 12, 2018.

especially with the heavy traffic jams on the road, where drivers do not even think of stopping. In fact, this was the main complaint of the shop owners on the ‘Anata Road.

Rapid population growth in the Shu’fat Camp area formed an unprecedented business opportunity that was immediately seized by a large number of merchants, mainly from the different West Bank cities. Growth in the population means growing demand on consumer goods of food, clothes, and growing demand on different kinds of services, primarily health and education. Although the concentration of people brought huge economic results to the camp area, it put heavy pressure on the existing infrastructure, which already suffers shortfalls that need to be addressed.

5.3.4. Refugee women’s status

In very rare cases in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp do women play the role of head of their household or the primary breadwinner and caretaker of themselves and their families. Mostly, the camp women are supported by the men in their families. However, interviews with Shu’fat Camp women refugees revealed that the camp’s women played a significant role in managing their homes beside the men in the family and in camp life in general. This section intends to identify the position of women in the Shu’fat Refugee Camp and the role that they play in the camp’s socio-economic life.

Most of refugee women in the Shu’fat Camp, who witnessed the 1948 war, were originally village women working in the land beside the men. Expulsion and refuge changed their lives and presented new challenges for them, especially as the men in their families lost their source of

income and needed to look for alternatives. Women did not stand still in this predicament. They also sought alternative opportunities for work to help the men in the family. Most of the interviewed women of this first generation said they mainly resorted to dressmaking and embroidery work at home with the goal of helping support their families.[216] Many of them continued their home-based work after they were moved to the Shu'fat Camp. However, they rarely worked outside the camp, considering that work at home was more decent for them. Besides the money-generating work at home, the camp women played the traditional gender role, doing physical housework and water collection as well as some gardening or poultry breeding[217].

However, despite the lack of precise statistics, there were some women refugees in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp that were the sole head of household and breadwinner of their family and worked outside the home. Um Khalil was the only woman amongst the women I contacted who was the primary breadwinner in her household. Um Khalil moved to live in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp with her four children in 1967 after her husband was killed by the Israeli troops in Imwas village during the 1967 war. She said that she worked in cleaning homes, hospitals and monasteries in order to support her family and ensure the education of her children.[218]

The later generations of women in the Shu'fat Camp had a more comfortable life due to improved economic conditions in the seventies and later. More women sought higher education to take up white-collar jobs in teaching, nursing and other office jobs, mainly in the Jerusalem institutions. In 2017, the labour force participation rate for females in the eastern part of

[216] Interviews with Um 'Umran, ibid; and Um Jihad, ibid;.
[217] Interviews with Um Ayman, ibid; Um Ashraf, ibid; Um 'Umran, ibid, and Um Jihad, ibid.
[218] Interview with Um Khalil, ibid.

Jerusalem reached 6.7%.[219] Shu'fat Camp women are included in this figure, but unfortunately, there were no specific statistics for the women of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp.

The Oslo process in the early 1990s renewed hopes of an imminent solution for the Palestinian refugee problem and encouraged the Shu'fat Camp women to develop social responsibility and strengthen women's social institutions. The camp women played a significant role in this area. In the mid-nineties five refugee women volunteered to establish the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp (WCSHC), which began operating as of 1997.[220]

The main goal of the center was to empower the women of the camp. "The center activities targeted camp women by providing training on income-generating work. This included women's accessory-making, dress-making and beauty courses, in addition to involving women in paid work in the center itself, such as making healthy food that was sold and distributed to school cafeterias."[221]

[219] PCBS (2018), Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2018, 53.
[220] The five founders were socially active women with links to the Fatah Movement and vary in their educational levels. One of them holds a master's degree, another one holds a two-year community college diploma, two women hold *Tawjihi* (high school) certificates and the fifth holds a preparatory school certificate (WCSHC website). The administrative commission of the women's center is elected democratically every two years. The founding women were elected as members of the administrative commission in different rounds. The first elections of the center took place in 1998 under the supervision of UNRWA officials. In 2002, the center was registered officially at the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, which became responsible for supervising the performance of the center, including the annual administrative and financial reports and the elections of the administrative commission. (Source: Interview with Ms. Samira, ibid.
[221] Interview with Ms. Samira, ibid.

Figure 5.6: Shu'fat Camp refugee women taking part in an accessory-making course in the Women's Center. Source: Author, October 25, 2018.

The Women's Center also opened job opportunities for women in its facilities. Women can work in administrative jobs in the center itself, serve as trainers for different courses, teachers in the school and kindergarten, belonging to the center, serve as babysitters in the center's child care facility, or as fitness trainers in the center's gym facility. Through its training courses the center provided women with new skills and capabilities to start their own micro-businesses at home. The courses are mostly given for free or for symbolic fees.

Although somewhat hidden and rarely considered in any official statistics on the labour force, a significant number of women are working from home. On December 15, 2019, one of the camp's women refugees advertised on a WhatsApp group a one-day soap-making course at her home. The course is directed towards women only. She stated on the WhatsApp group that she will be charging each trainee one hundred shekels. Thus she will be generating some income and teaching others to learn something they can generate income from in the future. This woman was trained on soap-making at the Women's Center and now she is training others to benefit as well.

However, the more fortunate women continued their higher education and sought more profitable jobs. Women's work outside the home became more acceptable. This may be

attributed to the increasing rates in educational attainment along with the openness to Jerusalem and Israeli society. This openness led to increasing liberal attitudes amongst camp refugees, both men and women. Today it is normal to see women run their businesses in women's hair-dressing, selling women's clothes, or women's accessories and cosmetics. I met seven of these women whilst I was surveying businesses in the camp area. Moreover, many women can be observed in the Shu'fat Camp driving cars and wearing a more liberal dress style, particularly teenagers. This indicates that women are increasingly seeking independence of choice and challenging patriarchal attitudes in society. These liberal attitudes towards women in the Shu'fat Camp are stronger amongst the more economically and educationally fortunate refugees, where women can afford to get higher education, buy cars or place their children in nurseries and day care facilities whilst they establish a business outside their homes.

The story of Hanan, 30, of the Shu'fat Camp is quite interesting in terms of women seeking independence. I met Hanan in a beauty Salon on the 'Anata Road in October 2018. Hanan holds a university degree in law. She told me that after her graduation, she trained in several law offices for a symbolic salary. After two years of practice, she felt it wasn't the job that coud offer her financial security. She left the office job and took a beauty course. Her family members were completely opposed to her decision but based upon her determination they financially supported her to open her own beauty salon. She said that her work in law will not be as profitable in the short term.[222] In general, all groups of women in the Shu'fat Camp whether rich or poor seek to empower themselves and have a lifestyle that is under their own control. Income-generating jobs, no matter how much they generate, no doubt add to their independence.

[222] Interview with Hanan, 30, originally from Beit Thul village, at her beauty salon on October 29 2018.

5.4. Summary: Encounter of wealth and poverty

Figure 5.7: Inside Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Source: Author, January 3, 2019.

Addressing the socio-economic developments in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp after 1995, this chapter draws an overall picture of changes that took place in the camp in the wake of the increasing commercial construction and the influx of non-refugee Jerusalemites into the camp. The chapter discovered increasing socio-economic gaps amongst the camp residents. The considerable economic activities manifested in the new surge of commercial buildings do not mean that poverty is absent in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Although there are no official estimates, the high density and congestion levels within the original UNRWA boundaries of the camp reveal widespread levels of poverty.

The emerging real estate sector and the concentration of capital in the hands of a small group of the refugees during the past twenty years led to a polarizing effect on the fabric of the camp and increased inequality amongst the camp refugees. Ownership of land indicates greater disparities. The acquisition of land and its development by a small number of refugees led to soaring land prices so that it became unaffordable for most of the camp refugees who did not seize the opportunity to purchase land when it was cheap at the beginning of the land '*hajma'* in the year 2000, a time with high demand for housing.

The less fortunate groups in the camp depend more on the free services, offered by UNRWA, which is of lesser quality than the education and health services offered by the private sector. Moreover, their children are less educated as they are mostly encouraged to work to help in supporting their families, one of the reasons behind the dropout rates in UNRWA schools, as mentioned earlier. Also, less fortunate refugees cannot afford to send their children to the more expensive private schools in the area.

However, there is a need for more research in the future to assess quantitatively the correlation between educational attainment and income. For example, can we say that the poor are less educated, whilst the rich are more educated? I believe this equation is not quite adequate in Palestinian society in general. In a 1992 report, Marian Heiberg wrote, "unlike Western societies, in which increased education correlates strongly with increased income, in Palestinian society this correlation is weaker. …. based on an economic classification of the Palestinian population into the thirds ranging from the poorest third (0-33%) to the richest third (67- 100%) ….. In Arab Jerusalem only 2% of the most educated household heads are found among the poorest third and a full 83% are among the richest third. However, notably in Arab Jerusalem, of those household heads who have no education at all, a full 44% of them are also among the richest third of the population." (Heiberg 1993a, 137-139).

The Shu'fat Refugee Camp is a good example of Heiberg's proposition. There is no visible correlation between education and wealth. The wealthiest people in the camp are the construction developers, most of whom did not complete university education. Only two out of ten of the

refugee developers carry university certificates. At the same time, there are many well-educated people in the camp who are not as rich as these construction developers. But we cannot divide the camp residents into two categories: the very rich and the very poor. There are people stratified in between, depending on their income, type of work and also whether they work or not.

The development of the urban construction sector in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp led to a stratified society in the camp area, especially with the emergence of the economic elite of new construction developers and land owners. However, unlike many other stratified societies, these refugee construction developers in the camp did not distance themselves from the rest of the camp refugees after they became wealthy. Although most of them moved their dwelling from the original UNRWA houses to newer houses that they built in the camp area of expansion, they maintained ties with their families in the camp. Some of them did not even relinquish their UNRWA houses. They either rented them or granted them to other family members to expand and improve their living conditions. Thus they did not make a segregated group. While some of them preferred to stay far from the general social life in the camp, others were socially active. For example, one of them is well known for his financial support to public events that are organized by camp institutions. Others became well-known social reformers at the level of the camp and the Jerusalem district.

CHAPTER SIX

6. From Marginalization from Above to Power from Below

6.1. Introduction

Every story is unique *per se*. The story of the Shu'fat Camp refugees, their origins, expulsion, refugee life, and the places and events they encountered, all shaped who they are today. It was very revealing to trace the development of the Shu'fat Camp and the history of its refugees. The developments in Shu'fat Refugee Camp provide many important insights. The developments or changes that it experienced from small and narrow UNRWA houses to the current dense and highly congested urban space provide an extensive picture of the ongoing socio-economic changes that took place in the lives of the camp refugees since their expulsion from their towns and villages in 1948. These transformations can be divided into phases, depending on their cause and characteristics. They are as follows:

The first phase began more than fifteen years before the establishment of the camp in its current location in Shu'fat. In 1948, most of the Palestinians, not only the later inhabitants of Shu'fat Camp, were transformed from *fellahin*, living in their homes and land in their towns and villages, into dispersed refugees without homes or land, and living on humanitarian aid. The *Nakba* was crucial for the establishment, survival and continuation of Israel and its Zionist colonial project which thrived on the destruction of Palestinian towns and villages, the expulsion of Palestinian people and the theft of their property. The refugees in Shu'fat Camp were only a very tiny percentage of all expelled Palestinians. However, they expressed the general story of expulsion and *sumoud*. After their expulsion in 1948, the refugees of Shu'fat Camp were forced to survive

in very dire conditions in the Mu'askar Camp in the Old City of Jerusalem before they were moved.

The second phase began in 1965, when the Mu'askar refugees were moved to the current location of the Shu'fat Camp, four kilometers northeast of the Old City of Jerusalem, where they had lived for about fifteen years. In Shu'fat, the refugees developed their camp identity and an attachment to their new place of living.

The third phase began in 1967 when Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. As part of illegally annexed Jerusalem, Shu'fat refugees were granted Jerusalem IDs. This distinguished them from the rest of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Above all, it opened up work opportunities for them in Israel, thus improving their living conditions. This also created economic disparity amongst the camp refugees, due to the differences between them in terms of skills and the type of work they sought. It also enabled many of them to invest money in renovating and expanding their UNRWA houses.

The fourth phase began in the year 2000 and its impact is still felt today. It began when some of the camp refugees initiated a land acquisition process, through which they significantly expanded the camp boundaries and embarked on a surge of commercial residential construction. Their action led to significant socioeconomic transformations in the camp area that revealed important sources of power and resistance in the hands of the marginalized indigenous people against an oppressive settler colonial regime.

A fifth phase might arise if the Jerusalem Municipality proceeds with its plans to oust UNRWA from Jerusalem and assumes its responsibilities in Shu'fat Camp.[223]

These phases in the life of the Shu'fat refugees give us insight into the socioeconomic conditions of camp residents and their resistance tools. They help us understand how transformation has taken place in the camp and the sources of power available for the refugees during every phase that enabled them to make changes in their lives. The history of the Shu'fat Camp refugees helps us understand how marginalized indigenous people can combat a violent settler colonial project that is based on exploitation and dispossession. Tracing the changes that the Shu'fat refugees experienced reveals a set of intertwined types of economy, power and resistance, all of which shaped their life today.

6.2. Power, resistance, and collective action

Resistance of the marginalized Shu'fat refugees is not meant to challenge and fight the official authorities, but rather to empower oneself, survive, and secure a dignified life. It is a case of power from below. Marginalized refugees were able to develop bottom up strategies to overcome economic hardships and challenge formal regulations that sabotaged their development. The research highlighted several resources of power that the Shu'fat Camp residents mobilized in order to overcome their precariousness on the one hand and to thwart Israel's plans against them on the other.

This research drew on the analysis of Lila Abu Lughod (1990) of power and resistance. Abu Lughod (1990), diagnosed power through unlikely forms of resistance, such as songs, that

[223] Further discussion of the municipality step is presented in the coming sections.

Bedouin women use to overcome the authority of men. In this research, I considered the activities and practices of the Shu'fat residents, including construction activities, acquisition of land and mass return of Jerusalemites to live within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, as forms of resistance that diagnose tools of power from below in the hand of the marginalized groups. These are unlikely forms of resistance that are not meant to achieve liberation or end the occupation, but rather they are meant to overcome marginalization and precariousness that is imposed on them from above.

These unlikely forms of resistance of the Shu'fat refugees can be situated within Asef Bayat's concept of social non-movements (Bayat 2013) that can best express the unorganized collective actions of the Shu'fat residents as explained in chapter three of this study.

When the goal is one, the action is mostly similar. Unorganized collective action appeared amongst the Shu'fat residents in different ways along their history of refuge. Building on the previously mentioned historical phases of the life of Shu'fat refugees, we find that during the first phase, these actions appeared in the early fifties when dozens of refugees decided to leave their first place of refuge to occupy empty houses in the Old City of Jerusalem. That was not an arranged action. Rather they followed their desire to have a home to compensate for their lost homes after expulsion.

During the second phase, with their relocation to Shu'fat, this compensation was granted to them by UNRWA which built homes for them in Shu'fat. Regardless of their disappointment and dissatisfaction with these tiny homes, they developed a sense of stability and attachment to them.

They also developed their own camp identity. This identity made them act as if they owned these homes and adapted themselves to life in them. At the same time, they adapted these houses according to their lifestyle by utilizing their limited financial capabilities to modify their homes and some of them even built walls around them.

This collective action developed over time granted them more sources of power. The process of developing and expanding their houses amplified during the third phase, which witnessed a slight improvement in their economic situation as they entered work in Israel. This phase witnessed the beginning of social disparity amongst the camp residents, based on economic and political factors. During this phase, the unorganized collective action at the camp level continued. However, another type of unorganized collective action took place amongst certain groups with shared characteristics. At the camp level, the refugees continued the yet more feverish expansion of their houses both horizontally and vertically. Their action was against UNRWA regulations that had no plans to meet their growing needs for space. However, they did not act upon a specific ideology, nor did they intend to challenge UNRWA, but rather, they wanted to enhance their lives, improve their living conditions, and fulfill their growing natural needs.

At the same time, a group of 35 politically-engaged refugees encroached on the *waqf* land, east of the camp and fenced it in. Although they are politically-engaged people, their action was not ideologically-led. They were *Intifada* activists, but their action in fencing the land was not meant for political end. Rather, it came from their urgent need for space. Nonetheless, the action brought political results. It was the first action by the camp refugees to block any planned expansion of the neighbouring Pisgat Ze'ev settlement towards the camp whilst expanding their

camp boundaries. They proved that they possess the power to act to meet their need for space although their action is illegal and it is socially unacceptable out of the fact that *waqf* properties are endowed for public use and they should not be exploited for private use.

The fourth phase, which shapes the Shu'fat Refugee Camp today, presented different and more developed types of resistance, power and economic practices, all of which are unorganized collective actions at the level of various groups of the camp residents. The most prominent groups that were able to change their lives and leave significant prints on themselves, at the camp level and at the Jerusalem level were construction developers, and the returning Jerusalemites that became camp residents.

The unorganized collective action of construction developers led to several significant results. They became rich whilst the camp expanded and became a central space for those seeking affordable housing inside Jerusalem. They also played a significant role in countering Israel's demographic plans in Jerusalem at a time when they blocked any plans for continuity between the neighbouring Jewish settlements on the account of the camp.

The influx of the Jerusalemites into the camp area to occupy the hundreds of commercial high rise buildings is also a manifestation of the unorganized collective action. They formed another social non-movement, resisting the Israeli plans against them and countering Israel's "center of life policy". Here we distinguish the encounter of two social non-movements that led to the same end, although each had different goals. Construction developers sought financial profits, whilst

the returning Jerusalemites sought a living place. The actions of both these parties thwarted Israel's demographic policies in Jerusalem.

Consequently, several characteristics distinguish the collective action in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, based on the analysis of Asef Bayat of social non-movements. It is not driven by any ideology. It is based on unorganized action that turned into an unplanned ordinary practice. It is conducted individually without the need for leadership. Mostly, these actions are unlicensed, counter the Israeli policies and regulations and are deemed informal.

These actions are seen as mobilizing others outside the spectrum of the group that initiated them. This is revealed when professional non-refugee Jerusalemite construction developers followed the steps of their refugee counterparts in acquiring land in Shu'fat for the goal of constructing commercial residential buildings. Perhaps they would not have dared to act had they not seen first-hand the success of the refugees in this business and the benefits they accrued without the Israeli authority interference to stop them. This indicates that the "illegal, unlicensed, informal" actions are threatened and can be sabotaged from above at any time. The success of these actions lies actually in "the *power of big numbers*, that is, the consequential effect on norms and rules … of many people simultaneously doing similar, through contentious, things" (Bayat 2013, 21, *emphasis* in original).

Applying this to the case of refugee construction developers, whose number is quite small, here again arises the encounter of the two different groups – construction developers and returning Jerusalemites and the strength they provide each other. The mass presence of the returnees

strengthens the action of the construction developers that could not have resumed their work without the high demand from returnees for affordable housing that they offered. Together, their actions were seen as subverting Israel's settler colonial policies as was previously discussed. Israel did not consider meeting the housing needs of Palestinian Jerusalemites with the goal of pressuring them to leave the city. At the same time, if refugee construction developers apply for construction licenses, their applications will automatically be turned down. Consequently, they have to act to fulfill their needs.

The action oftentimes is not without cost; however, sometimes action is less costly than inaction. For the returning Jerusalemites, inaction means losing their residency status in Jerusalem. They do not intend to change the laws or to end the occupation. All they intend to do is to secure their right to space and their right to their city. Meanwhile, for refugee construction developers, inaction means they remain in precariousness and poverty.

Consequently, this research diagnosed several forms of power in the hands of the Shu'fat Camp residents that served in the achievement of the current transformations in the camp area. These forms of power included the power of seizing the right opportunity at the right time, the power of tactic, the power of big numbers, the power of collectivism, the power of understanding the psyche of the enemy, the power of breaking the fear barrier, the power of resilience and the power of persistent existence and survival within a discriminatory and exploitative settler colonial context that is targeting their existence in their land.

6.3. Israeli version of settler colonialism

The developments in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp confirm the Zionist settler colonial procedures in Palestine in general and particularly in Jerusalem. They also emphasize a special form of settler colonial regime of Israel in Palestine that deviates from the pure settler colonial paradigm, presented by the main scholars in the field. These scholars advocate for a sharp differentiation between settler colonialism and classical colonialism in that settler colonialism is based on elimination of the indigenous people and dispossession of land, whilst classical colonialism is based on exploitation of indigenous people and extraction of land resources (see Wolfe 1999; Veracini 2010).

However, this analysis not only ignores the fact that the settler colonial dispossession of land automatically means extraction of land resources, but it also ignores the specificities of certain settler colonial projects that did not abandon – or were built on - exploitation of indigenous people such as the settler societies in Africa. The indigenous people were also exploited by the Zionist project in Palestine.

This research highlights this specifically in the case in Palestine and presents throughout the research several forms of exploitation of the Palestinian people in general and Jerusalemites in particular. More elaboration on these forms will be presented later on in this chapter.

In the following, I will present specificities of the concepts of elimination and exploitation in the case of the Zionist settler colonial project in Palestine that deviated from the norms of the mainstream settler colonial paradigm as analyzed by the main scholars in the field. It is important

to trace this deviation and understand its reasons and consequences in order to bring an alternative reading that can best express the Zionist settler colonial regime in Palestine and overcome the limitations of the pure settler colonial paradigm in analyzing it.

6.3.1. 'Taming' the logic of elimination

Israel never abandoned the idea of eliminating Palestinians; however, it failed to accomplish the process that it began in 1948 and attempted to repeat in 1967. The results of the elimination attempts were limited as the largest portion of the expelled Palestinians did not leave historical Palestine and remained within its boundaries[224].

With a focus on Jerusalem, Israel's attempts to displace Jerusalemites from their city also failed. Jerusalemites challenged Israeli laws to displace them, especially the "center of life policy" and returned to live within the city boundaries. Jerusalemites forced to remain outside city boundaries including those who had their IDs withdrawn for various reasons also did not leave the boundaries of historical Palestine and remained living in their homeland. Thus this is not an elimination process, but rather a kind of internal displacement or rearrangement of people within Palestine.

[224] More than 800,000 Palestinians became refugees, who were expelled from their homes and lands in 1948. Moreover, 30,000 refugees remained in areas that are today called Israel, but never allowed to return to their original villages. The largest number of the expulsed Palestinians sought refuge in the Palestinian areas that were not occupied by Israel in 1948 and were later on called the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The population of these areas was doubled with the arrival of the refugees. The population number of the WBGS in 1948 was about 500,000 people, whilst the number of the refugees was about 590,000. Only 300,000 out of the 800,000 refugees settled outside the historical boundaries of Palestine. Out of these, 104,000 refugees settled in Lebanon, 110,000 refugees settled in Jordan, 82,000 refugees settled in Syria and about 12,000 refugees moved further and settled in other countries, such as Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Britain (Sources: Kana'na 2000, 87; Sayigh 1979, 99-100).

We cannot ignore the important role that the development of international law played in "taming" the logic of elimination in the context of Israel's settler colonialism in Palestine. However, the agency of the Palestinian people and their continual resistance and persistence to survive also had a solid role in foiling Israel's deliberate elimination attempts.

The continual survival of the Palestinians in their land limited Israel's accumulation processes, represented in the dispossession of the land. Thus, as elimination of the Palestinians was not fully accomplished and in order to achieve its primary goal of dispossession of land, Israel chose exploitation as an alternative strategy to elimination. The strategy is modified, but the goal remained the same -- dispossession of land.

6.3.2. Exploitation and accumulation by dispossession

This study shows that a large number of Palestinian Jerusalemites, including Shu'fat refugees, were exploited in the Israeli labour market. I argue here that Israel uses the colonial logic of exploitation of the indigenous labour force in order to achieve its settler colonial goal of dispossession of land.

In its plans to Judaize Jerusalem, Israel is mainly concerned with the expropriation of Palestinian land. To achieve this goal, it needed to detach Palestinians from the land which was once their only means of production, and force them into the Israeli labour market, by imposing oppressive economic policies that are to be discussed later on in this section. The irony in this process is that the Palestinian workers, especially in the fields of construction and agriculture are forced to build

settlements for Jews on their own land or to cultivate their expropriated land for the benefit of their dispossessor.

Israel was capable of managing its economy without the employment of Palestinian workers, but this was its only way to weaken their attachment to their land and get them out of it. Developments since 1967 proved that the Palestinian workforce was not that necessary for the Israeli economy as Israel was able to replace Palestinian workers with foreign workers in the wake of the First *Intifada* and later on in the wake of the Second *Intifada*. Thus, the colonial exploitation of the Palestinian labour force was only meant to achieve a settler colonial goal of seizing land. Israel does not want the people, but rather it wants their valuable land. The cheap labour force of Palestinians was easily replaced with cheaper labour.

Therefore, Israel is built on the accumulation by dispossession that is based on continual exploitation of the indigenous people. According to David Harvey (2006), accumulation by dispossession is a continual process in capitalist societies and is not limited to the origins of capitalism such as with primitive accumulation. Harvey defined several ways in which accumulation by dispossession takes place: “the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations (as in Mexico and India in recent times); conversion of various forms of property rights (e.g. common, collective, state) into exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neocolonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave-trade (which continues

particularly in the sex industry); and usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all, the use of the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation" (Harvey 2006, 153).

Based on Harvey's perception, we can detect the oppressive economic policies that Israel imposed on the Palestinians and involved several forms of exploitation that Israel used with the goal of dispossessing Palestinians in general and particularly Palestinian Jerusalemites. The primary manifestation of dispossession and exploitation of Palestinians is Israel's control of natural resources of land and water. This is achieved by implementing many economic policies that were aimed at weakening the Palestinian economy, maintaining its dependency on Israel and detaching Palestinians from their land. These policies can be listed as follows:

Utilization of natural resources: Israel's control of land and water resources is its initial exploitation and dispossession of the Palestinians.

Exploitation of the Palestinian labour force: Israel began with encouraging Palestinians to seek "well-paid" jobs in the Israeli labour market. This; meanwhile, encouraged them to leave their land that is no longer profitable or cannot be as profitable as work in Israel, thus transforming Palestinians from farmers into proletariat. This transformation can have a deeper meaning in a settler colonial context, built on detaching the Palestinians from their land. It can be utilized by the settler colonial entity that the Palestinians have no roots in this land and therefore it is easy to get them out.

Imposing discriminatory and exploitative economic policies: Israel enforced various trade and business policies on the Palestinians that resulted in extracting money from Palestinian merchants who are required to pay high fees for business licensing even the very small ones. At the same time, Israel subsidized Israeli businesses. The result is that the Palestinian businesses could not compete with the Israeli ones and remained limited in their impact.

Imposing high taxes: Israel's taxation policy against the Palestinians has maintained exploitation and dispossession of the Palestinian capital. It has systematically sabotaged development of the Palestinians.

Turning Palestinian Territory into a market for Israeli products: Israel prevented the products of Palestinian companies from entering Jerusalem and Israel, whereas Israeli products invade Palestinian markets. This further weakened the Palestinian production and industry and at the same time turned the Palestinian towns and villages into consumer markets for Israeli products.

Turning Palestinian Territory as market for Israeli currency: in 1967, Israel imposed its currency on Palestinians. This transformed the OPT including Jerusalem into a large market for Israeli currency and further increased Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy.

Construction of settlements: Israel allocates large budgets for the construction of Jewish settlements on Palestinian land. Settlements are the primary manifestation of Israel's settler colonial land grab policy.

Consequently, Israel is a settler colonial regime that was forced to replace full elimination with other means of exploitation, racialization, and exclusion. If Israel had been able to eliminate the Palestinians entirely, it would not have resorted to exploiting them in labour. Therefore, the exploitative trend of Israel's settler colonial project in Palestine transformed the project into a hybrid project that mixes between elements of colonialism and settler colonialism.

6.3.3. The cunning of history: Thwarting settler colonial policies

Israel has been extremely successful in changing perceptions of history and imposing the historical version that meets its interests. But it does not always work as long as the Palestinians are there, writing their history with their presence on their land. This research has shown how history can work to undermine those who try to impose their own. This is confirmed by the unplanned urban sprawl in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp area, which actually had serious political results. The dense construction in the Shu'fat Camp area created a serious obstacle for Israel's plans to create settlement continuity amongst the Jewish settlements in the area. If accomplished, that plan would have trapped the camp between settlements, threatening it with evacuation. But the agency of the camp refugees proved that power and resistance are inseparable.

Another manifestation of how Palestinians are writing their history by maintaining their presence on their land against the will of their occupier is the agency of the Palestinian Jerusalemites who insisted on returning to live in their city, preempting Israel's discriminatory policies aimed at getting them out of it. Thus, the process of getting rid of the Palestinian Jerusalemites stopped where it started.

6.4. Conclusion: What future for Shu'fat refugee camp?

A fifth phase in the life of the Shu'fat Camp residents is still not clear and depends on the Israeli municipality's implementation of its threats against UNRWA. It would of course create new non-movements (or movements), new forms of collective actions, new types of resistance, new sources of power and therefore new outcomes and new characteristics. Whenever Israel tightens its settler colonial grip over Jerusalem, the Palestinian Jerusalemites emphasize their steadfastness by inventing new forms of resistance.

The Jerusalem municipality's threats against UNRWA, which coincided with launching the intensive part of my fieldwork in the camp for the purpose of the current research, were considered a significant political development, concerning Jerusalem in general and the Shu'fat Camp in particular. The Jerusalem municipality actually started implementing several measures in this direction.

On October 4, 2018, former Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat prepared a proposal to stop UNRWA's work in Jerusalem and opted to have the Jerusalem Municipality provide education, health, and sanitation services in Shu'fat Refugee Camp. Barkat announced that Israel does not want refugees in Jerusalem, but it wants residents who will be served by the municipality. However, he did not set a timeframe for the change.[225] In response, UNRWA expressed deep concern and said that such a move would impact its humanitarian action in Jerusalem.[226]

[225] https://www.timesofisrael.com/outgoing-jerusalem-mayor-lays-out-plan-to-oust-unrwa-from-city/ (retrieved on June 24, 2020).
[226] https://middle-east-online.com/en/israel-threatens-remove-unrwa-occupied-jerusalem (retrieved on July 4, 2020).

On October 23, 2018, the municipality workers began cleaning garbage in the camp, a problem that all the camp residents complained of because UNRWA was unable to fix this problem entirely. On that same day, Barkat, escorted by Israeli forces, toured the camp in a move that was viewed as provocative to UNRWA and the camp residents.[227]

Thus, Shu'fat Camp refugees have come to a crossroad where they need to make painful choices between the right of return and better services. During informal conversations I had with the camp refugees, it emerged that they considered the municipality action as an attempt by Israel to emphasize its presence in Jerusalem and to end the Palestinian refugee cause. They also said that the dissolution of UNRWA is dissolution of the Palestinian refugee issue.[228] Although some refugees were happy that the camp would get cleaner, worries were high that the municipality would start forcing them to pay taxes.

Barkat's move came only several months before he left his post as mayor of Jerusalem; however, the municipality proceeded with other measures, emphasizing its control of the camp area. The municipality worked on dividing the camp's area of expansion – Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada - into neighbourhoods with different names. Some of these neighbourhoods were named "Sa'ad Ben Abi Waqqas," "Khallat 'Omari," "Al Ma'bar," and "New 'Anata." They also numbered the buildings, but not the apartments. This procedure was viewed as part of the municipality's attempt to tighten control on the camp residents as it has become very clear where each one of the residents lives.

[227] https://imemc.org/article/barkat-raids-Shu'fat-refugee-camp/ (retrieved on June 24, 2020).
[228] Author's informal conversation with camp residents on October 25, 2018.

The municipality's intervention in the Shu'fat Camp culminated with the demolition of about sixteen commercial stores on November 21-22, 2018. The stores were located along the main road between the military checkpoint and the camp's entrance. These stores were built after UNRWA constructed its new school for girls and surrounded it with a wall in the early 2000s. The refugees built their stores immediately in the street behind the school wall, using it as a back for their stores.

Reaction from camp residents was mixed. They were happy these stores were removed as they narrowed the main road, adding to heavy traffic jams, whilst at the same time, they were sad that the demolition was accomplished by the municipality which is considered an enemy. Though the stores were built by the refugees, they were mostly rented to non-refugees, including West Bankers. Therefore, the people affected are the managers of the stores and the camp refugees that built and rented them.[229] During the demolition period, parent committees in the camp schools decided there would be no school to ensure the safety of their children as they were worried that confrontations might erupt[230].

In another serious development on April 30, 2019, the Jerusalem municipality took an unprecedented and dangerous step in a clear challenge to the presence of UNRWA in Shu'fat Camp. The municipality sent orders to halt new construction extensions to both the Popular Committee and the Youth Social Center on pretexts of unlicensed construction. The two

[229] Author's informal conversations with camp residents on November 25, 2018.
[230] Shu'fat Camp account on facebook: https://m.facebook.com/Shu'fatCampState/?locale2=ar_AR.

buildings are located within the original UNRWA boundaries of the camp and officially under UNRWA jurisdiction.[231]



Figure 6.1: New construction inside Shu'fat Camp ordered to stop. (Left) Additional construction threatened with demolition in the Youth Social Center in Shu'fat Camp. (Right) Israeli Jerusalem municipality's notification to halt construction work in the Youth Social Center – Shu'fat Camp. Source: Author 30 April 2019.

Figure 6.1 above (left) shows the new under-construction floor of the Youth Social Center inside the UNRWA camp boundaries. The first two floors of the building were constructed in the late seventies without municipality intervention. The photo to the right shows the municipality's notification halting the additional construction in the center. The notification ordered an immediate halt of construction work; otherwise, the municipality would take further legal procedures against those that are responsible for this unlicensed construction work in the center. This was the first time the municipality interfered in the refugees' construction activities within UNRWA boundaries that should only be the responsibility of UNRWA.

[231] Wafa News Agency: https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/98277.

The issues of Jerusalem and refugees were also taken into consideration in the so called “peace plan” presented by the US President Donald Trump in January of 2020 with the goal of resolving the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Officially titled "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People."[232] The plan divided Jerusalem and granted the Palestinians a capital on the edge areas of the city, including Shu’fat Refugee Camp, thus emphasizing the separation wall as a border line between the two Palestinian and Israeli capitals.

The report said on page 17 that “Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.”

Regarding the issue of refugees, on page 31, the report clearly rejected the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their towns and villages. Rejecting the right of return means stripping the refugees their legal rights, and their status as refugees, thus, stripping UNRWA of all its responsibilities as well. The results of these developments remain to be seen.

It is not easy to conclude a non-ending issue. Israel’s exploitative settler colonial project is still continuing and the Palestinian resistance will continue. In an attempt to draw a comprehensive picture of the situation in Shu’fat Refugee Camp, this interdisciplinary work has combined

[232] To view the plan, for more details, see the full report at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf.

several fields of study including: history, political economy, international law, urban studies, ethnography, geopolitics, and sociology.

Using different types of historical resources - official history, primary and secondary resources and oral history – it presented a historical background of the Shu'fat Camp and its refugees that did not receive attention in previous literature.

The political economic analysis within the general framework of settler colonialism helped us to understand urban construction developments in Shu'fat Camp and their causes and impact. Analysis of international law helped us to understand the complex legal situation of the Palestinian Territory. Ethnographic field work helped us to delve deeply into the daily life of the camp people that culminated in the discovery of activities of poor camp women to maintain survival.

The study also relied on multiplicity of different resources to draw socioeconomic surveys of Shu'fat Camp to figure out the transformations that took place in the camp in terms of the diversity of population, commercial sector, educational, and health services, giving convincing results and filling gaps in literature.

Using a settler colonialism framework, we have focused on how the indigenous people succeeded in thwarting the policies of the colonizer by their determination and s*umoud*. Israel is constantly using all of its 'legal' tools to get rid of the Palestinians in Jerusalem; however, the results are counterproductive due to the Jerusalemites' continual resistance and their

determination to maintain a persistent presence on their land. However, we need more academic work on this angle by highlighting more cases to enrich the debate on how settler colonialism can be foiled and how the natives can play a significant role in this effort.

Looking at the future of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp area, we need to ask, what is next in the Shu'fat Camp? I want to end this research with a new argument that can serve as an introduction for future research on Shu'fat Refugee Camp and its residents. This research focused on power from below and the forms of resistance of Palestinian Jerusalemites. It did not elaborate on the Israeli policies, except where needed.

The Palestinian resistance portrayed in this research is of great significance and reveals high agency amongst the camp residents to overcome the harsh circumstances imposed on them by an oppressive and exploitative settler colonial regime. However, looking at Israel's overall colonial spatial goals in Jerusalem, we need to consider other aspects in the type of development found in the Shu'fat area. It is true that the residents succeeded in subverting Israel's demographic plans in Jerusalem, but Israel turning a blind eye to this type of development raises many question marks.

Israel is escalating its strategies of denial with the goal of deepening the marginalization of Jerusalemites. Being enclaved in an informal, low quality and dense space serves Israel's goal of isolating these Jerusalemites in well-defined and deeply deprived ghettos that can only deepen colonization. It is clear Israel is actually only interested in gathering Palestinians in spaces that remain far from Jewish spaces in the city.

This again confirms Abu Lughod's perception that this form of resistance is not completely independent from a domination framework (Abu Lughod 1990, 47). It also conforms to Foucault's (1978, 96) suggestion that resistance cannot be viewed as independent or outside the system of power.

This research focused on the role of the marginalized in changing their societies with daily practices that are viewed as forms of resistance and did not focus on the Israeli colonial policies *per se*. But we also need to diagnose forms of power from above through these forms of resistance of the marginalized Shu'fat residents. The practices of the Shu'fat residents in a way both challenge and promote Israel's dominating settler colonial power, affirming that their resistance practices are not external but embedded in the dominating system itself. The Shu'fat residents are not completely powerless, but at the same time Israel still has the upper hand in the struggle to change the course of things.

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Hamoked: http://www.hamoked.org
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IMEMC: International Middle East Media Center: https://imemc.org/artic
JCSER: Jerusalem Center for Cultural, Social and Economic Rights: http://www.jcser.org
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OCHA: https://www.ochaopt.org
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PCBS: The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics: http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/default.aspx
POICA: Palestinian Observatory of Israeli Colonialization Activities: http://poica.org/
PRCS: Palestinian Red Crescent Society: https://www.palestinercs.org/Shu'fat Camp State: https://www.facebook.com/Shu'fatCampState/
PLO Refugee Affairs Department: http://plord.ps/
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Appendices

Appendix I: Documents



وزارة الداخلية
محافظة القدس
القدس

الرقم .....
التاريخ ١٩٦٦/٧/١٧

أمر دفاع رقم (٣٥) لسنة ١٩٦٣
صادر بمقتضى المادتين ٢ و ٥ من نظام الدفاع رقم ٢ لسنة ١٩٣١

بناء على ما تقتضيه السلامة العامة وبالاستناد الى الصلاحية المخولة الي بمقتضى المادتين (٢ و ٥) من نظام الدفاع رقم (٢) لسنة ١٩٣١، آمر بنقل اللاجئين الموجودين في حي المعسكر بالقدس الى المكان الجديد الذي اعدت السلطات المختصة لاسكانهم فيه، كما آمر بمنع اي لاجئ جرى نقله بمقتضى هذا الامر من العودة للاقامة في الحي المذكور وعلى امانة القدس ان تقوم بهدم الاوكار غير الصالحة الموجودة في ذلك الحي بعد اخلائها.

١٩٦٣/١٠/٥

رئيس الوزراء
حسين بن ناصر

Document 1: Decree No. (35) by Jordanian Premier Hussein Ben Nasser ordering the movement of the Palestinian refugees from the Old City of Jerusalem to a new location in Shu'fat (October 5, 1963). Source: Maps Department –Orient House.



امانة القدس

رقم الملف ٣/٢/٧٢/٢/١٦/٨

القدس في ١٩٦٦/٧/٢٠

هام ومستعجل

معالي محافظ القدس المحترم

بعد ان تم نقل اللاجئين من داخل المدينة الى مخيم شعفاط ، اصبح امر العناية بامر الابنية المتداعية والمهدومة ، ملحا وهاما جدا بالنسبة للتنظيم والصحة العامة .

ان امر الدفاع الذي صدر بخصوص هذا المخيم يقضي بان تتولى امانة القدس ، هدم الابنية الخربة منه ، وان القيام باي اجراء من هذا القبيل يتطلب اجراء كشف هندسي لتحديد الابنية التي يتوجب هدمها ، ومعرفة اصحابها ، ورصد المبالغ لعملية الهدم .

ولما كان الهدم ، هو اول خطوة في سبيل تعمير هذا الحي الذي يشكل مساحة ليست بالقليلة من داخل السور ومعظم املاكه عربية ، لذلك يتوجب علينا المساعدة في صيانة هذه الاملاك ، امتلاكها لاصحابها العرب .

وكخطوة تمهيدية لتحقيق هذا الهدف ، اقترح تشكيل لجنة لوضع تقرير عن الاملاك العربية واليهودية في هذا الحي ، يتضمن وصفا كاملا لما يحتاجه كل منها من هدم واعادة تعمير او صيانة ، واسم كل مالك ، وتقدير التكاليف في كل حالة . وارى ان تتألف اللجنة من السادة :-

١ - عمر ابو حوى — عضو الامانة
٢ - المهندس ساميه الحنبلي — مساعد مهندس المدينة
٣ - موسى القطب — مساعد محاسب الامانة المختص بضرائب الاملاك

ومتى توفرت لنا هذه الدراسة ، نسعى لتوفير قرض بمجموع المبلغ المطلوب ، ونقوم بعدها بالخطوات التالية :-

١ - نستأجر الاملاك من اصحابها العرب لآجال طويلة ، ونقوم نحن بالتعمير المطلوب لها ، على اساس منحنا حق الاستفادة من اجارة تأجيرها للمدة .

٢ - اذا رغب احد الملاك العرب القيام بالتعمير لحسابه ، نسهل له قرضا مناسبا ، بعد اخذ الضمان الكافي لاستعادة قيمة القرض على آجال طويلة وبفائدة معقولة .

٣ - الاملاك العائدة لليهود ، يقوم بتعميرها حارس املاك العدو .



امانة القدس

رقم الملف

القدس في

- ٢ -

هذا الحي امانة في اعناقنا جميعا ، واني لكبير الامل في ان معاليكم ستوصون بحرارة ، ان تعمير [ام]ره ، على المستوى الذي يستحقه ، من النواحي التنظيمية والصحية والاثرية والاسكانية واخيرا القومية .

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام

(روحي الخطيب)
امين القدس

ر م خ / ع ن

Document 2: Letter from Jerusalem Mayor Rauhi Khatib to Jerusalem Governor Anwar Khatib, urging for the importance to help facilitate the process of the demolition of the battered houses in the Old City after the refugees were evacuated from them (July 20, 1966). Source: Maps Department –Orient House.



القدس

القدس في ٤/ ٣/ ١٩٦٧

معالي محافظ القدس المحترم

اشير الى نسخة كتاب معالي وزير الانشاء والتعمير رقم ١١/ ٥١/ ٤٧٣ المؤرخة في ٢٤/ ٢/ ٦٧ والمرسل اصلها لمعاليكم ، حول موضوع البيوت التي اخليت في مخيم المعسكر داخل سور مدينة القدس ، وافيد ان تنفيذ امر الدفاع بالنسبة لهدم الابنية المتداعية او اصلاح الممكن منها ، كان مدار مراسلات بين معاليكم والامانة ، وانتهت بموافقة معاليكم على تشكيل لجنة لدراسة اوضاع هذه البيوت ، وقد رفعت لمعاليكم نسخا عن تقرير هذه اللجنة ضمن كتابي رقم ب/ب/ ٣١/ ١/ ١/ ١ المؤرخ ١٦/ ١/ ١٩٦٧ ، طالبت فيه مساعدة الامانة بالحصول على قرض بمبلغ مايتي الف دينار اردني للقيام بالتعميرات اللازمة للابنية الخربة في هذا الحي .

ان الموضوع ، يشكل مشروعا حيويا بالنسبة للقدس ، واذا لم يكن بالاستطاعة الحصول على القرض المطلوب ، فارجو التوصية بشدة على تبني الدولة لهذا المشروع ، اسوة بالمشاريع العامة التي ترعاها ، وتفضلوا معاليكم بقبول فائق الاحترام .

(روحي الخطيب)
امين القدس

نسخة الى معالي وزير الانشاء والتعمير المحترم
نسخة الى سعادة مساعد وكيل وزارة الانشاء والتعمير المحترم
القدس

Document 3: Letter of Jerusalem Mayor Rauhi Khatib urging Jerusalem Governor Anwar Khatib to provide the required funding for the Old City Project (March 4, 1967). Source: Maps Department –Orient House.



Document 4: Parts of a manuscript diary by Hussein Fakhri Khalidi, Director of Al Aqsa Mosque and Supreme Guardian of Holy Places in Jerusalem during the Jordanian rule in Palestine, recorded in the Khalidi Library.

Appendix II: List of Interviewees

Interview (1): Um Mahmoud (nickname), 55, January 5, 2017.
Interview (2): Nidal (nickname), 52, January 10, 2017.
Interview (3): Abu Mansour (nickname), 57, a construction developer in the Shu'fat Refugee Camp, (February 15, 2017).
Interview (4): Mr. Yousef (nickname), 55, member of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp, at the committee headquarters (June 30, 2018).
Interview (5): Mr. Sa'eed, (nickname), a refugee restaurant owner on 'Anata Road, at his restaurant, (July 12, 2018).
Interview (6): Mr. Ayyoub (nickname), one of the displaced Jerusalemites, who ended up living in Shu'fat refugee camp and is now owner of a grocery shop on 'Anata Road, (July 14, 2018).
Interview (7): Mr. Rashid (nickname), one of the owners of a concrete factory in 'Anata, providing concrete for the construction in Shu'fat camp, (Sep. 9, 2018.)
Interview (8): Um Ayman (nickname), 61, originally from Jaffa (Oct. 25, 2018).
Interview (9): Mrs. Manal (nickname), 38, at gym center – Shu'fat Camp (Oct. 28, 2018.)
Interview (10): Um 'Omar (nickname), 62, originally from Hebron, Women's Center, (Nov. 8, 2018).
Interview (11): Um Anas (nickname), 65, originally from Beit Jibrin destroyed village, at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp (Nov. 8, 2018).
Interview (12): Mrs. Amina (nickname), 30, originally from Hebron, Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp (Dec. 9, 2018).
Interview (13): Abu Hiba (nickname), 57, West Banker from Hebron married to Jerusalemite refugee in the camp, Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp (Dec. 9, 2018).
Interview (14): Um Ashraf (nickname), 65, originally from Lydda at her home in Shu'fat camp, (Dec. 9, 2018).
Interview (15): Abu Firas (nickname), 83, originally from Qatamun, west of Jerusalem, at his home in Ras Khamis-Shu'fat camp, (Dec. 23, 2018).
Interview (16): Ms. Samira (nickname), 28, project coordinator at the Women's Center-Shu'fat Camp (Dec. 26, 2018).
Interview (17): Um 'Umran (nickname), 84, originally from the destroyed Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, at her home in Ras Khamis-Shu'fat camp (Dec. 26, 2018).
Interview (18): Mrs. Iman (nickname), 52, originally from Qatanna village, northwest of Jerusalem, at her apartment in Ras Khamis (Dec. 29, 2018).
Interview (19): Um Khalil (nickname), 87, originally from 'Imwas destroyed village, at her home in Shu'fat Refugee Camp (Jan. 3, 2019).
Interview (20): Um Jihad (nickname), 85, originally from Hebron City, at her home in Shu'fat Refugee Camp (Jan. 31, 2019).
Interview (21): Um 'Izzat (nickname), 81, from Jerusalem, at her home in the Old City of Jerusalem (February 6, 2019).
Interview (22): Miss Hanan, 30, originally from Beit Thul village, at her beauty salon (February 12, 2019).
Interview (23): Mr. Ibrahim, (nickname), 56, owner of a shop, selling shoes on 'Anata Road, Shu'fat Refugee Camp, (February 17, 2019).

Interview (24): Mr. K. T., head of Maps Department in the Arab Studies Society – Orient House, at his office in Daheyat el-Barid on February 24, 2019.
Interview (25): Mr. Sami (nickname), an official at the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry, at his office in Ar-Ram (March 25, 2019.)
Interview (26): Fathi Othman Mahsiri (Abu Taj), UNRWA Director in Shu'fat Camp, at UNRWA offices in Shu'fat Camp (March 27, 2019).
Interview (27): Mr. Mousa (nickname), 67, originally from Malha, at the Child center in Shu'fat Refugee Camp (March 27, 2019).
Interview (28): Mr. M. S., 57, Head of Popular Committee of Shu'fat Camp, originally from Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, at committee headquarters in Shu'fat refugee camp (March 27, 2019).
Interview (29): Dr. Nazmi Jubeh of Birzeit University (June 20, 2019).
Interview (30): Sheikh Salem (nickname), 58, originally from Beit Thul village, west of Jerusalem, Head of the Youth Social Club and a construction developer, at the Youth Social Club in Shu'fat Refugee Camp (June 25, 2019).
Interview (31): Abu Mujahed (nickname), 63, refugee, originally from Beit Thul destroyed village in western Jerusalem, interviewed on phone (July 10, 2019).
Interview (32): Mr. Ayman, (nickname), 28, a Jerusalemite returnee, at his home in ʻAnata Road on January 17, 2019.
Interview (33): An anonymous lawyer from Jerusalem. (July 24, 2019).
Interview (34): Mr. Zuheir (nickname), refugee, originally from Beit Thul village in western Jerusalem. He was interviewed on phone on February 9, 2020.
Interview (35): Mr. Ahmed (nickname), 54, one of the First *Intifada* activists from ʻAnata village, northeast of Jerusalem. He was interviewed on phone on April 12, 2020.
Interview (36): Mr. Maher (nickname), 56, one of the owners of a concrete factory in ʻAnata, providing concrete for the construction in Shu'fat camp, interviewed on phone (April 16, 2020.)
Interview (37): Mrs. Muna (nickname), 55, the sister of Shu'fat Camp martyr at her place of work on September 22, 2020.
Interview (38): Abu el-ʻAbed (nickname), 58, from the Abu Khdeir family in Shu'fat and one of those *Shu'fatis*, who sold land in Ras Shehada to the camp refugees in 2003, interviewed on the phone with on October 5, 2020.
Interview (39): Mr. ʻImad Abu Khdeir, 63, an architect, living in Shu'fat. Interviewed with the help of supervisor Dr. Helga Baumgarten of Birzeit University. He was sent written interview questions. His answers to the questions were received on October 29, 2020.

Appendix III: Interview Questions

Refugees: **(life stories)**[233]

- Where are you originally from?
- How was your childhood in your village/town of origin before the *Nakba*?
- How did you leave your village/town during the *Nakba*? How old were you? How did it happen?
- Where did you settle first? How did you arrive in the Old City of Jerusalem? How was life there?
- How did you move to Shu'fat? Who ordered your mobility? Did anyone use force against you?
- What did you do to gain living? How did your life change by time?

Construction developers

- Where are you originally from?
- What was your original work before construction? Why did you turn to the construction sector and when? Do you do anything else besides construction?
- How did you acquire the land? How much did you pay for it? What are the legal procedures of the land purchase? How was the payment method? Down payment? Monthly installments? Checks or cash?
- Was it easy for you to develop the land? Has Israel ever interfered in the construction process? Did you receive any notifications of demolition or halt of work?
- How did you advertise for selling the apartments? How much do you sell an apartment? What are the legal procedures of the sale of the apartments?
- How was the payment method? Down payment? Monthly installments? Checks or cash?

Jerusalemite newcomers

- Where are you originally from?
- How many members is your family?
- How long have you been living in Shu'fat?
- Where were you living before?
- Why Shu'fat camp?
- How many storeys is the building you are living in? Which storey is your apartment? What size is it? Describe your apartment and the environment around it!
- How did you reach the construction developer? How was the purchase process? What are the legal procedures of the sale of the apartments?
- How much did you pay for the apartment? How was the payment method? Down payment? Monthly installments? Checks or cash?

[233] The questions on the *Nakba* were directed only to the refugees of the first generation.

Shu'fati landowners

- What is the legal status of the land of Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada hills? Is the land registered in *Tabo*?
- Have the Israeli authorities ever issued an order of confiscation against this land?
- Is the land an ownership of Abu Khdeir family only, or there are other Shu'fati families, who have rights in it? Who are these families? How was the land divided? Is it common land for the extended family or there were individual properties?
- Historically, were owners of the land cultivating it as a source of living? When did they stop and why?
- Why didn't they use it for construction after they stopped farming it and left it empty?
- Can you tell the story of land sale to the Shu'fat refugees in the year 2000? How did you contact them? Has any of them tried to squat the land illegally? How the land owners reacted?
- Have all the *Shu'fati* families sold their land in Ras Khamis and Ras Shehada? Who sold exactly? Why they agreed/decided to sell?
- What is the legal status of the land sale process, especially as the land is mostly *Musha'* land and its division is not clear?
- What were the prices of land that time (2000), and how have the prices changed by time?
- Do you have any information regarding the Shu'fat land that was rented to UNRWA in the sixties (current location of Shu'fat Camp)? What were the terms of the lease agreement? Was the duration open or defined by a number of years? How much was the annual rental? Did the Jordanian government that time exert any pressures on the *Shu'fati* people to rent their land to UNRWA?

UNRWA Director

- What are the reasons for the closure of Mu'askar Camp in the Old City in the mid-sixties? Why it was called Mu'askar?
- When did UNRWA start moving the refugees from Mu'askar to Shu'fat? How many refugees were moved from the Old City? What are their origins?
- Is it true that non-refugees were also moved along with the refugees from Mu'askar to Shu'fat? Why? When did these poor non-refugees receive UNRWA cards?
- What was UNRWA's means in moving the refugees? How were they convinced to move? Did UNRWA use any kind of force?
- A kind of real estate market appeared in Shu'fat camp as of the seventies and the refugees were renting and selling UNRWA houses. Did UNRWA interfere or take any action against the refugees, who rented or sold their UNRWA houses?
- The Shu'fat refugees also started renovating and expanding their houses horizontally and vertically as of the seventies. Did UNRWA interfere in that whether supporting or opposing? Did UNRWA ever take any action against those refugees that constructed more than two floors or fined them?
- What role does UNRWA have as with regard to meeting the refugees' need for space and expansion? Does it have any plans to cover the housing needs of the new couples or accommodate the natural increase of the refugees?
- Has Israel ever interfered in the work of UNRWA in Shu'fat? How do you view the latest Israeli threats to oust UNRWA from Jerusalem?

Head of Popular Committee

- May you tell us about the history of the establishment of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp? How many members? What is the criterion for choosing or electing the committee members? What are their affiliates? When was the first such committee established in Shu'fat Camp?
- What is the role of the Popular Committee in Shu'fat Camp?
- Is there any cooperation or coordination with UNRWA?
- How do you view the construction development in the camp?
- What intervention does the committee have in this development?
- Did the committee members face any Israeli intervention to prevent their activities?
- What do you expect will be the future of the committee if the Jerusalem municipality assumes responsibilities in the camp as it threatens?

Head of Youth Social Center

- May you tell us about the establishment of the Youth Center in Shu'fat Camp? How was the beginning?
- What are the activities of the center? How it serves the camp refugees?
- Has Israel ever interfered in the activities of the center?
- As with regard to the latest Israeli notification of the halt of the new construction of the center, what are you planning to do? Will UNRWA interfere in the issue?
- What do you expect will be the future of the center if the Jerusalem municipality assumes responsibilities in the camp as it threatens?

Project coordinator at the Women's Center

- May you tell us about the establishment of the Women's Center in Shu'fat Camp? How was the beginning? What is the criterion for choosing or electing the administrative commission?
- What are the activities of the Women's Center? How does it serve the camp women? What type of women take part in the center's activities? Can you estimate how many women benefitted from your activities and services?
- Do you receive financial returns for your services?
- Is there any cooperation or coordination with UNRWA?
- Did the committee members face any Israeli intervention to prevent the activities of the center?
- What do you expect will be the future of the center if the Jerusalem municipality assumes responsibilities in the camp as it threatens?

Appendix IV: Survey of refugees of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp based on place of origin - 2008[234]

Place of origin of refugees of the Shu'fat Refugee Camp / May 2008				
No.	**Area**	**District**	**Place of origin**	**No. of refugees**
1	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Jerusalem – New City	2438
2	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Beit Thul	1447
3	Lydda	Ramleh	Lydda	1178
4	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	893
5	Lydda	Ramleh	Bir Imma'in	416
6	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Malha	314
7	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Jerusalem – Old City	281
8	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Walajeh	270
9	Jerusalem	Hebron	Barqusia	204
10	Lydda	Jaffa	Jaffa	203
11	Lydda	Ramleh	Deir Ayyoub	203
12	Jerusalem	Hebron	Beit Natif	189
13	Jerusalem	Hebron	Dawaymeh	165
14	Lydda	Jaffa	Al-'Abbaseya	160
15	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Qatanna	141
16	Lydda	Ramleh	Iqbab	139
17	Lydda	Ramleh	Ramleh	134
18	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Lifta	130
19	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Qalunia	124
20	Jerusalem	Hebron	Dura	102
21	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Nataf	100
22	Jerusalem	Hebron	Tel Safi	96
23	Jerusalem	Hebron	Khirbet Beit Awwa	93
24	Jerusalem	Hebron	Beit Jibrin	92
25	Jerusalem	Hebron	Khirbet Ilweibda	91
26	Lydda	Ramleh	Jemzo	88
27	Gaza	Bir Sabaa	Bir Saba'	78
28	Haifa	Haifa	Haifa	76
29	Lydda	Ramleh	Abu Shusha	70
30	Lydda	Ramleh	Beit Shana	64
31	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Abu Ghush	59
32	Lydda	Ramleh	Latrun	58
33	Lydda	Ramleh	Deir Tarif	57
34	Lydda	Ramleh	Yazur	54
35	Lydda	Ramleh	ʿAqer	54
36	Lydda	Ramleh	Tina	52
37	Gaza	Gaza	ʿIraq el-Mansheya	50
38	Lydda	Ramleh	Al-Bareya	47
39	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Qabou'	47
40	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Khirbat Limour	40
41	Galilee	Tiberias	Tiberias	38
42	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	ʿArab Ben ʿUbeid	36
43	Gaza	Gaza	Qastina	35
44	Lydda	Ramleh	Al-Burj	32

[234] The table and the chart following it are the author's translation of an Arabic table and chart that appear on the website of the Encyclopedia of Palestinian Camps, accessed on November 27, 2020 and are available at: http://palcamps.net/ar/camp/88. (Photocopies of the original table and chart in Arabic will follow.)

45	Jerusalem	Hebron	Beit Oula	32
46	Gaza	Gaza	Bureir	27
47	Gaza	Gaza	Al Falouja	26
48	Lydda	Ramleh	Yebna	24
49	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Rafat	22
50	Lydda	Jaffa	Yafa el-Mansheya	21
51	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Deir Rafat	19
52	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Saris	18
53	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Sar'a	17
54	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Beit Mahsir	17
55	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Deir Yassin	17
56	Lydda	Jaffa	Salama	13
57	Lydda	Jaffa	Fajja	12
58	Lydda	Ramleh	Brafilya	12
59	Lydda	Jaffa	Yafa Nuzha	12
60	Lydda	Jaffa	Jaffa – Old City	10
61	Lydda	Jaffa	Kufr 'Ana	10
62	Lydda	Ramleh	Khirbet Boweira	10
63	Lydda	Ramleh	Qazaza	9
64	Gaza	Gaza	Al-Majdal	9
65	Gaza	Gaza	Al-Masmeya al-Kabira	7
66	Lydda	Ramleh	Beit Nabala	7
67	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Beit Sourik	7
68	Jerusalem	Hebron	Khirbet Um Shaqaf	4
69	Lydda	Jaffa	Yafa Jabalya	4
70	Lydda	Ramleh	Tira	2
71	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Ras Abu 'Ammar	2
72	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	Deir Aban	1
Total				**11009**



Place of origin

الواقع- السكاني- وا

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أصول اللاجئين في (مخيم شعفاط)/ أيار 2008م

الرقم	المنطقة	القضاء	البلدة المهجرة	العدد
1	القدس	القدس	القدس المدينة الجديدة	2438
2	القدس	القدس	بيت ثول	1447
3	اللد	الرملة	اللد	1178
4	القدس	القدس	القدس	893
5	اللد	الرملة	بير اماعين	416
6	القدس	القدس	المالحة	314
7	القدس	القدس	القدس المدينة القديمة	281
8	القدس	القدس	الولجة	270
9	القدس	الخليل	برقوسيا	204
10	اللد	يافا	يافا	203
11	اللد	الرملة	دير أيوب	203
12	القدس	الخليل	بيت نتيف	189
13	القدس	الخليل	الدوايمة	165
14	اللد	يافا	العباسية	160
15	القدس	القدس	قطنه	141
16	اللد	الرملة	القباب	139
17	اللد	الرملة	الرملة	134
18	القدس	القدس	لفتا	130
19	القدس	القدس	قالونيا	124
20	القدس	الخليل	دورا	102
21	القدس	القدس	نطاف	100
22	القدس	الخليل	تل الصافي	96
23	القدس	الخليل	خربة بيت عوا	93
24	القدس	الخليل	بيت جبرين	92
25	القدس	الخليل	خربة الوبيدا	91
26	اللد	الرملة	جمزو	88
27	غزة	بئر السبع	بئر السبع	78

الواقع- السكاني- والبنى

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الرقم	المنطقة	القضاء	القرية المهجرة	العدد
28	حيفا	حيفا	حيفا	76
29	اللد	الرملة	أبو شوشة	70
30	اللد	الرملة	بيت شنه	64
31	القدس	القدس	ابوغوش	59
32	اللد	الرملة	اللطرون	58
33	اللد	الرملة	دير طريف	57
34	اللد	الرملة	يازور	54
35	اللد	الرملة	عاقر	54
36	اللد	الرملة	النبة	52
37	غزة	غزة	عراق المنشية	50
38	اللد	الرملة	البريه	47
39	القدس	القدس	القبو	47
40	القدس	القدس	خربة العمور	40
41	الجليل	طبريا	طبريا	38
42	القدس	القدس	عرب ابن عبيد	36
43	غزة	غزة	قسطينة	35
44	اللد	الرملة	البرج	32
45	القدس	الخليل	بيت أولى	32
46	غزة	غزة	بُرير	27
47	غزة	غزة	الفالوجة	26
48	اللد	الرملة	بينه	24
49	القدس	القدس	رافات	22
50	اللد	يافا	يافا المنشية	21
51	القدس	القدس	دير رافات	19
52	القدس	القدس	ساريس	18
53	القدس	القدس	صرعة	17
54	القدس	القدس	بيت محسير	17
55	القدس	القدس	دير ياسين	17
56	اللد	يافا	سلمة	13
67	اللد	يافا	فجّة	12

58	اللد	الرملة	برفيلية	12
59	اللد	يافا	يافا النزهة	12
60	اللد	يافا	يافا المدينة القديمة	10
61	اللد	يافا	كفر عانة	10
62	اللد	الرملة	خربة البويرة	10
63	اللد	الرملة	قازازة	9
64	غزة	غزة	المجدل	9
65	غزة	غزة	المسمية الكبيرة	7
66	اللد	الرملة	بيت نبالا	7
67	القدس	القدس	بيت سوريك	7
68	القدس	الخليل	خربة أم الشقف	4
69	اللد	يافا	يافا حيالينا	4
70	اللد	الرملة	الطيرة	2
71	القدس	القدس	رأس أبو عمار	2
72	القدس	القدس	دير أيان	1
المجموع				11009